FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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JANUARY 1944

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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FREEDOM AND CONTROL

By Geoffrey Crowther

AT this stage of the last war, friend and foe alike knew the main general principles of the world order that would follow on an Allied victory. The world would be made up of self-determined, independent, sovereign states, linked together by a League of Nations founded on the principles of collective security, arbitration and disarmament. The normal pattern for a state would consist of a two-chamber legislature elected by universal suffrage, a responsible executive, an independent judiciary and guarantees of the civil liberties. Financial relationships between nations would be regulated by the gold standard, buttressed by central banks. Commercial policy would permit only moderate protective tariffs and would frown on such expedients as quotas, discriminations, dumping and official trading. Internally, every state would be dedicated to the principles of free individual enterprise, with a minimum of state interference or control.

It is beside the point that these principles were not completely applied and that some of them which were applied were unsuccessful. In 1918-19 that all lay in the future. The point is that, at the end of the last war, the world knew what an Allied victory would mean. The "triumph of democracy" then had a fairly detailed intellectual substance as well as an emotional content.

But who knows today what an Allied victory would mean? Of the four major Allies, two are democracies, but, apart from the general conviction that people should be allowed to settle their own affairs, how much of the formulae of democracy do the Americans and British regard as articles of export? To take a specific case, should we recommend the Germans to set up a replica of the Weimar Republic, or the French to restore the Third Republic — supposing that our advice were asked for in either case? And, if not, what do we recommend? Moreover, the

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other two major Allies do not, in their own affairs, practise anything that we should recognize as democracy. Some allege that the real preference of the western Allies is for legitimist, conservative, monarchist governments in Europe. One may think that it is not so. But can anyone of us say, of full knowledge, that it *is* not so? We want governments to be democratic, yes. But we want them to avoid the mistakes that were made in the name of democracy after the last war. And where does that leave us? Does anyone know?

The confusion is hardly less in the sphere of international organization. The League of Nations is still alive, and the many small nations of the world will not abandon without a very fierce struggle the doctrines of sovereign equality and equal sovereignty on which the League was founded, or the principles of arbitration (*i.e.*, willing submission to arbitration), collective security (*i.e.*, security by the consenting coöperation of all) and disarmament (*i.e.*, equalization of advantages and burdens) by which it hoped to secure peace. But there has been much talk of other conceptions. Much has been heard of the international police force. Some conceive it as a genuinely international body, responsible to a world agency, to which, consequently, the essential attributes of sovereignty would have to be ceded. Others conceive it more in the light of a continuance into the peace of the concept of the present major allies. This latter has become almost a majority concept; and even most of those who criticize the idea of an Anglo-American alliance (should anyone propose it, which no one in authority has done thus far) are usually content if it is enlarged to cover only four of the nations of the world. Does anyone know whether the system to be created will be a "Great Power system" or a generally collective one? If a compromise, will it lean more one way or the other? And do we believe in disarmament, for ourselves, in the practically foreseeable future?

Our economic principles are equally indefinite. Do we still believe in free individual enterprise as the basis of economic activity? Many Americans — probably the majority — say they do, though the vehemence and frequency with which they say it seem to suggest the existence of a doubt. (It was not necessary to make any such profession of faith in 1919.) Most Englishmen have very serious doubts whether private enterprise can any longer be regarded as the sole, or even as the principal, determinant of economic activity. And the Russians have no doubt at

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all that it cannot. In this supremely important aspect of human society, what would an Allied victory mean? Do we believe in the gold standard? In the old sense, clearly not (for the minority of the faithful is very small). But do we believe in the possibility of universal currency standards in any sense? It is the question that has underlain the recent international discussions, and no answer that is given can be more than experimental. Do we believe in a return to a commercial régime of moderate tariffs only, with the abolition of all the other obnoxious obstructions to world trade that have grown up in the last generation? The American and British Governments share some hopes, but not much confidence. The Russians have not been heard from. And if we do not believe that the international economy of which free trade and the gold standard were the chief symbols can, or should, be re-created, what do we believe in to take its place?

II

This is a formidable list of questions, and if there is any one of my readers who can answer any one of them — answer it, that is to say, not for himself alone, but as expressing the dominant view of the United Nations, or even of the two democratic Great Powers — then he is a far bolder man than I am. It has often been pointed out that there has been nothing in the present war to compare with Woodrow Wilson's magnificent series of definitive and expository speeches in the latter phase of the first World War. The Atlantic Charter was very vague, and subsequent pronouncements have been even less precise. But this is a very small part of the story. It was easy for President Wilson to make his speeches because he knew what to say and he knew that it would command general agreement. He knew this because the western democratic world knew in 1918 what it was after. Last time, we knew what our ideas were. We were putting the finishing touches to a triumphant program. The war of 1914–18 was to be the means of plucking good out of evil, an opportunity to finish off the job on which the western democracies had been engaged for more than a century. The Armistice and the peace were to register the final victory of everything in which the nineteenth century liberal believed. Wilson and everybody else knew what the ideas were because a hundred years had been spent in working them out.

Now nobody knows for sure. We have not yet made up our collective mind (and not many people have made up their indi-

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vidual minds over the whole range) whether there is life in the old dogmas yet, or whether our problems are so different that they cannot be handled by the former body of doctrine, however amended. Is the twentieth century an extension of the nineteenth century, or something different? We do not know, and it is very foolish to cavil at Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill because they have not taken an afternoon off to tell us. They do not know either. The western democratic world is perilously close to a vacuum of faith.

It is the thesis of E. C. Carr's influential book, "Conditions of Peace," that the dominant ideas of the nineteenth century are dead — or at least that they no longer have sufficient validity to serve as our guiding lights. He defines these dominant ideas as being, in domestic politics, representative democracy; in economics, free individual enterprise; and in international affairs, the sovereignty of self-determined nations. For myself, I would not admit that either representative democracy or free capitalism was dead. But even in our domestic affairs, it seems to me to be very difficult to affirm that they are still the sole or the dominant principles. And as articles for export they are even more doubtful, while between nations it has become clear that national sovereignty, so far from being the only valid principle, is the only certainly disastrous principle. In general, though I would differ from Mr. Carr in matters of degree, I find it impossible to refute the substance of his charge. The twentieth century is *not* simply an extension of the nineteenth. The problems of the postwar world will not be those of the nineteenth century. In many respects they will be directly opposite (*e.g.*, the pressure to create maximum employment rather than maximum income, the need to curb the freedom of nation-states rather than to create them), and in every case they will be different.

Moreover, the people who will face them will be different. Hitherto, the world has been run by men and women who were born in the nineteenth century. Only one man born in the twentieth century has yet sat in an American or British Cabinet. The Russians and Chinese leaders are nineteenth-century-born. So are the chief Nazis. It happens that the children of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are divided by much more than the accident of a numeral. The eldest child of the twentieth century—a man who was born on January 1, 1901 — was within a few weeks of the draft age when the last war came to an end. He stands just on this side of that great dividing line — a border-

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line of much greater psychological importance than any that will be created by this war, for all but the very youngest of those who fought in the last war had been brought up to a world of security. They had come to accept a set of absolutes which crumbled in front of their eyes, while the children of the twentieth century have never known what a secure world is. In Britain, though not in America, there is also the great chasm of the "missing generation" dividing the children of the twentieth century from their fathers.

This is not the only accident of history that sets them off. The great technical inventions of the nineteenth century were industrial processes, which the individual rarely saw; they were ways of producing familiar objects in greater numbers and at lower cost, ways of providing for the poor what had formerly been the prerogative of the rich. They extended the spread of comfortable living, but they did not greatly change its content. Round about the turn of the century, however, technical progress began to have a direct impact on social customs and modes of thought. The men and women born in the twentieth century are the first generation to have been familiar, for the whole of their lives, with such revolutionary molders of thought and custom as air travel, individual transport on land by means of the automobile, the moving picture, the radio. They have been influenced by the decline in formal religion. They are the first generation in which it has been more than an impiety to think that the human race could or should control its numbers. In America, they are the first generation in which high-school education has been universal and college education general. In England, the creation of a complete educational ladder from bottom to top dates from 1902.

The historians of the future will have to judge whether these changes were, on balance, for good or evil. My present point is that they make for a greater cleavage of instincts and of instinctive ideas between old and young than has perhaps ever before existed. And just when this strange new generation would in any case be beginning to push its way into the driving seat, there comes the vast catastrophe of the present war to accentuate still further the difference between its environment and that of its fathers. In view of all these facts, I do not believe it is an exaggeration to say that we stand at one of the grand climacterics of world history. If there is any carry-over of dominant principles from the former age to the latter, it will be a matter for marvelling.

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My quarrel with Mr. Carr is not, then, that I wish to refute his main thesis but that I do not like being left where he leaves me. The dominant doctrines of the nineteenth century, if not dead, are so battered that they will not serve us any longer as our main props. We are, indeed, living in a vacuum of faith. But the trouble about a vacuum is that it gets filled, and if there are no angels available to fill it, fools — or worse — rush in. Let us, then, take Mr. Carr's threefold division of politics, economics and international relations, and consider in each case the alternatives to the old principles which he condemns. What are, not merely the theoretical alternatives, but the actual enemies that have been pushing them off their thrones?

The trend away from liberal democracy has been a trend towards totalitarian dictatorship. The trend away from individualist capitalism has been a trend toward rigid state control exercised in the interest of a war economy — or at least of a war-minded economy. The trend away from the sovereignty of the nation-state has been a trend towards the concentration of aggressive strength in the hands of a few Great Powers. These are not, of course, the only conceivable alternatives; but they are the alternatives that the pressure of the age has been forcing upon us.

That pressure, it will be objected, is about to be lifted by a victory for the United Nations. I am not so certain. I have the suspicion that the Nazi alternatives, diabolical though they are, have far too much of the logic of events in them to be brushed aside by the military defeat of Hitler. If we are realistic, we shall recognize, even though it increases the difficulty of our task, that there is a great deal in the circumstances of our century that leads straight to Fascism. The enormous development in the technique of propaganda and advertising, in the power to sway the minds of people in the mass, plays straight into the hands of the would-be dictator or any other manipulator who, for large ends or small, seeks to muddy the waters of democracy. The growth of large-scale industry, the need for gigantic aggregations of capital, the implications of a maximum employment policy — all these create the danger of a concentration of economic power. The technique of modern war, with its emphasis on the possession of certain complicated weapons which only a handful of highly industrialized states can produce, makes the small nations, or even the league of small nations, quite helpless, and compels the Great Powers to devote quite unprecedented proportions of their resources to the barren purposes of war. We cannot abolish these

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things, we cannot dodge them. We cannot cancel the invention of the radio and aircraft or unlearn the technique of mass production. But if we accept their existence, we must also accept their consequences. Propaganda *plus* the concentration of economic power *plus* Blitzkrieg technique add up to Fascism; or they may be made to add up to something new that will be compatible with democratic ideals. But whatever else they add up to, they certainly do not add up to the sort of democracy that our fathers thought of. The plain truth is that Hitler has an answer to the problems of the twentieth century and we, as yet, have not. It follows that whatever happens in the present war, Hitler will be hot on our heels for the rest of our lives. We shall have to think very fast, and run very fast, to keep ahead of him. One slip, one stumble, and he will be on our necks.

The central dilemma of the present age is that we can no longer rely on the old principles alone, but that we abominate the alternatives that time and tide, if it is left to them, will produce. This dilemma can be solved in only one way, by the birth of a new faith, adjusted in its instrumentalities to the needs of the new century, but preserving the ultimate objectives of the old. The only way to avoid the murder of nineteenth-century Liberalism by twentieth-century Fascism is through the birth of a twentieth-century democratic faith by the new out of the old. The biological analogy with the conflict of the sexes is exact. If one kills the other, no continuing life is possible. This is what would happen if the crude, raw impact of changed conditions were merely to remove the tried doctrines of an earlier age. Nor is the future to be secured by some hermaphroditic compromise, in which the two elements are so much in conflict that the result is, as Disraeli said of the mule, "without pride of ancestry or hope of posterity." No, the only solution is to take what is strong and good and lasting in the new ideas, to mate it with the old and to conceive something that has elements of both, but has its own life, is new, harmonious, growing, integral. What we need is not a compromise between the old ideas and the new, but a fusion; not a mixture but an amalgam. The nineteenth century, before it dies, must take what is virile in the hostile movements and give birth to something new. Only then can it die in peace.

III

To state the need for such a new democratic faith is one thing. To meet it is another. The task of developing the thesis here

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presented in every sphere of public policy, political and economic, domestic and international, is probably beyond the power of a single pen; and certainly far beyond the reach of a single article. It may, however, be permissible to proceed a little way further in one particular direction, that of economic organization. What I have to say is chiefly directed to the internal economic problems of nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom — though it is, of course, impossible to treat of these problems in isolation from their international implications.

The air is full at present of wordy warfare on the relative merits of unhampered private enterprise and of government planning of economic developments. Both are being argued in extreme and absolute terms — that is, as principles capable of being applied universally and in unadulterated form. Possibly the protagonists have reservations and modifications in mind, but, if so, they escape but rarely into print or speech. Not often does an advocate of private enterprise make the admission that there are certain economic problems (and among the largest) which must either be tackled by the organizing powers of the government or else left untackled. Still less frequently does an advocate of "planning" pause to concede that over a vast range of industries and occupations either the mainspring of activity will (in any easily foreseeable future) remain that of individual enterprise and ambition or there will be no mainspring at all. No, the argument proceeds in absolutes: the free enterprise party has no use for "bureaucracy" anywhere at any time; and the planners will not admit that a businessman, by serving the interest of his own profit, can ever serve the general interest.

It is, of course, a sham fight. I do not mean that the contestants are not sincere; many of them doubtless (and unhappily) are passionately sincere. It is a sham fight because there is not the slightest chance of either side winning its fight. In the circumstances of the twentieth century, there is no prospect whatever of an industrial democratic state basing its affairs on the principle of unrestricted individual enterprise to the exclusion, or even to the subordination, of other principles. Even less can an industrial democracy contemplate governmental "planning" of the bulk of its activities — at least it cannot do so and remain a democracy.

Perhaps it is worth while pausing for a moment to justify these dogmatic statements. The reasons why unrestricted private enterprise is insufficient by itself are perhaps clearer to a British observer than to an American. The United States, after all, is still

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in the period of rapid expansion. It is wholly reasonable to suppose that by the end of the present century the American national income may be at least double what it is now — that is to say, at least three times what it was in the late 1930s. And the frontiers of possible achievement are more distant still. The supreme necessity of the American economy remains that of expansion and there is an almost automatic source of demand for great masses of capital. The pioneer is no longer, perhaps, the American archetype — but he is still a socially necessary type, and it is, of course, in a pioneering environment that unregulated private enterprise shows to maximum advantage.

In Great Britain, on the other hand, the end of the rising national income is in sight, owing to the imminence of a stable and even a falling population. It is unlikely that the British national income will ever be more than 50 percent higher than it is now, and even that moderate increase requires optimistic assumptions on the trend both of population and of individual productivity. The peak will be reached in about a generation from now, and thereafter the national income will be preserved from falling only if the rise in individual productivity succeeds in outpacing the fall in total numbers. Clearly, this puts the pioneer and the builder at a discount and the administrator and allocator at a premium. Moreover, there are other problems, hardly more important but possibly more urgent. Britain needs her foreign purchases to live, and the war has knocked a series of holes in the credit side of what was at best a somewhat precarious balance. The task of the postwar years will be not merely to get back the prewar trade, but to find markets for something like a 50 percent increase in the prewar volume of exports. No one but a fanatic would believe uncoördinated private enterprise capable of outfacing these difficulties.

Thus there are reasons why there is less talk in Britain than in America of the sovereign virtues of unregulated individualism. But this does not mean, in my judgment, that there is the slightest possibility of a return to laissez-faire even in America. For one thing, I remain obstinately skeptical about the possibility of making any appreciable headway against the menace of recurrent depressions except by the road of government action. The present attempt, sponsored by the Committee for Economic Development, to demonstrate that a regular and adequate flow of savings into physical investment can be organized by business itself, is a gallant rearguard action. I wish it well, but my money is on the

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other horse. Secondly, I remain even more obstinately skeptical about the ability of a free-enterprise economy — that is, of an economy where the requirements of free enterprise have priority over other objectives — to bring about any substantial improvement in the unequal distribution of wealth and welfare. Yet if there are two things in the sphere of economic policy that the electorate is going to impose as categorical imperatives on its representatives, regardless of party, they are contained in the current expressions Full Employment and Social Security. Walter Bagehot, the great apostle of the free economy, wrote nearly eighty years ago that "the coöperative, if not the compulsory, agency of the state ought to be used far more than now in applying to our complicated society those results of science which are new to our age." He was thinking, in the main, of physical science. But his remark applies with even greater force to those results of social science (and of social experience) which are new to our age and which must be incorporated into our economy and policy without damaging delay. There are certain objects that society can attain — it has been demonstrated — by means of "the coöperative, if not the compulsory, agency of the state." The Russians have shown that it is possible to secure a very rapid increase in the national income; the Germans have shown that it is possible for a highly industrialized state to remove within a few years one of the largest masses of unemployment known to economic history. We may abominate the methods by which these achievements were secured. But we cannot pretend they do not exist. On the contrary, the electorate is going to insist on emulation of the results, if not on imitation of the methods. Employment of "the coöperative, if not the compulsory, agency of the state" is an inescapable consequence.

But if the wholly free economy is an impossibility, the wholly controlled economy is no less unacceptable. There are two main reasons for this. In the first place, experience seems to show — and common sense would confirm — that it is considerably less efficient in the production of wealth for consumption. The planned economy has had its triumphs. But none of them, I think, has been a triumph in supplying in large quantities at low prices consumption goods of the kinds and in the variety that people want. Yet that must remain one of the fundamental and co-equal objects of any democratic economy. There are examples of planned economics where the strength of the state has been increased, where the capital equipment of the community has

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been enriched, where mass unemployment has been avoided. I do not know of a wholly planned economy where the consumer has been satisfied. And, in the second place, a wholly planned economy is incompatible with any degree of political freedom. The possibility of a man's earning his own living in his own way, without let or hindrance, is the essential condition of there being any freedom of discussion, any freedom to oppose. If more than a fraction of the electorate come to depend for their livelihood upon the temporary masters of the mechanism of the state — that is, upon the politicians — then democracy is at an end.

It follows from this discussion that the economic system of the next few decades will inevitably have elements both of individual freedom of enterprise and also of purposive direction by the state. This conclusion, by now, is almost a commonplace. What is not so generally realized is that it matters most vitally how the two elements are combined. Neither can, it is true, remove the other; democratic society is not going to be either wholly planned or wholly unplanned. But each opposing principle can very effectively obstruct the other. A society which is based on an active coöperation of the two principles will be a vastly different place from a society based on a deadlock between them.

Deadlock is what the western democracies have been threatened with in the past thirty years. It is easy to see how the desire to plan economic development, the desire to make it follow motives more socially respectable than the incentive of profit, the desire to ensure security in an insecure world — it is easy to see how these desires have clogged and frustrated the free economy. Over far the greater part of the economy, the businessman is still left with the responsibility of initiating activity. He has to make up his mind whether an enterprise is worth the risks involved in it, and unless he gives the word to start the wheels turning, no one else will or can. But the risks of loss have been increased by the great load of prior charges that has been put upon him in the way of rigid wage-rates, wasteful labor practices, social security contributions and the like, while his incentive to take these risks has been dulled by heavy and differential taxation, and his arm has been jogged by all manner of inspectors, controls, regulations, inquisitions, prohibitions and indictments.

The impact on our economy of the idea of planning and of the motive of social welfare has hitherto been almost wholly negative. Few industries have been planned, but a vast number have been bedevilled by planning. In many cases, the approach has been

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more than negative, it has been punitive, and the entrepreneur has been abused and penalized precisely in proportion to his success in performing his duty of running economic activity at a profit. To date, we are certainly far more planned against than planning.

The other side of the medal is very similar. Wherever the state has tried, by the use of collective methods, to make headway against the problems that beset it, it has been held back by a hundred visible and invisible strings of timidity and orthodoxy. If it wishes to close the deflationary gap by deficit financing, it can do so only within the very narrow field that runs no risk of competing with private enterprise. And every step is taken to the accompaniment of charges ranging from corruption and dictatorship to red ruin.

IV

The result has been deadlock, and if we sometimes wonder why it is that our economy seems to have lost its elasticity, its power to respond to opportunity, if we complain that only in wartime are its potentialities realized, the reason is that we have been busy putting brakes on both the two possible springs of initiative. We make it difficult for the profit motive to work lest it should be anti-social in its effect, and we make it difficult for the social motive to work lest it be too wasteful.

In this struggle, neither side can win. It follows that the most urgent task for all economic statesmen is to work out means by which the two principles of organization can live side by side. If there is to be activity of any sort, there must be some incentive to activity. For a generation or more, we have been hard at work whittling down all incentives, and trying to work out a compromise between freedom and organization on the basis that we shall have as little as possible of either. That is wrong. The right course is to have as much as possible of both, to take the brakes off both the profit incentive and the social incentive.

This is not the place to discuss how this can be done. But the method clearly lies along the way of sorting out the economic activities of the community that are to be powered by each incentive. There are no absolute rules for determining where the line should be drawn, and no doubt it will be drawn in different places in different countries, and at different times in the same country. There are some activities that every country puts on the "organization" side of the line and makes no attempt to run on a

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profit-earning basis — justice, education and war-making, for example. There are others that every democracy will put on the "freedom" side — the press, entertainments and most luxury trades. Between these extremes, the people will draw the line as they choose and the location of the line is a fit and proper subject for party controversy. What is essential is that, on either side of the line, the dominant incentive should be left as free as possible to stimulate activity. Neither one can be quite exclusive: profit-minded enterprise cannot be allowed to be anti-social, nor can social-minded activity be undertaken without any regard to its economic cost. But in each sphere the interloping considerations should be adjusted to interfere as little as possible with the dominant incentive. The businessman, for example, cannot be relieved of taxation; but his taxes can be designed to interfere as little as possible with the earning of profits.

There will be those among the critics of this doctrine who will shake their heads and say that it cannot be done. They will quote Abraham Lincoln to the effect that a nation cannot live half slave and half free. If so, then the prospect is black indeed for all of us; because, for the reasons given above, it seems to me inconceivable that we shall ever be able to pin our faith on either of the alternatives. If they are so instinctively and inevitably antipathetic to each other that they cannot live in peace, side by side, then we must conclude that democracy is incapable of resolving the contradictions to which it gives rise and must surely perish. I take a more optimistic view. It is true that the opposing principles of economic freedom and of economic organization have, in fact, generated frictions which have perceptibly slowed down the progress of the democratic economy. But this is because they have been stupidly handled and the frictions would not arise if the object of all parties were to avoid them, instead of, as at present, to seek battle on all occasions. Both the British and the American democracies have, each in its own way, over the past 150 years resolved the very similar conflict between freedom and order in the political sphere. I see no overriding reason why the same success should not be achieved in the economic sphere, provided the same essential moderation is shown.

There are those also who hold that there is some inevitability of conflict in the international sphere between nations which draw the line between freedom and organization in different places. This seems to me to be even purer defeatism than the former objection. No state is wholly without compulsory organization in its

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economy and none is wholly without freedom. The differences are of degree, not of kind, and our affairs are in a sorry posture if differences of ideological degree are going to cause irreconcilable conflicts. The battle, it is said, will come on the management of international trade; a country that exercises conscious management of its trade relations will necessarily have an unfair advantage over one that does not, and thus controlled economics are inevitably aggressive. But if there is anything at all in this objection, the way to meet it is directly, by securing agreement on the definition of unfair practices and putting a ban on them, whether perpetrated by governments, by cartels or by individuals.

V

This economic argument, as has been said, is intended only as an illustration of the wider thesis that, if western democracy is to confront its twentieth-century problems with any hope of success, there is an urgent necessity for hard thinking on first principles. It is not enough either to demonstrate the inadequacy of the old liberalism or to expatiate on the abomination of the Fascist alternative. Both are destructive exercises, necessary as preliminaries perhaps, but contributing nothing to the positive task of construction. That task involves nothing less than the creation of a new faith, a newly articulated set of principles by which the imperishable objectives of a free humanity can be sought by techniques appropriate to this century. And the first step is to realize that it is not only the theses of the nineteenth century that are dead or dying, but the antitheses also.

I am not one of those who holds that a vacuum of faith will be much handicap to us in winning the war. War is fought mainly by material means, and though it would be an advantage to know what we are fighting for, it is enough to know what we are fighting against. It is after the fighting is over that the trouble will begin. For when material force is removed, it is only the force of ideas that can prevail. At present, in the realm of ideas, we are almost completely disarmed. Rearmament, with modern weapons, cannot begin too soon.

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SIGNALS FROM GERMANY

By Dorothy Thompson

NEWSPAPERS in dictator-countries serve several purposes. They disseminate such news as the authorities think wise to convey to the people. Their decision on this is bound to be influenced by certain factors. It obviously is necessary to convince the people that they are being informed, otherwise nobody would buy newspapers at all. It is necessary, also, to publish such news as is already widely known from other sources, such as the verbal reports of eyewitnesses. Facts which simply cannot be suppressed must be admitted by the most rigidly controlled press; for any press is effective only if it gives the *appearance* of candor. Even total despotism, so long as it rests upon a mass base, as all modern despotisms do, has to admit that you cannot fool all of the people all of the time. It can only hope to fool some of the people all of the time and all of the people some of the time.

The press in a dictatorship is also used as a vehicle for distributing the party propaganda and bolstering national morale. As propaganda organs, the newspapers are compelled to take account of unfavorable reactions to a particular policy and to offset such enemy propaganda as infiltrates into the country. This gives the editorials, feuilletons and other comments upon the news great interest, for they show what is causing the party leaders sufficient concern to demand counteraction.

They also serve a purpose which is not intentional. Even the most rigidly controlled press cannot fail to reveal a great deal about the civilization and state of public opinion prevailing in the places where it appears. From the beginning of the present war, then, I have made a special effort to follow the German press carefully. I believe that the pursuit has been rewarding.

The Nazi press is by no means uniform. There is a press for every class. The S.S. organ, *Schwarze Korps*, is designed for the most ardent Nazi élite. The party organ for the masses is the *Voelkischer Beobachter*, which is published simultaneously in several cities, has numerous daily editions, and is as consciously designed to appeal to the broadest masses of the people as is the Hearst or Patterson press in this country.

Das Reich is Dr. Goebbels's own party weekly, usually carrying an editorial signed by the propaganda minister in the two right-

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hand columns of the front page. This paper, which also circulates widely in the occupied countries, presents the party line in its most respectable and cultivated aspects. It is the *Voelkischer Beobachter* for those who cannot be moved by mass appeals, human interest stories, vulgarisms, and infinite repetitions reflecting the lessons which Hitler learned from the techniques of mass advertising. It plants its propaganda in a more cultivated bed, and nourishes it by more logical processes of reason.

For educated Germans of mature mind and memory there is a press which bears the outward marks of independence. It follows the party line closely, but wears its rue with a difference. Its object is to present Nazism as an integral development of German and European culture, to provide the news with apparent disinterestedness, to indulge, from time to time, in discreet but apparently candid criticism of wholly minor policies, and thus create the illusion that there is still a modicum of free speech in the Third Reich. To this group, among the Berlin newspapers, belong the *Boersenzeitung* and the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, and to it also belonged, until its demise on September 1, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, edited by a former liberal and distinguished Weimar Republic journalist, Dr. Rudolph Kircher. There is also a worker's press, represented by *Die Morgenpost* of Berlin.

A study of these various groups of papers, published for various classes and publics, reveals what line the party bosses think it necessary to take in order to have influence with the various strata of German society.

Much is revealed, not only by what is published, but by what is omitted. As far as possible, the German press works to give the appearance of openness. It is therefore interesting to notice what subjects are universally avoided. There are, for instance, ten to twelve million foreign workers in the Reich, but it is impossible from reading the German press to discover anything (except, occasionally, very indirectly) about their relations with other workers, their living conditions, the problems that may arise in connection with them.

Millions of Germans are scattered throughout Europe in the occupied countries, and presumably the conditions under which they are living and the problems they confront are of great interest to more millions of relatives. But although the German press carries many feature articles, the occupied countries are left very much alone, except for spot news, and pictures of purely cultural life. A search of the news columns and editorial pages also fails to

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reveal anything about domestic wages, budget problems or production figures in the Third Reich. Nor is there any publication of casualty lists or of editorial comment on them.

But the German press still publishes, as it always did in pre-Hitler times, privately inserted obituary notices. The obituary notices of war casualties carry the military-swastika insignia at the top. It is obvious that newspapers are restricted as to the number they may publish, for none carries more than half a page, and many carry much less. A study of these notices is nevertheless revealing.

Finally, the German press is still a vehicle for commercial transactions. Some inkling of what is suppressed in the news columns and editorial pages can be gleaned from the want ads and the ads of things for sale.

II

Bearing these circumstances in mind, I see by the German papers that the leaders of the Third Reich are profoundly concerned with rumors and that they are finding it desperately difficult to cope with them; that they find it necessary to conduct an unremitting campaign against the thesis that Germany, and specifically the Nazi régime, is guilty of the war; that they think the desire for peace can be offset effectively only by terrible pictures of Germany's fate as a people and as a nation in defeat; that they are so convinced of the fear in all classes of violent Bolshevism under Russian occupation that they do not feel the necessity of working up hate against Russia, but that they consider continual hate-mongering against the Anglo-American powers essential. I see further that bombings from the air require reiterated explanations that Germany was not guilty of starting this form of warfare; that all but the most reliable Nazis are impervious to the Master Race theory; that the slogan of *Lebensraum* is ineffective, and the "Defensive War for the Fatherland" highly effective; that draconian measures in the occupied countries must be justified as "temporary expediencies;" that the concept of the Unity of Europe is popular, while the concept of German domination must be played down; and that the Nazi Party itself is as strongly on the defensive among the German people as the Third Reich is on the defensive against the United Nations.

The slogans which are considered effective with the German people are revealed to be: "The war for the liberation of Europe against outsiders," "The punishment of the war criminals," "The

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war for survival," "The menace of Bolshevism" (the word "Communism" is never used), "The predatory plutocracy which seeks to destroy the German nation as a formidable peaceful rival," and "The war against the German people."

These slogans and ideas, in many variations, are bolstered by quotations from Anglo-American statesmen and spokesmen. In a single issue of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (August 29, 1943) the front page was given to a dispatch quoting, with great accuracy, Clarence Budington Kelland's speech before the Republican Committee on Foreign Affairs, in which he declared that the Pacific must be an American lake. Beside it was printed a précis of Kingsbury Smith's article in the *American Mercury* on "Our Government's Plan for a Defeated Italy." Inside was a review of Lord Vansittart's ideas on the sort of peace needed to keep Germany defeated.

These and many other quotations from Anglo-American sources are used to support the argument that Germany cannot expect after this war any peace comparable in mildness to the Treaty of Versailles; that the Anglo-American war is exclusively for loot and power over the whole globe; that defeat means the extinction of the German nation and the reduction of its population to slavery; and that, therefore, under whatever leadership, Germany must fight to the exhaustion of her enemies.

This argument was presented with an air of detachment by Rudolph Kircher in one of the last issues of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* (August 29, 1943). Kircher wrote:

> The original fight for our national rights has become, since many months, the fight for our mere existence. There may be different opinions about the juridical situation and about conflicting political claims, but whoever has to face the question of life and death need no longer indulge in intellectual arguments. He must merely decide whether he wishes to live or to die. And the fight for existence and national rights is essentially the same. . . . The menacing power is England, which decided to use the power of the Empire, the United States and the Soviet Union, to block the way for Germany, and to fight our nation to annihilation, knowing that our will to fight for our rights will never cease.

This argument, set forth by a former liberal in the paper that continued to attract former liberals, first disarms the reader by admitting, in a careful manner, the possibility of past mistakes. These are then described as no longer pertinent, for life itself is at stake. These points having been made, the writer proceeds to a study of war guilt, arguing that in the summer of 1939 a peaceful solution was still possible. "The English alone," he says, "did not

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want peace." He blames the British for playing the "game of the Bolsheviks" against their better interests and knowledge.

His argument is extremely interesting in that he blames the British — not Germany or Poland or the Soviet Union — for bringing Russia into the war: "It was the British who forced us to fight on an Anglo-Saxon and Bolshevist front." He attacks the version that the Allies are fighting to liberate Germany or Italy from Nazism or Fascism. "That," he says, "is a fairy tale. We can only be grateful to British politicians like Lord Vansittart for continually revealing the real truth." The writer concludes:

> Indeed, for the future of Germany the break into Sicily will not be decisive. Decisive will be the battle on the Eastern Front. The inner law of this enormous war cannot be changed by tricks. That law was created when England decided against reconciliation with Germany, and for war on the side of the Americans and Bolsheviks.

This argument contains practically the whole thesis which the German propagandists feel called on to present to German readers. Germany must be exculpated in the eyes of the German people of guilt for the war. They skilfully pass over the fact that Britain decided for war when Poland was her only eastern ally and that Russia at the time had a non-aggression pact with Germany. They of course ignore that Hitler himself agreed to Russia's penetration into Poland and supported her acquisition of eastern Finland and the Baltic states. Also ignored is the fact that it was Germany who prepared for "the defense of Europe" against Russia by first defeating and disarming all of Europe, including Poland. And forgotten (or rather not recalled) is the obvious historic fact that it was Germany, not Russia, who broke the Russo-German pact.

The article plays upon German admiration for Britain and German regret that she is an opponent, basing a peculiar hate against the British on the fact that they chose not to be brothers. "Und willst du nicht mein Bruder sein, so schlag ich dir den Schädel ein." It passes over Munich, tacitly revealing that Munich was immensely popular with the German people, as was the Russo-German pact and every other measure that seemed to promise peace.

Many other articles might be chosen, of course, to reveal how the Government is trying to answer the German people's questions about the charges of war guilt. For example, Dr. Goebbels, writing in *Das Reich* of September 6, attacks the problem in a

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more Nazi manner. Where Dr. Kircher registers grief at Allied stupidity Dr. Goebbels registers indignation:

> We may assume that the enemy statesmen and the secret powers who frivolously exploded this war on the Reich in the beginning of September 1939 did not foresee with any clarity the disastrous consequences of their fateful decision. It was their plan to knock down the Reich, for they observed in it the much too spontaneous hunger for life of the overpopulated young nations. They wished to prevent Germany from exploiting the forces given her by God. Therefore the war. The German people and leadership have no guilt. Our intentions and plans were exclusively in the domain of peace. Contrary to our enemies, we before this war had no internal difficulties from which we could escape only by war. The Reich was strong and solidly built, and consolidated in all directions. The German leadership had earned so much historic glory in the realm of peaceful construction that it needed to win no more by provoking war. But the contrary was true of our enemies.

Entirely passed over in this article is the fact that in September 1939 there was in England a government under Neville Chamberlain which was highly favorable to Germany, was anxious above all to avoid a war, had swallowed the conquest of Prague (which occurred while German and British industrialists were actually engaged in a conference in Stuttgart), and all but begged Hitler not to take a step in Poland which it could never persuade the British people to accept. The article indicates that the domestic development under Nazism is still popular with the German people. The "secret powers" (by whom is always meant the Jews) connived for war. No mention is made of the arrest at the very beginning of the Nazi régime of all German pacifists, Jewish or Aryan. There is a veiled reference to Germany's need for *Lebensraum*, immediately offset by the claim that Germany only needed to exploit peacefully her own "forces" — an ambiguous word — in order to become strong. The war thus is against German strength and unity, not against German expansion.

Dr. Goebbels, who is nobody's fool, here reveals clearly what is in the German mind. With peace and a reasonable diplomacy on the part of other countries we could have become great. We had no conceivable need of war. Our own resources and labor were sufficient. We had settled our internal difficulties. We had gotten rid of our "secret powers." So, argues Goebbels, picking up the content of the German mind at this point, since we had no necessity to explode externally, and since peace would serve us best at home, it is preposterous to assume that we precipitated the war. It was our enemies who undertook a preventive war against our growing national solidarity, which they envied and feared.

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It may be argued that the repetition of this theme song is another proof of German hypocrisy and that the German people as a whole join in the whitewashing perversion of events. It may equally be argued, and I think more reasonably, that it is essential for the Nazi leadership to answer serious doubts in the popular mind. If there were no doubts it would hardly be necessary to conduct so unremitting a campaign against them; nor would it be necessary if, in the minds even of Germans, aggressive war were not regarded as a crime. This is surely something new in German history. "Prussian militarism" never hesitated in the past to justify aggressive war for purposes of national power and expansion. But the Nazi leadership has felt compelled to present this war to the people as a defensive struggle in which Germany is the victim.

In the early stages of the war, when all campaigns were victorious, the Master Race theory and the *Lebensraum* necessity did play a rôle in the propaganda. Then the argument was that Eastern Europe is Germany's natural living space in which no European Powers have the right to interfere. The Czechs and Poles were inferior peoples whose integration into German civilization would eventually be to the advantage of all. Dr. Robert Ley, in Poland, made a speech brutally stating that Germans would remain forever masters and Poles forever inferiors, since such was the law of nature. The guilt of the British in those days was for interfering with something that was none of their business. But obviously this no longer goes down with the German public. Dr. Goebbels, in another article, admits that the Nazis are unpopular in Europe. "But," he adds, "war measures are no indication of the peace to come after a German victory." Germany, he argues, is now protecting Poles as well as all other European peoples and cultures against the Red Menace out of Asia. Germany is the servant and soldier of Europe, not its master. Germany never wanted war at all for purposes of expansion. It is the United Nations who are the expansionists.

If any comfort for the future can be derived from the apparent fact that Nazi leaders believe an Atlantic Charter for Europe is good propaganda with the German people we are entitled, on this evidence, to derive it.

III

The greatest efforts are made to convince the German people that they have never been guilty of using the Luftwaffe

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as the Allied air forces are now being used against Germany.

The sum of the argument, as it appears in numerous articles, is that the Luftwaffe was designed and used exclusively as a weapon to pave the way for, and to accompany, the German armies. The bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam are presented as military manoeuvres for accompanying land forces. That Rotterdam was bombed after a Dutch request for an armistice is not mentioned. A formidable literature has been compiled to prove that Britain started this form of warfare before the Germans, and a speech of Hitler's, made before the bombing of British towns began and warning that Germany would also indulge in this form of warfare if Britain did not stop, is often quoted. On the few occasions when mention is made of the bombings of London, Bristol, Coventry, Plymouth, etc., these are presented as reprisals for what the British had already done to Germany. The word "Coventrate" has been dropped from the German vocabulary. Previous Italian bombings in Ethiopia, and German and Italian bombings in the civil war in Spain, are passed over as apparently not belonging to, or pertinent to, this war, and of course no reference is made to the earliest use of this weapon in China by the "heroic and chivalrous" Axis ally, Japan. Clearly the Nazi leaders are making immense efforts to rid the German mind of any moral sense that payment is now being exacted in kind.

There no longer is any attempt — as there once was — to hide the devastating facts about the air warfare of the British and the Americans. It is impossible to do this, so a contrary line is taken. Heart-breaking and graphic eyewitness tales are printed of the sufferings of non-belligerents in Hamburg, Cologne and elsewhere. The Allied air forces are "torch murderers" and "air gangsters." At times comparisons are made between the Anglo-American war and the Russian, to the advantage of the Russians. "Our first enemies are the Bolsheviks, but they fight like real soldiers. They fight like men or like beasts, but they fight. But these westerners murder our wives and children in cold blood."

Occasionally one reads moving articles about the sufferings of the poor Russian people under their unconscionable dictatorship. We ourselves are in possession, from Polish and other underground sources, of terrible accounts of the treatment of Poles and Russians in the areas under the administration of Alfred Rosenberg; of how thousands of Russian workers have been sent on foot hundreds of miles to work at forced labor; of the appalling physical conditions and the terrorist tortures inflicted on the White

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Russian and Ukranian populations in the areas where the Gestapo is permitted unbridled license. But the German press carries touching tales of German tenderness to wretched peoples. Stories are printed of Russian civilians who beg the Germans to allow them to retreat with them. From some of these stories the Germans all appear to act in the East like Y.M.C.A. secretaries. The propaganda makes clear that the Nazis believe the German people prefer to think of themselves as liberators and ministers rather than as conquering master heroes. It would also seem that they feel the necessity of offsetting other sorts of stories that must be trickling home.

Through the editorials and feuilletons runs the line that Germany is even fighting for the British people against their misguided leaders:

> If we Germans were not fighting the Bolsheviks does anyone think that the British and Americans could ever defeat us? That is sufficient proof that there is only one wall of resistance against the Bolshevists — the German wall. Once that is broken, no one can stop the Bolshevik flood. The Anglo-Americans come with "agreements" reached with the Soviet Union. We do not believe, however, in scraps of paper, but only in power. Whatever illusions the Anglo-Americans may labor under, they are destroying the only possibility of keeping Russia within some bounds. Some smaller neutral Powers, Switzerland and Sweden, are also against us. [This is constantly admitted, as is German unpopularity in Europe as a whole.] How stupid of them! They live in a past age, longing for the happy time when they were not entangled in the tortures of Europe and blame us for the unrest which these tortures have produced. They do not see that the result of our defeat is inevitably their domination by Russia.[1]

The "pro-European" arguments of the German press today forget the time when Mussolini was hailing a trade treaty with Russia by saying that "the two great young Socialist nations now stand against the plutocrats;" when Goebbels, in the days of the Russian pact, was taking the same line; when Nazi boys were screaming, long before the war, "Siegreich werden wir Frankreich schlagen;" and Hitler was proclaiming, long before the war, that France was Germany's "eternal enemy." Germany has now become the lover and protector of all the nations of Europe. If she punishes them, it is only for their good, and it hurts her more than it does them.

IV

In contrast with earlier days, when the Weimar Republic

[1] Condensed from an article, "Darauf fallen wir nicht rein," *Schwarze Korps*, August 26, 1943.

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was continually presented to the people as the "fourteen years of chaos and shame," today's press seldom refers to the Weimar Republic with contempt. It is clear that all the misery of the days of democracy is nothing compared to the misery of today and everything is done to promote the concept of unbroken and legitimate continuity. The Kaiser's Reich is painted as civilized and liberal, and the last war becomes proof that Europe and Russia were determined not to let even such a Germany live. The Treaty of Versailles, once described by Hitler as embodying the worst fate that could befall Germany, is now referred to with contempt, but still as something better than any German government could now obtain. To depict the horrors of defeat, Goebbels now goes back to the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia, and promises that a defeated Germany's future lot would be worse than either the 1648 settlement or that of 1918. He draws on Allied hate-mongers for confirmatory evidence.

Until early this past autumn the press which was designed to appeal to the more mature and liberal elements of the German population was permitted to indulge in a certain amount of veiled nostalgia. The suppression of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* was therefore the more significant. The ostensible reason given was the paper shortage and rationalization of the newspaper industry; but this does not explain why this particular paper was selected for extinction. It had appealed to possible dissenters in the upper middle class who found themselves culturally and politically homeless in the Third Reich; but as rallying point for impotent but not extinct former liberal trends it was harmless and even useful. Its assigned task seemed to be to reconcile the "old" and the "new."

A feature of the paper was the publication of well-known poems evocative of the Germany of "Dichter und Denker." Apparently the Nazi leaders believed that it would be well to give the remnants of German humanism the sense of having an outlet somewhere, the feeling that their world continued. The departure from the party line was not political, merely sentimental. Thus in the midst of serious disasters in Russia, and simultaneously with the landing of the Anglo-American forces in Sicily, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* published this poem, which I translate freely:

At dusk the autumnal forests resound with deadly weapons,
Over golden plains the sun rolls gloomily,
Night embraces dying warriors, stilling a wild complaint out of dying mouths,
Quietly over the willow-planted ground the red clouds gather,

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And in them dwells an irate God.
Spilt blood, and the coolness of the moon!
All roads lead into black disintegration.
Beneath golden branches of night and stars
The shadows of our sisters move through silent trees
To comfort the ghosts of heroes, the bleeding heads,
And quietly in the bushes are heard the dark flutes of autumn.
Oh, proud grief on iron altars!
Today the hot flame of the spirit feeds on a powerful pain.
Oh, our unborn scions!

The gloomy and romantic mood was further emphasized by a reprint in the same paper of Goethe's magical "Ode to the Moon." It appeared conspicuously in the body of the paper. Such poems — sad, romantic, nostalgic — appeared for many months. From what I know of the German temperament I would say that the Nazis allowed it because they chose to canalize the disillusionment of older and more cultivated Germans into resignation rather than rebellion. One of the most important words in the German language as a clue to German character is *Schicksal* — Destiny. The Germans use it more than any other western people. It registers their sense of being the victims of forces that move in life and history apart from human will. Not for nothing did so many of the modern theories of "inevitabilities" — Marxism and Freudianism, for instance — come out of Germany. Apparently the Nazis, who themselves assert the "driving power of the will," concluded that the best thing to do with the hang-overs of the old régime was to let them weep for a lost world and resign themselves to Destiny.

But on September 1 the *Frankfurter Zeitung* ceased publication. From this it may be deduced that the rifts were becoming intolerable and that resignation was degenerating into outright defeatism, at least in the classes reached by this type of newspaper. Any sort of nostalgia, any concession to "objectivity," is now shut out except in the obituary notices.

These, however, have undergone a change in the last months. Except in the S.S. paper, *Schwarze Korps*, where almost all deaths at the front are formally announced with the words "for the Fuehrer and Greater Germany," these words now seldom appear. Germans today are all "dying in the defensive war." The notices are grim, and although the fallen are referred to as heroes, the survivors seem inclined to suggest a lip-biting doubt as to whether it is all worth while. This is the more understandable, since the notices often reveal that whole German families are being ex-

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terminated. Among the fifteen notices published in one newspaper, five report the death at the front of more than one member of the same family. Sometimes this is done in a veiled manner. The parents announce the death of "our *last* son," or say, "Now, *also*, our beloved son," or "Kurt has followed his father."

A sense of fatalism has come to pervade the notices, and many, neglecting Fuehrer and even Fatherland, appeal only to the "inscrutable will of God" and express a sense of comfort only in religion. I quote one from the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of August 28 in which relatives report the extinction of all but one immediate member of a family through a combination of the air war and the fighting at the front:

> In the night of August 23rd, my beloved husband Paul Becker, his daughter Gabriele, his son Klaus, fell, victims of the air war. They thus followed their son and brother who fell at the front, and today they look into the eyes of the God of Love, from whom in all the darkness of this life they alone drew strength and comfort. We, the remaining relatives, bow ourselves even in this hour of grief before the will of God.

Finis is written in another notice which concludes: "He was the last, highly-talented scion of a German family that had flourished for four hundred years."

Notable, also, is the number of high officers, generals and colonels whose deaths are announced. This does not indicate a repetition of what happened in the last war, when German officers, for reasons of military policy, were exposed as little as possible to personal danger. The nature of a war of movement necessarily brings higher casualties for officers. But the high proportion of officer deaths, on the Russian front particularly, may also indicate that the officers have found it more necessary to lead their men personally and furnish examples to them.

V

How about the morale of the troops? The German newspapers even reveal something of this. Some articles chide the civilian population, calling attention to the fortitude of the front soldiers. The Russian war is described in the most horrifying manner, and no attempt is made to play down the strength of the Russian enemy. Article after article describes the seemingly inexhaustible Russian reserves of men and matériel; the phalanxes that are shot down only to give way to new and fresh ones; the tanks that are obliterated, only to be superseded by new rolling masses; the ineradicable activities of the guerrillas. Thus:

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The air behind our lines is filled constantly with parachutists, dropping down to bring communications to the guerrillas, and to set up radio communications with the other front. Among these paratroopers are women radio operators of formidable intelligence. Every mile of the retreat must be protected against saboteurs; not a road is free of snipers; all bivouacs, though miles behind the front, must be protected and guarded; it is necessary to build entanglements and pillboxes at every bridge.

By painting the eastern front in the most somber colors an appeal is made to the public against lack of equal fortitude at home. Even very pessimistic letters from soldiers are printed, including one (which appeared in the *Schwarze Korps*, of all places) in which the writer asserted: "Every one of us here at the front knows that we are fighting the most formidable enemy in human history, and that victory for us will be only the right to walk ragged and barefoot, with nothing in the world but the packs on our backs, through the Brandenburger Tor." Such letters are played up — often with editorial comment — as indications of the realistic attitude of the troops and their unbroken morale in the face of the bleakest realization of the German situation.

But other things creep through, also. A writer discusses "the New German folklore" in an article in *Das Reich* of September 5 entitled "Soldiers' Dictionary." The article, written with humorous detachment, presents soldiers' slang as characteristic of the griping of men in all armies the world over. But some of it is extraordinarily contemptuous of the Party.

What, for instance, do the soldiers call the various medals for heroism? They call the Iron Cross "the border passport," obviously meaning something had by everybody who has struck across a frontier at the enemy. They call the Eastern Medal, for heroes fighting in Russia, "The Frost Medal" (a pun on Ost-Medaille — Frost-Medaille), or "The Order of Frozen Feet" (a pun on "Eisbein"), or, more grimly, "Snowman in Steel Helmet." The famous German Cross in Gold is called "Ideology Reflector." The Knight's Cross is contemptuously referred to as "Tin Necktie." The Civilian Service Order is called "Dumbbell's Citation." The military profession is referred to as "the sole German occupation," the Russian artillery as "the Volga song." The Steel Helmet is a "torture cap," an "enthusiasm cooker" and "an ideology cooler." Tanks are "Busses to Heaven" and "Motor-Hearses." The slang about food is not very different from that of most armies, but one expression reveals the general sense of security about the West Wall. Two varieties of bread are

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distinguished as "Maginot Line — takeable" and "West Wall — untakeable."

The abrupt end of the nostalgia-fortitude-resignation note was to be observed in a new editorial tone in all papers. *Schwarze Korps* on August 19 carried an editorial scolding the public. The argument was directed against the concept of a "Russian Miracle." It was no miracle at all, said the writer. The Russians are winning their victories, not because their armies are invincible, but because the Russian people are making the most terrific effort, sparing themselves absolutely nothing. A similar effort on the part of our own people would bring victory.

This attempt to dispel the myth of the invincibility of the Russian armies puts the shoe on another foot in the fifth year of the war. Certainly the change reveals the public mind. There is obviously a fear that discontent canalized into resigned acceptance is in danger of degenerating into outright defeatism. The clarion call to duty and emphasis on unexhausted German strength has come back into the press.

VI

The press also has to deal with rumor-mongers, and here it is belligerent, persuasive and threatening, suggesting by implication that the authorities are at their wits' end about how to deal with what they themselves describe as one of the greatest morale problems of the administration.

Rumors can be classified in groups. Among them, those dealing with the corruption of Party bosses seem to be rife, and the newspapers complain that it is all but impossible to trace them down. Thus, again, the *Schwarze Korps* (August 26), instructing good Nazis on how to deal with the enemy within the gates, complains (and suggests) in an article entitled "Have You Heard?" It seems that Germans have been hearing that the wives of prominent leaders have been taking the children "for holidays" in Switzerland to escape the air bombardment, that they have been taking baby carriages with them, and that in these baby carriages are secret compartments hiding incriminating documents. They have also heard that famous Gobelins from Castle X are now hanging in the bedroom of Nazi Leader Y, and that valuable pieces of art have been stolen by Gestapo leaders from bombed towns.

Looting charges, circulated by rumor, are also offset sometimes by stories of Anglo-American looting. It is asserted, for instance, that art dealers accompanied the British and American troops

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into Italy and have already sent valuable objects of art back to New York and London.

Then there are the rumors about the effects of bombings. It is claimed that the numbers of dead are exaggerated. It is announced that a high ranking official was court-martialed and shot for spreading false stories about the devastation at Rostock and the behavior of Nazi officials. Rumors to the effect that the U-boat warfare is a complete flop also bother the Nazis greatly. But worst of all, writes the Nazi press, are the optimistic rumors that backfire. As an example is cited the rumor that "England is about to be bombed with a vengeance, that the Luftwaffe has been biding its time, but within a few hours we shall receive fantastic news." "The people," complains the article, "wait anxiously. They hang upon their radios, and rush into the streets for each new edition of a paper." The rumor spreads like wildfire, "for whose heart does not leap and who does not rush to spread the good news?" Days pass and nothing happens. Then another rumor is started. "The attack started but failed." Hopes have been driven to a peak, and then are dashed into bitter disappointment.

What can be done about this? The paper complains that it has gone so far that "even Nazi officials have refused to listen to denunciations, and have declared that such denouncers are not good colleagues." It swears that old and reliable Nazis have been deprived of their offices by higher-ups for attempting to take too draconian measures against the rumor-mongers. "The creeping tuberculosis affects all classes and ranks, from top to bottom." An appeal is made to fight it. "But this," says the S. S. organ, "requires *civil courage*." I find this remark most enlightening. "Civil courage," in its traditional German meaning, has meant the courage to stand up against the powers that be, namely the state. Now civil courage is being required of those who are loyal to the state!

Another article headed "Attack!", published on September 9, pursues the matter further. It admits that it is rarely possible to catch the culprit. In case after case investigated the rumor-spreader has been entirely innocent. The Gestapo, it is pleaded, cannot do everything alone. The public must help. It must not only denounce those responsible for "a phosphoric excretion of disintegrating defeatist rumors, false news, libels, illusions, and threats," which "are spreading in Germany and throughout Europe," and not merely deny the rumors, "for this is a hopeless

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fight, since they change from hour to hour and circulate so rapidly that when one version is denied another is already current." No, the public must find means to frighten both the malicious and the innocent.

Examples are given of how rumor-killers should behave. Overhearing two ladies in a compartment telling a defeatist yarn, one young man needed but remind them that the Gestapo had ears and eyes everywhere. "They turned pale and got off at the next station." Another suggestion is that work hours be further extended, "for the utterly fatigued have neither time nor energy to listen to or spread rumors." Particular places where they flourish are said to be railroad compartments and offices. The stenographer tells the boss that she heard thus and thus on the German radio; the boss tells the directors at lunch; the directors, after lunch, tell their secretaries, etc., etc. In this case a Nazi faithful traced the story down to the original stenographer, who swore that she was certain of what she had heard, although the static was rather bad. He "fined her fifty marks for the Red Cross." Making people pay by fines like this one is recommended.

VII

Although the news columns of the papers reveal practically nothing about economic conditions in Germany, the commercial advertisements reveal a great deal.

From them we learn that everyone is loth to sell anything for money, and that when anyone is willing to do so he demands an exorbitant price. The goods sought after are those which presumably have some international value and are mobile. There is an enormous traffic in works of art, and anything in a frame or on a pedestal is so classified. The demand market is indicated by the prices asked, and prices that would once have bought museum pieces are demanded for what in prewar Germany or present-day New York would be classed as junk. Pictures are advertised without the artist's name, or with the name of an obscure painter and described by subject, such as "Charming interior, circa 1890," or "Wild romantic landscape near Abbazia." These pictures, which in prewar Germany would have brought 25 to 50 marks are now selling for 800 to 5,000 marks. A marble pillar of the sort that used to support a bust in a cluttered bourgeoise drawing-room brings 800 marks.

A newspaper article satirizes this, and also the fact that anyone who can daub paint on canvas has an eager public waiting to

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carry his work away. The article accuses the public of being gullible. "Any sunflower in a pot, created by a man who according to his talents ought to be a house painter [sic!], is snatched up for anything from 20 to 10,000 marks. All artists would be millionaires if paint and brushes were not rationed."

There is also a rush after stamp collections, which in the public mind belong in the category of easily transferable and negotiable goods. The collections of rank amateurs bring fabulous prices. Since they are often advertised in detail, I consulted a New York expert regarding the prices, and found that they varied from ten to twenty times normal, supposing they were saleable in a normal market at all, as they often would not be.

The advertisements also make clear that usable consumers' goods are not to be had at any price in money. Occasionally a table cloth or tea set is offered second-hand for money, but the price is fantastic. For instance a second hand damask tablecloth is offered for 575 marks (the official rate of the mark is .45 to the dollar, making the price of the tablecloth over $200).

Apparently the whole of Germany is a thrift shop. The barter is mainly in consumers' goods. An outgrown pair of children's shoes is offered against a garden hose; china, kitchenware, carpets, furniture, winter coats, and toys, are offered in exchange for underwear, tools, baby carriages, curtains, etc. Apparently everyone, desperately needing household goods or personal effects, is going through his possessions and seeking to find something he can offer in exchange. It is worth while to advertise any old thing even in papers which are "class" organs.

Since there seems to be considerable ready money lying around for objects of art, one can only conclude, first, that there is a great shortage of the most primitive consumers' goods, and, second, that nobody believes in the currency.

No department stores advertise at all. Presumably they have nothing to offer. Businesses are also using the small classified advertisements, as apparently providing the only means to get new equipment. In one such advertisement a factory advertises for "70 burlap bags," either "to buy or to *rent*." The same exchange that goes on with household goods goes on between factory owners, especially in smaller business. There is no hope of buying; they can only hope that some other factory owner, for a consideration, will help them out.

Elsewhere in this article I have remarked the absence of any news about the working conditions of labor, or about relations

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with foreign labor. But sometimes light is thrown indirectly.

In the *Schwarze Korps*, to quote it once again, an angry editorial on August 19 was directed against industrial managers for not maintaining adequate discipline amongst their workers. "Some seem to think," it says, "that if two, three, or four foreign workers can do the work of one German, everything is all right, since money doesn't matter in war production. But it does matter, and apart from that, these workers take food and shelter from Germans. Admitting that these fellows are none of them worth a good German, with his superior skill and joy in work, the effect of their loafing on the job carries over to the Germans themselves and spoils morale. One manager had the right idea. Sick of the halfheartedness of the foreigners, he took a lazy German and made an example of him in front of the others, giving him a resounding kick in the backside. That impressed the foreigners, for they could see what might happen to them. The example is highly to be recommended." I find this a quite extraordinary revelation. Why did the energetic manager, who is cited as a rare example, not take a running kick at one of the "worthless foreigners"? Why did he have to select a German worker as an example?

A letter to the editor complains that foreign workers grab the best seats on trolley cars, and sit while German women and children stand. Cannot anything be done about it? Apparently not. Apparently the imported slaves have the *Herrenvolk* rather nervous.

A little glimpse on wages is afforded by an article attacking the extravagance of the rich. A lady, it is reported, sent off a whole flock of telegrams to various resorts in a search for accommodations for a holiday. The editorial attacks this use of the crowded telegraph wires, and adds: "And incidentally, her bill of 127 marks was exactly the monthly wage of a woman worker in a war plant." That is about $57 a month in an economy where a second-hand damask tablecloth brings over $200.

The German press is also concerned with the social effects of the bombings. The public in areas which have escaped bombardment, and to which the bombed-out victims are being evacuated, are warned by the newspapers not to expect from these victims "the same view of property that others who have suffered less still have." It is pointed out that men and women who have seen their fellows buried and burned, and have escaped "with only one thought, gratitude for life, and the chance to rebuild their lives with work," cannot "attach the same importance to every trinket and teaspoon as the more fortunate still do."

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An article ruminating on the Bolshevik menace and why the British should have been so stupid as to have clasped hands with the Soviet Union remarks somberly that even Germany, which normally has been made immune to Bolshevism, is learning, from the air bombardments, to take a quite different attitude toward property rights than it used to have.

VIII

A summary of my impression of the condition of public opinion in Germany, after months of reading the German newspapers as they have come to me in batches from time to time, would be about as follows:

The fear of losing the war is acute. Stress on this fear is considered by the authorities to be the most effective form of propaganda. Defeatism is strong, but fear is stronger still, and transcends all questions of ideology. A promise to punish Nazi war criminals alone is not effective Allied propaganda, because the German people are absolutely convinced from the writings of the Vansittart school that surrender will finish Germany as a nation-state, as an industrial civilization, and an independent country.

The German people have a strong sense of guilt; but it is clouded by doubts and counteracted by self-pity.

There is an almost universal distrust of Anglo-American promises.

There is an almost universal fear of Russia. Communism is not feared. What is feared is violent Bolshevism, in the form of wholesale purges, shootings, mob incitations, conspiracies and civil war.

The Nazi Party is not popular. The recital of its past achievements is not good propaganda. The people are apathetic even toward Hitler. And, in retrospect, the Weimar Republic and the Kaiserreich seem like relatively golden ages.

There is no longer much popular interest in plans for the German domination of Europe or in German expansionism. The occupied territories are looked on as valuable only as they form a protective cordon around the German homeland.

The Nazi "revolution" is an admitted failure elsewhere in Europe. The German people are being promised that after their victory the western Europeans and even the Poles will be given freedom, in the framework of some all-European integration.

The *Herrenvolk* idea has proved such a dud that it has been dropped completely out of popular propaganda. The people are

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told that they are fighting to save Europe, not to rule it. Imperialism is unpopular.

A profound sense of comradeship is growing up amongst the masses of the people, who have become increasingly dependent on mutual aid both for spiritual comfort and for the simplest amenities of life. Draconian state measures against the people do not work, because even Nazi officials often stand with the people against the Gestapo and will not denounce them.

There is a thirst after religion and culture, peace and quiet.

There is an intense social introversion. Germans fear the foreigner, whether as conqueror or worker in their midst.

People are not classified as Nazis and anti-Nazis in the popular mind. There are those who are "with the people" and those who are "against the people." The only place where the Party takes an aggressive tone is in the S. S. sheet published for its own corps.

Finally, the Nazi leaders wish they had pursued a different policy and are trying to persuade their own people that they did. They committed no aggressions, they worked for peace, they tried to build a strong enterprising Socialist country on the basis of Germany's own labor and resources, they wished to achieve European unity, diplomatically and with respect for all European cultures and peoples. Plutocratic greed and Bolshevist rage rose against them; so they struck first, but only in order to carry the inevitable war as far as possible from German soil. Now, in the face of terrible odds, victory is mere survival.

The Nazi leaders thus reveal what they now believe their people sincerely want. Unfortunately for them, and unfortunately for Germany, they are too late. Germany is in the terrible dilemma of no longer believing in the original war and of believing with conviction that no German government can make a tolerable peace. Can the armor of this despair be broken? Or will the German people support the war until their armies crack and are totally defeated?

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AMERICA AT WAR

The End of The Second Year

By Hanson W. Baldwin

THE United States ended two years of war confident that the last phase of the struggle in Europe was starting. The protracted retreat of the German Army on the eastern front, the increasing tempo of Allied air raids on the Reich, the continuing failure of the German submarine war, the invasion and collapse of Italy, and particularly the Moscow conference justified that assumption. The Moscow Declaration that Britain, Russia and the United States would fight the war to unconditional surrender weakened Germany's hope of retrieving victory from defeat by political means. Specifically, the better understanding which the three Powers achieved there must have ended any idea she may have nourished that she could negotiate a separate peace with Russia. Since in addition it prepared the way for the international collaboration of the three Powers it must have dampened Germany's longer-range hopes also.

The last chapter nevertheless may be a long one. The end of the second year of war brings no evidence that Germany's military power has been broken. As Prime Minister Winston Churchill warned, the climactic year of 1944 is likely to be somber and bloody.

II

The great advance of the Red Armies on the eastern front was the most important event of the summer and fall of 1943, and as these lines were written it was continuing, though against stiffening opposition. Between July and late November the Russians reoccupied about 140,000 square miles of their own territory. The battle lines were approaching the pre-1939 Russian frontiers. Despite months of campaigning and great losses the Red Army evidently still possessed great offensive power.

Most of the credit for the Russian successes in the greatest campaigns in military history is Russian alone. Stalin has fashioned the Soviet states into a mighty machine for making war. The operations assigned this machine have often been prodigal in lives. But they have been effective because all the national energies of the Russian people were harnessed to a single end, and because no sacrifice was considered too great to achieve it.

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The fact remains that the Russian victories of 1943 would not have been possible without aid from Britain and the United States. Lend-lease supplies, particularly in the category of automotive vehicles, gave the Russian Army much of its mobility, and American and British planes — many of them flown into Russia by various routes — helped materially in giving the Red pilots air superiority for the first time since the Russian campaign started. Shipments of lend-lease goods to Russia from the United States amounted to $3,287,047,000 by the end of September 1943, and of this total more than half had been shipped in the first nine months of 1943. The planes numbered 6,500. Among the other military items sent from the United States were 3,000 tanks, 125,000 sub-machine guns, 145,000 trucks, 25,000 jeeps, 200,000 field telephones and 700,000 miles of telephone wire. British shipments to Russia of vehicles, tanks, guns, ammunition, aircraft and industrial and naval supplies had reached the value of £179,000,000 by June 30, 1943. This figure is exclusive of the heavy expenses of delivery and convoy and also of the value of the large quantites of food, clothing and other civilian supplies sent to Russia on a credit system without any definite term for repayment. American and British food helped keep Russia from starving and American and British factories gave the Red Army some of its offensive punch.

But American and British aid to Russia was more important than even these figures indicate. Direct military intervention by the Allies on the battlefields of Europe diverted strong German forces from the Russian front, greatly weakened the German war potential and certainly was a vital factor in making it impossible for the Nazis to retain their hold on much of the richest Russian territory. The impossibility of measuring the effect of the Allied air raids on Germany and the Allied invasion of Italy in terms of miles gained by the Red Army has led certain elements in the United States to say that those operations were unimportant strategically. From the start, American Communists and fellow-travellers have been in the habit of belittling the American and British military effort. It seems time now to record that the Russian campaigns of the summer and fall of 1943 supplied direct evidence that the Allied operations in southern and western Europe had created a major diversion for Russia. The invasion and defeat of Italy forced Hitler to concentrate 20 to 25 divisions in that country. He also was compelled to reënforce the German divisions in the Balkans and to utilize for Balkan garrison duties

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the Hungarian and Rumanian units which otherwise would have been in action on the Russian front. How many German divisions the Allied operations actually drew away from the eastern front is not yet clear, probably not more than 5 or at the most 20. Our forces in Italy identified one or two crack German units which had been brought there from Russia. The important point to remember is that the majority of the enemy reënforcements sent to Italy and the Balkans probably were shifted from France or other occupied territories, and in turn were replaced from Germany's strategic reserve, thus restricting her ability to reënforce the Russian front. By December that strategic reserve was quite small.

The effect of the Allied air raids on western Europe was even more pronounced. These raids became so serious that Germany had to withdraw the bulk of her fighter planes from the eastern front. In consequence, our bombers in their raids over Europe in the latter half of 1943 faced two to three times as many German fighters as the Red Army encountered on the entire Russian front. In addition, units of the Luftwaffe were shifted from Russia to the Mediterranean. These shifts in German air power, in conjunction with the delivery of American and British planes to Russia as part of lend-lease aid, enabled the Russians during 1943 to secure air superiority except in localized sectors where the Nazis thought it important to make a great temporary effort. Thus it is fair to say that two of the important factors in the German retreat in Russia in 1943 — German air weakness in that theater and lack of German reserves — were the direct effect of Allied efforts. Nor can a third effect be ignored, though it was less direct and obvious. The bombardment of Germany without any question decreased her war potential, limited and in certain cases sharply curtailed her industrial output, damaged her communications, hampered her transportation and had devastating effects on the morale of her population. All this diminished the Reichswehr's strategic mobility and kept out of the hands of the German soldiers many weapons which they would otherwise have had at their disposal in fighting the Russian armies.

These contributions of the United States and Britain to Russia's victorious campaign during the summer and fall months have been dealt with here at some length, first because they often are glossed over; second, because without taking them into account we cannot arrive at a clear picture of the strategy of the war in Europe; third, because the Russian front indubitably re-

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mains of surpassing importance, and whatever has affected it and continues to affect it is of strategic significance.

III

The climax of Allied operations in the Mediterranean came on September 3 with the collapse of Italy. The Badoglio Government, which assumed power when the "Sawdust Caesar" was deposed by a palace revolution on July 25, did not wait for the end of the 38-day Sicilian campaign to ask for the terms of surrender. After protracted negotiations, an armistice was signed on September 3, the very day British troops of the Eighth Army (General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery commanding) were ferried across the Strait of Messina to land on the Calabrian "toe" of Italy. The terms of the armistice, though not yet made public, evidently involved the cessation of all Italian fighting against the Allies, the surrender of as much of the Italian fleet as possible, Italy's adherence as a "co-belligerent" to the Allied cause, and the use of Italian troops against the Germans.

No major American units took part in the relatively small-scale invasion of Calabria across the Strait of Messina. But early in the morning of September 9, six days later, and 12 hours or so after the announcement of the Italian armistice (it was signed on September 3, but public announcement was delayed to secure the greatest military advantage), a combined Anglo-American army landed on the sandy shores of the Gulf of Salerno, some 30 to 35 miles below Naples. Lieutenant-General Mark Wayne Clark commanded this army, which, although it was known as the Fifth American Army, was composed almost equally of British and American divisions. Salerno was selected because it was the only practical landing beach within fighter range (extreme fighter range, at that) of Allied air bases in Sicily and extreme southern Italy. It had apparently been hoped that merely Italian coast defense troops would be encountered and that these would offer no great resistance. But Germans had replaced the Italians some days before, perhaps because of a "leak" in the Allied plans but more likely because obviously the Salerno beaches were the only possible place, south of Rome, where a landing was practicable. Apparently, also, the Allies miscalculated the strength of the German forces south of Rome and their ability to concentrate quickly.

What happened is now history. The Allied strategic plan involved some risk, since the landing was at the extreme range of

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fighter aircraft. Also, the Germans are an alert enemy and the terrain of most of Italy is mountainous. We were too sanguine in our hopes. The landing of the Eighth Army in Calabria — and subsequently at Taranto and Brindisi on the Italian "heel" — was intended to draw German units into southern Italy. The troops landed at Salerno, much further north, would be able, it was hoped, to slice across the peninsula and cut those German troops off.

But at Salerno the Germans had the great advantage of holding the wooded and precipitous heights around a saucer-shaped beach; their guns could fire downward into our concentrations and could command some of our landing places. There followed a battle which is rightly called "bloody Salerno." It was probably the hardest struggle in which American troops have yet been engaged in the European phase of this war, and one which we nearly lost. The vestigial glories of great empires of the past formed a picturesque setting for the bitter and costly action. "G.I.'s" bivouaced literally in marble halls and amid the ruined columns of Paestum, and their course toward Naples led them over the beautiful Sorrentine peninsula and past Pompeii and Herculaneum.

The British units which landed were on the northern flank, the American on the southern. At the start, the German defenses pinned them to the beaches and foothills. Then came a surging enemy counterattack which almost swept them into the sea. Initially, however, the situation of the Allied forces did not seem serious. The first waves were able to get ashore and a giant armada of 500 landing craft, warships and merchantmen anchored in the Gulf of Salerno or plied about its smooth waters.

As in previous operations in the Mediterranean, General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander commanded all British and American land forces. His was the strategic command, however; General Clark was in immediate control. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Andrew Cunningham, Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean under General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, also exercised a strategic command; in immediate charge of naval operations was Vice Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U.S.N., with his flag in U.S.S. *Ancon*. His Western Task Force, as it was called, was divided into two main groups — the Southern Attack Force, under Rear Admiral John L. Hall, Jr., U.S.N., with his flag in the U.S.S. *Samuel Chase*, and the Northern Attack Force, under Commodore G. N. Oliver, R.N., who flew his broad pen-

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ant in H.M.S. *Hilary*. Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly, U.S.N., with his flag in U.S.S. *Biscayne*, although senior in rank to Commodore Oliver, volunteered to serve, and did serve, as a Task Group Commander under Commodore Oliver. The Southern Attack Force landed United States troops and their supplies on the beaches from the south bank of the Sele River to Agropoli; the Northern Attack Force landed British troops and their supplies from the north bank of the Sele to a point about three miles southeast of the town of Salerno.

These attack forces, with their great flotillas of transports and landing craft, were in turn protected and supported by a very large covering force of battleships, aircraft carriers and destroyers, known as "Force H," under the command of Vice Admiral Sir Algernon U. Willis, R.N. "Force H," entirely composed of British Naval Ships, included two large aircraft carriers, the *Illustrious* and the *Formidable*, the new battleship *Howe* and the *Nelson* and *Rodney*. Originally other ships had been assigned; but when the Italian fleet surrendered they were withdrawn to cover the Italian sortie from Spezia and to provide support for the British occupation of Taranto.

"Force H" also was entrusted with the task of providing fighter cover for the "Air Support Force" of the Royal Navy, under Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian. This force consisted of three British cruisers and five auxiliary (converted) aircraft carriers, sometimes called escort carriers. These carriers provided the planes — fighters, dive bombers and other types — which covered and supported the initial landings, and were in turn protected by fighters flown off the *Illustrious* and *Formidable*. This seemingly complicated arrangement was necessary because Salerno was, as previously mentioned, at extreme range for single-engined fighters operating from our Sicilian land bases. The naval air support, little mentioned in the contemporary accounts of Salerno, was undoubtedly a major factor in the success of what proved to be a touch-and-go operation.

The guns of three United States cruisers — the *Philadelphia*, *Savannah* and *Boise* — and of some 18 United States destroyers, in addition to many smaller combatant craft and great numbers of mine sweepers, gave close support to the landings. There was some difficulty in locating enemy shore batteries. However, a message sent five hours after "H-hour" on "D-day" by an American general ashore to the commander of the fire support unit epitomized the general effectiveness of the naval fire: "Thank

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God for the . . . Navy ships. Probably could not have stuck out on Blue and Yellow beaches. Stout fellows. Please tell them so."

The naval vessels in the first and subsequent days of the disembarkation indeed provided a tremendous volume of fire support, ranging in size from machine gun ammunition to 15-inch shells. The *Philadelphia* fired a total of 2,946 rounds of 6-inch and 1,161 rounds of 5-inch while the operation lasted, and the destroyer *Bristol* fired a total of 900 rounds from her main batteries. In the northern sector alone, 135 mines were swept up or exploded in the first four days. Future analyses of the Salerno battle will probably support the preliminary finding that naval gun fire and air support saved the day.

The crisis came in the days September 13 to 16. Up until then we had developed our initial landings, smashed through the Axis beach defenses (though with considerable casualties), fought off Axis air attacks and deepened and widened our beachhead. But we had not been able to win more than toeholds in the high ground which dominated the Salerno "saucer." The German counterattack, which we had been desperately trying to forestall, almost rolled the Allied forces back into the sea.

General Clark has said that the situation at Salerno was never desperate. In retrospect it does seem likely that A.F.H.Q. in Algiers viewed it overanxiously. Nevertheless, the situation was serious, serious enough to warrant a comparison between Salerno and Gallipoli. In some sectors both Americans and British were pressed back to the beaches — almost to the water's edge. The casualties were heavy, and for a time the British and American forces were almost cut off from each other. The naval armada offshore, however, opened up with everything it had; carrier-based planes were active; and the Northwest African Air Force on September 14 flew 1,888 sorties over the battle area — more than one a minute — and dropped an average of nine-tenths of a ton of bombs on the German positions every minute. That day and the next saw the Nazi tide stemmed and led to the enemy retreat.

The battle was not won by any one arm alone. It was won only by the most careful coördination of each service with the other, and the most complete teamwork of each Navy and the troops of each nation with the Navy and troops of its ally. The cost was high, probably higher to the British than to the Americans, for the British — contrary to the impression of most Americans — had

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as many men at Salerno as the Americans did and held an even hotter sector. Ships were damaged and sunk, some of them by the Germans' new weapon, the controlled glide bomb (one of which is believed to have sunk the Italian battleship *Roma* as she was escaping to Malta). Losses in matériel were heavy.

We learned bitter lessons in the school of bloody experience. One of them was the necessity of getting tanks ashore in the early stages of a landing. Another was the old, old lesson — so often repeated in this war — of the absolute necessity of competent leadership. An American Corps Commander and several general officers and colonels were relieved in action and some of them were demoted. We learned the need for quicker decision. A large force of heavy bombers was detached from the Eighth Air Force in Britain and sent all the way to the Mediterranean to assist at Salerno; but they arrived in the theater after the crisis of the battle was past. We learned again what had always been known but can easily be forgotten — the immense difficulty of making good a foothold on a shore strongly held by a determined foe.

Once the beachhead had been made good, General Clark's forces joined hands across southern Italy with the small Eighth Army forces which had pushed up the heel and toe of Italy against slight German opposition. The Nazis not only eluded the trap we had set for them, but almost baited it for us. They had suffered heavy casualties, however; they had failed to eliminate our beachhead; and, pivoting on the Sorrentine peninsula, they swung back their Adriatic Sea flank and commenced a slow and fighting retreat to and beyond Naples. Naples was captured on October 1 after considerable difficulties, but the water-front facilities had been thoroughly blasted by bombs and demolitions and the harbor was a tangle of wrecked shipping. The water supply of the city had also been destroyed and the inhabitants were starving. We began to experience both the liabilities and the assets of conquest.

On September 27 the nexus of important airfields at Foggia was captured. With these and other air bases in our possession, as well as a major port of great potential importance, the immediate issue was not any longer in much doubt. Our strategic objectives had been accomplished.

There followed a slow and wearing struggle up the spiny ridge of the Appennines toward Rome. All roads lead to Rome, but all of them in September and October and November of 1943 were mined, mired in mud and bracketed by the fire of German

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88's. The Nazis fought strong delaying actions, gradually bolstering their forces in southern Italy until by late November they had 10 (perhaps 11) divisions in line or in immediate reserve. In November, the enemy defense stiffened very considerably along the line of the Garigliano and Sangro rivers in an area where jutting mountains shoulder the sea, and where climate and terrain are among the bleakest and toughest in all Italy.

The American forces participating in the Italian campaign included the Thirty-sixth and Forty-fifth Infantry Divisions, and the Germans have announced that some American armored units and airborne troops, plus the Third Division, had been in line against them. In addition to these, and probably other American forces, three British corps have been publicly announced as serving in Italy, one with the Fifth Army, two with the Eighth, a total of eight or nine British divisions.

Progress in Italy at the time of writing is slow and may so continue. Weather, terrain and unexpectedly heavy enemy resistance are in part responsible. It is also true, however, that the strategic spotlight in Europe is shifting, that the Mediterranean is becoming a secondary theater. We therefore are trying to accomplish our remaining objectives in Italy (the immediate one is undoubtedly to capture Rome) with the utmost economy of force, so that our main effort elsewhere will not be reduced in strength.

The principal strategic objectives of the Allies in the Mediterranean were three: (1) the conquest of North Africa and the opening of the Mediterranean to Allied shipping; (2) the elimination of Italy from the war; (3) the seizure of Italian air bases for use in an air offensive against southern Germany. The capture of Foggia and Naples meant that all of these objectives had been achieved. What remained to be done in Italy was aftermath and to some extent anticlimax.

The first remaining objective — psychological and political rather than military — was the capture of Rome. A longer-range objective was, by maintaining the offensive against the German forces in Italy, to occupy and divert as much German strength as possible from other theaters. No major invasion of the Balkans was indicated; but support of the guerrilla armies already operating there could intensify Germany's problem and compel the diversion to that area of additional bodies of troops.

The objectives in the Mediterranean have been accomplished with very moderate losses so far as the United States is concerned. Figures for previous campaigns have already been given in this

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series of articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS.[1] In the Italian campaign, United States Army casualties from the beginning of the invasion to November 25, 1943, numbered 1,613 killed, 6,361 wounded, 2,685 missing, a total of 10,659. Naval losses have likewise been quite moderate. The destroyer *Rowan* was sunk on September 11, apparently off Salerno, and the destroyers *Bristol*, *Buck* and *Beatty* were sunk later by mines, torpedoes or air attacks. One naval tug and a minesweeper have also been reported sunk since the invasion of Italy started. Some merchant ships may have been sunk (their losses are often not announced by name), and the cruiser *Savannah* and other vessels were damaged.

The strategic balance sheet in the Mediterranean is overwhelmingly in the Allied favor.

IV

Another offensive, of a different sort from the Mediterranean campaigns but perhaps even more effective, reached a climax in western Europe in the fall of 1943. In collaboration with the R.A.F., the Eighth United States Air Force, Lieutenant-General Ira C. Eaker commanding, based on Britain, greatly intensified the scope and scale of its raids against the Reich. In certain months of the summer and fall those "raids" led to great air battles — the greatest, perhaps, since the Battle of Britain three years previously. September was the peak, so far, of the American effort in 1943: a greater tonnage of bombs was dropped with smaller relative loss than in any previous month. The following table indicates the scale of daylight bombing by the Eighth Air Force during three crucial months:

	Tonnage of Bombs Dropped	*United States Bomber Losses*	*German Planes Claimed*
August	3,575	100	631
September	8,190	99	312
October	5,533	176	784

For a time, in this period, there seemed to be a weakening of the German air defense. But of that there was no certainty. And our own effort fell off markedly, though temporarily, both in the depth to which Germany was penetrated and in frequency of major raids, after the serious losses in the October 14 raid against the Schweinfurt roller-bearing factory.[2] Sixty United States

[1] *Cf.* "America at War: Three Bad Months," April 1942; "America at War: The Second Quarter," July 1942; "America at War: The First Year," January 1943; "America at War: December 1942–May 1943," July 1943; and "America at War: Summer 1943," October 1943.

[2] The relative lull of late October and early November was broken late in November by a series of heavy and intense day and night attacks.

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bombers were lost in combat on that one raid, and probably at least an equal number were lost operationally or were severely damaged. The damage done to the Schweinfurt plant was officially said to be worth the cost. But apparently there was a growing recognition in the United States and Britain as the year ended that air bombardment alone would not be enough to give the *coup de grâce* to Germany. Cologne was raided for the one hundred twenty-second time in this period. Either it had not been as thoroughly destroyed as had been previously indicated, or else the Germans have remarkable recuperative powers.

Air bombardment nevertheless was having a steady attrition effect upon the moral and physical strength of Germany, and this effect was mounting as American air strength in Britain increased and as R.A.F. night raids became more frequent and more accurate. Some of our technical problems were being solved. Lockheed Lightnings and Republic Thunderbolts, equipped with detachable gas tanks, flew on many of the shallow-penetration raids all the way to the target and back, thus providing excellent cover for the bombers and greatly reducing our losses. The air operations also began to clamp Germany in an air pincers from two sides, with the attacks of the newly created Fifteenth Air Force, based on Mediterranean fields, joining those of the Eighth Air Force, based on Britain.

These air raids, heavy and frequent though they were, were certain to be greatly stepped up in tempo and weight as the winter progressed. For the air plan was entering another phase, and the strategy of the Allies was clearly focusing on western Europe. Shifts in high commands in United States Air Forces around the world, the creation of a Tactical Air Force in Britain to supply close support for an invading Army, the unannounced appointment of General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, to command a western European invasion, all indicated that Britain was now to be the base for the main Allied effort. This meant that the air attack upon western Europe was certain to reach a new crescendo of fury in the new year.

The air attack plainly is envisaged now not as supplying a knockout blow to Germany but as a means of softening her up for an invasion across the Channel. Since the beginning of the war the majority of American senior officers have felt that a cross-Channel invasion was, all things considered, the best and most sure way to bring Germany to her knees. They considered the Mediterranean operations and the air offensive as "softening"

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and diversionary operations preliminary to that one end. Those operations have been successful and may yield still more success. But the greatest task, the most formidable operation in American military history and probably in British military history, still remains to be accomplished. The invasion of western Europe is the capstone of our entire strategy. If it fails — and it can fail — we are undone. The war is not yet won.

V

On still another front — the sea front — Germany felt Allied might during the late summer and fall. Her submarine campaign, its backbone broken in the spring and summer months, continued to be ineffective. Ship sinkings were low during this period; in certain weeks and months they were negligible. But German submarine losses were high — at the rate of at least one every couple of days. The 60 Nazi submarines destroyed in the Atlantic during August, September and October exceeded the number of Allied merchantmen sunk in that period. Of these 60 submarines, 27 were sunk by American forces, 33 by British with Canadian assistance. United States Navy carrier-based aircraft accounted for 21 of the 27 submarines sunk by us. Destroyers sank two; a Navy long-range patrol plane sank one; a destroyer and carrier-based plane sank another; an Army plane sank one; and an Army plane and Navy plane teamed up to get the twenty-seventh. Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, one of the unsung leaders and organizers of this war, deserves much of the credit for this fine showing.

VI

Good news also came from the South and Southwest Pacific areas during the fall. Our two-pronged offensive which started against Japanese New Guinea and Solomon bases in June had progressed by November to a landing on Bougainville Island in the northern Solomons, only 250 miles south of Rabaul, the key Japanese base in the area. The last Japanese nest of resistance in the New Georgia group, Bairoka Harbor, was finally abandoned by the enemy on August 28. We occupied Vila, on Kolombangara Island, on October 11, after the Japanese line of communications had been cut by our prior move into Vellalavella. The Bougainville landing at a point on the west coast above the southernmost Japanese garrison came on November 1, after a prior landing on Treasury Island on October 26, and a feint — in the form of a

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raid by a Marine Raider battalion — against minor Japanese positions on Choiseul.

While these advances were being made by Admiral William F. Halsey's forces up the "ladder" of the Solomons, General Douglas MacArthur (who coördinated the Solomons and New Guinea operations) sent his Australians and Americans through the New Guinea jungles toward Salamaua, Lae and Finschafen. By a series of heavy bombardments, the use of air and sea transport, the employment of parachute troops and amphibious operations, the Allied forces had captured Salamaua, Lae, Finschafen, Sattelberg and all the Gulf of Huon area in New Guinea by the end of November, and were pushing on toward other Japanese outposts and the important Japanese base at Madang.[3]

The operations against Madang, however, progressed slowly, and while Australian patrols [4] were pushing their way through the terrible jungles, MacArthur threw most of his air force in repeated raids at Rabaul and adjacent bases, to support the Solomons operations. A number of these raids resulted in claims so high that they must be put down as extravagant. Indeed, many of the claims of enemy losses — particularly air losses — received from the southwest Pacific have borne the earmarks of exaggeration. Nevertheless, the Japanese did suffer heavy blows. Navy carrier task forces joined in the "strikes" at Rabaul in November, and by the middle of that month some spokesmen in Washington were saying that the Japanese position there had become untenable. But that still remained to be proven. It seemed improbable.

During the fall, the complaints that General MacArthur and the southwest Pacific were receiving only a small percentage of American overseas war material, that General MacArthur did not have men enough for a large offensive, and so on, had become

[3] Our own losses in the South Pacific fighting were not high. No personnel casualty figures for this area have been announced; malaria, however, was still the main enemy. From August through November 20 the announced naval losses in the Pacific area were two destroyers — the *Chevalier* and the *Henley* — one naval transport, four submarines and one tug.

[4] The principal burden of the land fighting in New Guinea has been borne by the Australians. The Seventh and Ninth Australian Divisions have been in action there, and the Thirty-second, and more recently, the Forty-first American divisions. A contingent of American parachute troops also aided in the Salamaua-Lae-Finschafen campaign. But the greater part of the land fighting has been done by Australians, with the Americans assuming the major burden in the air. In the South Pacific, the Twenty-fifth Division (United States) was publicly identified as participating in the Munda operations. A New Zealand division and other Army and Marine units have also been engaged in the Solomons fighting. The jungle fighting has developed many new techniques and modifications of old weapons. Flame throwers and bazoukas have been found useful against Jap coconut-log pillboxes. Bulldozers have been used to clear fields of fire to those pillboxes. Mortars, including the 4.2-inch mortar (once identified only as a chemical weapon but now widely used for other purposes) have been modified to permit direct fire. Camouflage suits are now worn almost universally.

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almost routine. Now, however, they were voiced by members of General MacArthur's staff. General MacArthur implied the same thing himself. These continued statements have served only to confuse the people and to prejudice General MacArthur's own case.

There is no doubt whatsoever that today General MacArthur's forces are far, far stronger in relation to the enemy forces opposed to them than they were a year ago. He now has a ground army (Americans and Australians combined) not much smaller in size than the Allied army fighting in Italy. If the ground forces under Admiral Halsey are included, the total is very considerably larger than the entire Allied Expeditionary Force in Italy. He has quite a sizeable air force (though not by European standards), and if the size of the naval forces directly under his command were known the average American would be surprised. The Pacific Fleet itself, of course, is directly under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, with headquarters at Pearl Harbor (and rightly). The statements coming from the South Pacific can mean only one thing: that General MacArthur is dissatisfied with the strategic plan for the war as a whole and for the Pacific in particular, and with the rôle assigned to him and to his forces. He wants to make the main effort; he does not want to assume a secondary rôle.

That there is a good chance that the main American effort will be made in other areas of the Pacific was shown by the increasing tempo of events in the Central Pacific during the late summer and fall. A series of carrier task force raids were made — chiefly with new carriers built and commissioned since the war — against Marcus and Wake Islands, then against islands in the Gilbert group. On September 4 marines occupied the little island of Nanumea in the Ellice group without opposition. From this island (presumably), and from previously occupied Funafuti in the same group, a series of raids by land-based Army and Navy bombers was carried out against Japanese-held Nauru island, Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert group, and Jaluit, Maloelap and Mali atolls in the Marshall Islands. At the same time, the duties of Lieutenant-General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Commanding Army forces in Hawaii, were broadened to include command of all Army forces in the Central Pacific. And Admiral Nimitz warned the Japanese that new blows were about to be struck in new areas. Plainly a major strategic offensive in the Pacific was about to start, perhaps from humble beginnings.

By November 20, this offensive had already begun. Carrier

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task forces hammered at Nauru and Tarawa, adding tons of bombs to those dropped by the land-based Liberators from Nanumea and Funafuti. The first major blows against Japan's "unsinkable aircraft carriers" — the islands of Micronesia — were dealt by carefully coördinated United States forces, and a new strategy, which would by-pass to some extent the malarial jungles of the South Pacific and strike more directly toward Japan, was being implemented.

This new strategy came to its first fruition on November 21 when Marines and Army troops landed on Makin and Tarawa atolls in the Gilberts and shortly thereafter on Abemama atoll. The operation was under the supreme command of Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, chief of a new central Pacific Command. The Second Marine Division (veterans of Guadalcanal) and the Twenty-Seventh Division (formerly New York National Guard) made the landings and captured the atolls within 76 hours. They were supported by the largest naval task force yet assembled in the Pacific. The fighting on Tarawa was described as the bitterest in the history of the Marine Corps, and casualties in the assault battalions were very heavy. In absolute terms, however, our losses were light. And we had taken successfully the first step on a new road to Tokyo.

At the same time continental operations against Japan were slowly starting. Lord Mountbatten, newly appointed Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia, concluded a series of organizing and policy conferences during the fall, and set up his staff. Although the composition of the staff was not officially announced three Americans were known to have prominent rôles. Lieutenant-General Joseph Stilwell apparently is to have a major ground command under Lord Mountbatten; Major-General Albert C. Wedemeyer is Deputy Chief of Staff; and Major-General George E. Stratemeyer a senior air commander.

Despite the end of the monsoon season and intensified activity by the Fourteenth United States Air Force in China and the Tenth in India, the time for major operations in Burma still appeared to be some months off. Great supply and organizational problems remained to be solved; there is perhaps no area in the world so difficult from the supply point of view as the Asiatic theater. But minor operations were starting; Chinese-trained and equipped troops provided the cover in northern Burma for engineers hacking the so-called "Ledo Road" from Assam into Burma out of the trackless jungles of the region. And the increased tempo

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of air attacks upon Akyab indicated that that port and airfield, objective of an abortive British campaign last year, might again be one of the first goals of Allied forces in the months before the monsoon again starts next May.

VII

As the year 1943 approaches its end the global strategic picture is more encouraging than at any time since the United States entered the war. Everywhere the United Nations have the initiative; everywhere the enemy is suffering defeat. Nowhere as yet, however, have the defeats been decisive. The enemy still is strong. If the war in Europe is to end in 1944, Britain and the United States probably will have to cap their entire strategical effort by a successful cross-Channel invasion. That is a venture which *can*, but *must not*, fail. It will usher in hard and bloody fighting. In the Pacific, the major strategic offensive which the Allies are now starting will assume weight and impetus during 1944. Its progress should determine in large measure the duration of the Pacific phase of the war. 1944 will indeed be a climactic year.

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THE INVASION OF EUROPE

By George Fielding Eliot

WE ARE attacking Germany by blockade and by assault. These are the only ways to attack a country, just as they are the only ways to attack a fortress. They are complementary, and usually necessary to each other. Blockade strikes at the enemy's means of making war, seeking to weaken or disarm him. Assault strikes at his armed forces, seeking to overcome them and penetrate into his home territory.

Before the invention of the airplane, blockade could be said to be external pressure, while assault sought to exercise internal pressure. This distinction no longer stands, for air power has made it possible to carry on an internal blockade as well as an external one. The operations of air power are, indeed, a form of blockade rather than a form of assault, curious as this may sound. These operations are directed at industrial facilities, railways, docks, shipping, canal locks, and other fixed targets of like nature. Their purpose is to prevent the enemy from moving raw materials from their sources to manufacturing centers, and from moving finished munitions from manufacturing centers to the fighting fronts. It makes no difference, in principle, whether this process is interrupted by destroying a railway bridge between the mine and the factory, or by destroying the factory itself. The basic idea is to disarm the enemy by depriving him of the means of making things to fight with.

Whether air power by itself can be decisive in the war against such a nation as Germany has been a matter of much controversy. It is a controversy that may never be decided. If the Germans were to offer to surrender unconditionally tomorrow, there would be enthusiasts to claim that air power did it, and there would be counter-enthusiasts to claim that the Russian Army did it. The fact is, of course, that if there were no Russian Army, the Germans would be able to put a lot more effort into defending themselves against Anglo-American air attack; and if there were no air attacks they would be able to do much more against the Russian Army. You can carry this a little farther and point out that if there were no British and American navies, there would be no effective air attacks. The vast bulk of material which makes them possible could not be ferried across the Atlantic Ocean because of the U-boats; nor would

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the Russian Army be as tough a customer as it is, for a great deal of its best equipment — particularly the motor transport which is the core of its 1943 offensive — comes by sea from the arsenals of North America and Britain. Total war cannot be carried on effectively by one means alone. It demands the coördinated use of all methods of striking at the enemy. Teamwork, not any one fighting arm, is the key to victory.

For the moment, Britain and the United States are doing most of the blockading, and the Russians most of the assaulting. But unquestionably, the Allied High Command has decided upon a full-scale invasion of the European Continent by Anglo-American forces. The Germans face not only intensified air attacks but also the prospect of having to fight on two major land fronts, at the same time keeping in check the civil populations of their territories. What measures will they take to defend themselves?

II

The area which the Germans must defend is considerably less than the area which they now occupy. As long as they can hang on to the Lorraine iron mines, the coal and iron of Polish Silesia, the Rumanian and Galician oil fields and the mineral deposits of Jugoslavia, these, with their imports of Swedish iron, their own native resources, and their accumulated reserves, will enable them to carry on a long defensive war.

Germany's western industrial district in the Ruhr valley has been the principal target of our air power and has suffered severely; so also have other western industrial centers. The Germans have tried to counter this loss by transferring industries to safer areas and by building up the existing industries in other parts of the territory they control, notably in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Silesia. They have decentralized their industry as much as possible, especially their aircraft plants. There is, of course, a limit to what can be done in these directions. The production of steel, for example, is not an economical process except in close proximity to large coal fields. The bulk of the coal used in producing a given amount of steel is so great that long hauls from mine to foundry are not efficient. The Germans are not worried about production costs as far as balance-sheet figures are concerned, but they must take into account the terrific strain now being put on their railways and canals. They are short of locomotives, freight cars and barges. Their transportation system is one of our major air targets, and it is likewise suffering from all

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the ills which beset the German industrial plant as a whole. The moving of German industries from the places where the natural laws of economics originally caused them to be established, to other sites dictated by strategic necessity, imposes unnatural strains on this harried transportation system.

The effect of the continued air attacks must be to force the Germans to abandon occupied territory. This is a logical method of providing better air protection for the essential industrial districts. As the fighting fronts are contracted, less mobile field artillery is needed, for example, and hence more antiaircraft guns can be turned out. And all the equipment for repelling bombers can be concentrated. The Germans will retreat according to plan — if they can. They will do it in such a way as to gain the greatest possible advantage from it, and to leave behind them the fullest measure of chaos; but withdrawals are inevitable.

From the strategic point of view, the Germans must first of all take into account the geography of Europe. The most important topographical feature of the Continent is the great mountain wall of the Alps (extended eastward by the Carpathians), which stretches right across the middle of Europe from the Gulf of Lions to the western end of the Black Sea. North of this wall lies the European coastal plain, which begins at the Pyrenees, includes most of France, all of Belgium and Holland, and almost all of Germany and Poland, sweeping on to the east to lose itself in the vastness of the Russian steppes. The would-be invader of Germany must fight his way into the central portion of that plain in order to reach Germany's vital centers. He must, therefore, have a foothold in France or the Low Countries on the west, or in Poland on the east, or he must storm the passes of the mountain wall on the south.

At this writing, the Anglo-American forces have no foothold in France or the Low Countries. To get one, or to invade Germany from the German coast or through Denmark, they must effect a landing against a defense that will certainly be more powerful, more concentrated and better coördinated than the opposition to our landings in North Africa and Sicily. The German defensive measures in the west will make such a landing a very costly operation. No beachhead can be established against strong coastal defense except under the most complete air cover. That primary consideration restricts the likelihood of a landing in western Europe, based on Great Britain, to that part of the coast of Holland, Belgium and France which lies within 100 to 125

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miles of British air fields, this being the practical limit for fighter radius of action. Roughly speaking, then, a large scale invasion of that western shore must take place somewhere between the mouth of the Scheldt and the mouth of the Seine. This stretch of coast is, of course, the scene of the strongest German counter-preparations, and it also happens to be that coastal area where the German communications are best and shortest, so that they can bring to bear the most powerful opposition.

The chance of a landing in Brittany, or on the Atlantic coast of France, should not be ruled out, however. Such an invasion would have to be supported by long-range aviation plus carrier-based aviation. It would be possible as a diversion for a more important attack; or it might be a main effort if the Germans were already very busy elsewhere.

With the Allies in possession of Sardinia and Corsica, a landing on the Mediterranean shore of France will also be feasible, for there is a stretch of the Côte d'Or 80 miles long which on the average is only about 115 miles from the northern coast of Corsica. Such a landing would be still easier if it were part of a larger operation which included an assault from Italy against the Alpine passes separating Italy and France. But that would mean that the Allies were in possession of the plain of Lombardy and the valley of the Po, which the Germans may decide to hold in strength. It is an attractive plan, for it imposes heavy burdens on the German communications and is a combination of two methods of assault — the breaching of the mountain wall and the landing from the sea.

No landing is necessary at the eastern end of the north European coastal plain. The Russian armies are already advancing across their steppes toward the plains of Poland. There are no natural obstacles in their path save the great rivers of the region and the Pripet marshes. The Russians are superior in numbers to the Germans, though probably not yet superior in equipment, or in what may be called — for lack of a better term — tactical resourcefulness. The Germans here must base their defense on exploiting their superior skill and equipment by the use of every artificial obstacle and fortification which their engineers can devise. But the insufficiency of manpower both behind the lines and for fighting must compel the Germans to seek ever shorter fronts. The geography of the region favors such a plan. As the Germans retire westward from their present positions, the length of the Russian front contracts steadily; and they can even count

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on the front being divided, for defensive purposes, into two separate short fronts when they have reached the region of the Pripet marshes.

The European southern, or mountain, front is divided into three parts. The first is the Alpine front between France and Italy. Next, after the interval formed by neutral Switzerland, comes the mountain wall which divides Italy from Austria and northwestern Jugoslavia. Finally there is the Balkan front, which presents a series of mountain barriers beginning clear down at the head of the Aegean Sea and stretching back to the final barrier of the Carpathians. The Germans must decide where and how these several fronts will be defended.

Under modern conditions of warfare it is better to begin the defense of a mountain barrier by defending the approaches to the passes. If no such position is held and the enemy is able to move directly upon the passes, a mountain chain is not as formidable a barrier to military movement as it used to be. The Germans themselves proved this in their Balkan campaign and in Norway. If the attacker has good mountain troops he will quite surely be able to get hold of one or more passes, once he is beyond the approaches. The only hope of preventing him from passing over is a counterattack by strong reserves when he is (in the military term) astride the pass. But the attacker will always have air superiority; he would not be the attacker if he did not. And that air superiority can interfere drastically with the efforts of the defense to bring its reserves into action. In forcing a mountain pass, a powerful air cover acts as in forcing a beachhead, giving the attacking troops protection from counterattack until they are firmly established.

In other words, mountain warfare has now become as much a warfare of manœuvre as fighting in open country, although of course it is slower manœuvre and carried out by smaller units. The German Staff will not look upon mountains as impregnable defenses. Their chief value to a defender is that they impose delay and restrict the number and capacity of the enemy's lines of communication. An army which has passed through a mountainous region, and whose communications with its base remain dependent on the roads and railways of that region, is limited in size by the precariousness and awkwardness of the supply lines.

The geography of the southern front makes it seem desirable for the Germans to try to hold northern Italy as long as they can, in order to protect the approaches to the French and Austrian

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passes. Southern and central Italy are strategic liabilities, and for the most part economic liabilities as well, if the Germans have laid up sufficient reserves of sulphur, lead and zinc. The line of the Etruscan Apennines, roughly from Leghorn to Ancona, offers one possible defense position; the line of the river Po offers a second; and a third, that of the Piave, is available for defense of the approaches to the Brenner Pass and the Austrian frontier. But the loss of southern Italy is disadvantageous to the Germans in that it offers the Allies a base of operations against the Balkan peninsula.

The Balkan front is a difficult one for the Germans. Probably their most hopeful course is to fight desperately to prevent an Allied lodgment there at all. The Allies now have no foothold in the Balkans. To get an army there, they will have to come in from the sea, and to do that they will have to begin by reducing the island outposts which command the approaches to the Aegean Sea. That in turn is the avenue to Saloniki — the gateway of the Vardar-Morava valley — the only practicable approach to the heart of the Balkan peninsula which an invading Allied army can use. The reduction of Crete, with its strong fortifications and its picked German garrison, may prove even more troublesome than the reduction of Sicily, especially as the Allied bases are not as close to Crete as Tunisia, Malta and Pantelleria were to the Italian island. An approach by way of Cyprus to Castelorizzo to Rhodes seems probable. Indeed, Rhodes is in many ways the key to the Aegean, and the chink in the Cretan armor.

Once the outposts are driven in, so to speak, the German situation in the Balkan peninsula becomes more difficult at each step. From southern Italy, and the Aegean Islands, if they can be taken, the Allies can immediately do two things: they can start sending supplies and reinforcements across the Adriatic Sea to the Dalmatian ports of Jugoslavia, and they can start transforming the Aegean Islands into air bases and supply depots for a landing at Saloniki. It is hardly practicable to send an army of invasion across the Adriatic Sea from Italy; the seaports of Jugoslavia are small and their communications with the interior run through the terrific passes of the Dinaric Alps. But there are many brave, tough fighting men already in those mountains who ask only weapons and direction to launch themselves against the Germans. If they can be induced to stop fighting each other, and are supplied with light automatic arms, grenades, explosives, portable radios, light mortars and small fast tanks, as well as

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reinforcements in the shape of engineers, signal troops and specially trained units of mountain artillery, they can give the Germans a great deal of trouble. With proper air assistance, they might be able to cut the Belgrade-Nish-Saloniki railway and keep it cut. If this were done, the Germans would have difficulty in making a defense at and around Saloniki. And it certainly would take a great many German troops to keep that railway guarded.

With the Serbs in arms, and with Saloniki taken, the Germans must eventually withdraw to the line of the Danube and the Sava; and they must stand on that line. If they fail to make that stand good they permanently lose the Rumanian oil fields, one-half their supply. They risk the turning of the line of the Dniester, and a junction between the Allied right and the Russian left somewhere on the Moldavian plain. When these things happen, Germany is in a bad way.

III

There are two other factors in the defensive strategy of Germany. One is the question of defense against air attack. Germany must not only build up physical defenses; she must keep Allied air bases at a distance. On the east, the Russians — whose strong point has never been strategical bombing — can be allowed to come quite a bit nearer than they are now without undue German risk, though the industrial district of Silesia must be protected at all costs. On the south, however, the Germans cannot allow the establishment of Allied air bases in the plain of Lombardy if they are to keep inviolate their Czech and Austrian industrial regions, which hitherto, like Silesia, have gone comparatively untouched. The Germans will probably turn almost the whole attention of their aircraft industry to the production of fighters. A very considerable increase in the scale of antiaircraft protection for key industrial centers seems also certain; it will result naturally from a withdrawal in the occupied territory, as we have noted.

The remaining factor to be considered is naval strategy. There is evidence that the U-boat is being effectively dealt with. Should the Germans be compelled to abandon the U-boat campaign, the effect on their strategy would be a diminished interest in the Atlantic ports of Norway and France. As for the German surface fleet, it seems possible that some of its heavy units may be deliberately sacrificed in a desperate attack on the Atlantic shipping which is bringing to Europe the power that turns the balance against Germany. The remainder will be required to protect the

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left flank of the German Army, on the Baltic Sea, as the retirement from Russia develops.

To summarize. The object of German strategy from this time on must be to gain time — time for the United Nations to sicken of the bloodshed, time for dissensions to arise among them, time for political shifts of power in Germany herself which may make it possible for her to secure better terms. The German "Heartland," without which Germany cannot go on fighting, may be described as the territory of Germany itself, western and central Poland, Denmark, the Low Countries, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, northern Jugoslavia, Austria, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands and part of northern France. This central and vital area must be held. Once it is invaded, the beginning of the end is at hand, and the end itself not too far away.

It is, of course, a much smaller area than the Germans now possess. In Russia, they may find themselves compelled to give up much of their present conquests and they may do this rather suddenly, in a strategic withdrawal in great depth and on a broad front. They may also have to abandon Finland and southern and central Italy. But the rest — Norway, western and southern France, the Aegean Islands, the southern Balkans, northern Italy and western Russia — may be the scene of furious delaying actions, in which the German object will be to exact heavy Allied losses without paying too great a price themselves. They will try to keep their positions well consolidated and linked up. They will form powerful reserve armies from the forces they save by their Russian withdrawal. They are unlikely again to take the risk of pushing out large forces into exposed positions, as they did at Stalingrad and in Tunisia. And they will have to abandon hope of an offensive in the air in order to purchase increased defensive power. They may also have to abandon their offensive at sea.

The defeat of Germany will come about when the German Heartland can no longer be defended.

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CURRENCY STABILIZATION: AMERICAN AND BRITISH ATTITUDES

By John H. Williams

LAST April the American and British Treasuries published two plans for monetary stabilization after the war, one the work of Harry D. White, Director of the Division of Monetary Research of the Treasury Department, the other of Lord Keynes, now serving as an adviser of the British Treasury. Since I commented on the two plans in these pages last summer [1] several events have occurred which might indicate that the present is not a good moment to continue the discussion. In July there appeared a Canadian plan which was in the nature of a compromise between the other two. In August a revised White plan was published. Then in the autumn Lord Keynes came to Washington for the first time since the plans were announced. Until the results of the conversations which then occurred become known there is much to be said for postponing further technical analysis.

For a discussion of the nature of the problem, however, as well as of the issues which may determine national attitudes towards it, we do not need to await the definitive work of the experts. There are reasons, indeed, to believe that this sort of discussion should not be delayed. Early comments on the plans in the press, both here and in Britain, were largely non-committal. But, as time went on, the opinions expressed took more definite shape. It can be said that from the time of the publication of the revised White plan in August the American press and American banking and foreign trade opinion have been almost uniformly unsympathetic to both plans. For example, on September 29 the *New York Times* rejected them both and quoted with approval a statement calling for the restoration of the gold standard at the earliest possible date after the war.

In England the comment has revealed a strong determination to avoid the gold standard and what is called the "straitjacket of 1925–31." This determination seems to be shared by all classes in the community. The opposition to the White plan has been pronounced. On August 24 the *Manchester Guardian* wrote of it: "Let it be said at once that no British government could accept

[1] John H. Williams, "Currency Stabilization: The Keynes and White Plans." FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1943.

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anything remotely like these proposals and remain in power beyond the first postwar election." On the Keynes plan, British opinion has been generally favorable. But the London *Economist* of August 28, after withholding judgment for several months, stressed the basic similarity of the two plans, warned of the danger of "repeating the gold standard mistake of 1925 and of setting up an excessively rigid system which cannot be maintained," and expressed doubts whether even the British plan is flexible enough to work in the conditions that are likely to exist after the war.

In my previous article I raised two main questions: Is it wise to attempt to deal both with the problems of the transition period from war to peace and with longer-run currency stabilization under a single plan? Could the longer-run stabilization be best effected by the adoption of an over-all plan like the Keynesian clearing union or the White stabilization fund or by a more gradual "key countries" approach, beginning with the dollar-sterling rate and tying in, as circumstances warrant, the other currencies significant for international trade?

Towards the second suggestion American banking opinion has seemed to be generally sympathetic; but in England, so far as I am aware, there has not been the faintest favorable response. British opinion seems fully as opposed to tying sterling to the dollar as to tying it to gold. The British alternative to the Keynes plan is an enlightened bilateralism. How it might work out is described by *The Economist* in the article just quoted. "The principles of the clearing union have for some years been applied within the boundaries of the sterling area. . . . Other such groupings may well come into existence, and it ought not to be very difficult to build up a system of currency groups with substantial freedom of payment within each group and controlled — but not restrictively controlled — exchanges between group and group. . . . There is not the slightest reason why the relations between these groups and the dollar, or the dollar group, should be relations of hostility or discrimination — unless, indeed, it is hostility and discrimination to suggest that other countries cannot spend more dollars than they earn." This proposal has some similarity to my own "key countries" suggestion, except that what I had in mind was that by stabilizing the principal currencies, each of which would be central for an area of trade or be otherwise internationally significant, a truly multilateral system could be attained. But the difference between the suggestion of starting this

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process with the dollar-sterling rate and *The Economist's* hope that the relations with the dollar would not be necessarily hostile shows how wide is the gap to be bridged.

On the other suggestion — to treat separately the problems of the transition period and those of long-run currency stabilization — there seems to be almost complete agreement in this country. Whether the British or the American experts really intended that their plans should be used for both purposes seems now less clear than was at first assumed. It has been said on excellent authority that this was not the case, and the misinterpretation has been ascribed to the failure to bring forward simultaneously with the currency plans the more comprehensive program for dealing with the postwar problems. The need for a clear and unmistakable separation between these two problems now seems to me the greatest single prerequisite for the success of any plan for currency stabilization. There is a fundamental conflict between the requirements of the transition period and those of longer-run monetary stabilization; any plan that serves one purpose well is bound to fail in the other. In the immediate postwar period the chief needs will be for relief and rehabilitation and for the liquidation of the foreign-owned balances that have accumulated in certain countries, most notably in England. These will be needs of very large dimensions. In my previous article I spoke of the inflationary danger of meeting these needs by a method which would expand American bank reserves and deposits, already greatly enlarged by the war. I cannot avoid the conclusion that preoccupation with this problem has been one of the main reasons for the marked difference between the American and British experts with regard to the size of the stabilization fund or clearing union and the amount of the American commitment. But to restrict unduly the provision of funds for these immediate postwar needs would be probably the greatest mistake that could be made. We are brought back to the fact that the two purposes are in conflict with each other.

The immediate postwar need will be for lending and borrowing — or, as I earlier suggested, for extension of lend-lease — and very probably many of the loans will have to stand for a considerable period. It was doubtless because of this problem that Sumner Slichter in the July issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS called for the creation of an international bank before the end of 1943; and one of the most significant recent developments was the publication by our Treasury experts in October of a tentative draft for

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an international bank. I cannot discuss this proposal here beyond saying that I have the greatest difficulty in understanding how there can be an international bank, except in a formal or nominal sense, or for very limited purposes, in a world which has only one large creditor country and many debtor countries. My present point is that, however it is to be met, the first and most pressing need after the war will be for lending and borrowing or for lend-lease.

But this is a totally different thing from what is required in any successful plan for currency stabilization. In any such plan the fundamental requirement is the maintenance of an even balance position with only temporary fluctuations from it. Under the gold standard, for example, such a position is supposed to be indicated and maintained by a two-way flow of gold, and any pronounced and sustained tendency for gold to flow one way is a sign of disequilibrium calling for major international adjustments.

The danger under the Keynes or the White plan, unless the needs of the transition period are handled separately, would be that the clearing union or stabilization fund would get into a chronic lopsided condition. Some countries would have run up large debits and other countries (mainly the United States) largely credits, and each group of countries would then be expected to pursue the policies of adjustment which are required by the plans — and this not by reason of anything arising out of their, by then, more normal situations but because of the past misuse of the stabilization fund. The alternative course, and the wiser one, if such a condition were allowed to develop, would be to reorganize the fund and start over again; but it seems not unlikely that by then the whole scheme would be discredited.

The right remedy, as I have said, would be completely separate provision for relief and reconstruction, war balances, and all other requirements of the transition from war to peace. On some parts of this program we are already embarked;[2] but it will be a laborious task, more difficult and less fascinating than working

[2]As this article goes to press, details are becoming known regarding the funds to be made available through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The proposal to spend about 2.5. billion dollars in this manner constitutes a step in the right direction, but this amount will not take care of reconstruction needs in a broader sense, which also must be prevented from becoming a drag on the international stabilization mechanism. Britain, for instance, will have a great deal of reconstructing to do, although in the UNRRA she will be not a beneficiary but a contributor. It may furthermore be necessary to make provision for bridging the period which may elapse before Britain and particularly the continental nations can reëstablish their export trade. As to British war balances, they have been estimated at 4 to 5 billion dollars, and growing at the rate of some 2 billion dollars a year.

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out the mechanics of plans for currency stabilization. It seems fair and prudent to insist that no decision on currency stabilization should be made until these plans are known and have been weighed in their entirety. If this procedure is followed, it may help to create a better atmosphere in this country for further consideration of the plans. Undoubtedly, one factor making for hostility has been the suspicion that under the guise of a world currency plan other matters were being brought in that did not properly belong, and this unfavorable attitude has not been helped by references to the advantages of "anonymous borrowing," or of "denationalizing" or "impersonalizing" loans.

An interesting question in recent discussions has been whether, if an adequate program is worked out for the transition problems, a plan for currency stabilization should be set in operation simultaneously with it or at the end of the transition period. This is another of the major questions and it is closely related to the first, for if the two plans are set up simultaneously the currency plan will inevitably be the catch-all for any inadequacies in the transition program. We would probably do a better job on relief, reconstruction and war balances if we knew we could not fall back on the currency plan; and we would run less danger of ruining the latter if we postponed it. One argument advanced in favor of having the currency plan at once is that we must avoid the monetary chaos that followed the last war. The analogy, however, is misleading. We now have well-developed systems of exchange control, and the task of currency stabilization this time will not be to prevent wild gyrations of exchange rates but to work toward the economic and political conditions and the level of exchange rates under which the controls can be relaxed. This will take time, and meanwhile a good program for handling the transition problems, internationally and nationally, would be the greatest help. From this point of view it can be argued that the right time for a plan designed to stabilize currencies under more normal conditions is when those conditions have arrived.

A more persuasive argument for the immediate adoption of a currency plan is that the only time, if ever, that the nations will agree on such a plan is now, under wartime stress and in close wartime association. With this can be coupled the argument that once the plan is agreed upon it need not go into complete effect at once. The enemy countries, in any case, could be brought in only after a period of preparation; and even in the case of the United and Associated Nations criteria could be established for

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determining the conditions under which each would participate actively. This could be a way of incorporating the "key currencies" proposal into the White or Keynes plan, though it would still leave in my mind the question whether the more elaborate plan, with its international governing body and its formalized rules and quotas and voting powers, is really necessary or would really work. Like the editors of *The Economist*, I fear the plan might prove too rigid, though I think I am not giving this word the application they intended. I do admit, however, that the safeguards I have mentioned — the separate treatment of transition and long-run problems and a well-conceived procedure for a gradual incorporation of countries under the stabilization plan as they become ready — would go some distance toward lessening some of my doubts about the currency plans.

II

But there is a deeper difficulty. The examples of conflict between British and American opinion already cited — and I might have quoted at much greater length — reveal a conflict between two fundamentally different schools of thought. Followed into all of its logical ramifications, the conflict embraces the entire clash of ideas between the principles of a world economic system as handed down from the classical economists and the closed-economy principles developed by Lord Keynes and others during the nineteen twenties and thirties. I have not believed that the two are irreconcilable, and one of the best reasons for such a view now is that Lord Keynes is strongly for their reconciliation. But it will be a formidable task and will call for a high degree of tolerance and sympathetic understanding by each country of the other's problems. The main question about the currency plans is whether we are prepared, on either side, to adopt them in our present divided state of thinking.

England's fears about currency stabilization, and especially about being tied to gold or to the dollar, are summed up in the phrase "the straitjacket of 1925–31." It means two things, or two aspects of the same thing. England wishes to control her internal economy and to avoid the external pressures which threaten that control. All through the British discussions of the currency plans runs the determination to avoid unemployment resulting from deflationary pressure. This is why the British fear the currency plans may be too rigid. The attraction for them of the Keynes plan is that it promises an expansionary method of adjustment,

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whereas they think the White plan, like the gold standard, would be deflationary. This is a rather difficult point to unravel. Basically, as I said in my last paper, the monetary mechanism of the currency plans and of the gold standard is the same. The only sense in which the Keynes clearing union could be more expansionary than the gold standard would be in providing larger foreign exchange resources and a better distribution of them. This would be an advantage all round by facilitating trade. But I cannot avoid the feeling that it is just here that the confusion between the transition period and the longer-run enters in. If the problems of the transition period are handled separately, the need for a very large fund, just to facilitate trade all round, becomes much less clear. The main purpose would be to provide some leeway for merely temporary departures, as circumstances might warrant, from the normal requirement that international transactions must balance. If the plan did not work in this way it would be a failure. But the size of the fund is itself an element of the problem, and too large a fund would be as dangerous as one too small. Probably only experience could give the answer.

According to the classical gold standard theory, the effect of gold flow should be two-sided — a fall of prices in the gold-exporting country and a rise in the gold-importing country. This should lead to a reverse flow of gold and the opposite price changes. The complaint of the British about the gold standard in the inter-war period was that it worked only one way, by gold outflow and deflation in the debit-balance countries. I will come back to this question later. But what many of them seem to mean when they contrast the Keynes plan with the gold standard (or the White plan) is that under the Keynes plan the adjustment process would again be one-sided, but that it would be a process of expansion in the creditor country rather than contraction in the debtor country. One thing this suggests is that the surplus country should simply let its credits in the clearing union pile up indefinitely; and some stabilization plans I have seen come to just about that, even providing for periodic cancellations and for starting over again if the credits get so large as to bother either party. Sometimes, too, the discussion of foreign "investment" as the balancing agent becomes almost as mechanical as this. But that of course is not what Lord Keynes means or what his plan provides. Some of the statements in his White Paper, however, do make it seem unrealistically simple for the creditor country to take over the burden of adjustment. This is especially true of

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the statement, often made by other British economists as well, that a surplus country need never have a larger surplus than it wants to have.

This could mean a rise of prices in the creditor country, as under the gold standard; but that only raises the question whether inflation is any more desirable to the creditor country than deflation is to the debtor country. It could also mean exchange control or direct manipulation of the trade, capital or other items of the balance of payments; but this raises the question whether direct controls are to be used as methods of adjustment or whether one of the objectives of the plans is not to lessen the need for such controls. Finally, there are the possibilities of correcting the balance by trade and investment policies without direct controls, and of appreciating the currency. But these are not so easy, and their effectiveness is not so clear as the statement that a country need never have a larger surplus than it wants to have suggests. Moreover, all the methods of adjustment mentioned are applicable in reverse to the debtor countries. The discussion leads nowhere, and we are forced to examine more carefully the particular circumstances, and also the character of the thinking, in the countries concerned. The real question is whether the nations can find and agree upon a system requiring mutual adjustments in which the benefits outweigh the costs.

III

For England the dangers in fixed exchange rates are undoubtedly much greater than for this country. With us, foreign trade plays a smaller rôle and the impact of changes in the balance of payments upon the domestic economy is much milder. Only in unusual circumstances, like those of the transition period from war to peace, are we likely to face a serious threat of inflation from external causes. Much more likely in most circumstances would be the threat of deflationary pressures upon the British economy. Two of the chief lessons from the inter-war period are the difficulty of finding new equilibrium exchange rates after a great war has profoundly changed international relationships, and the need for providing an orderly method of adjustment as the basic circumstances change thereafter. It seems safe to predict that no currency plan which does not promise this measure of flexibility of exchange rates will be acceptable to England or to other deficit countries.

But if such countries were to press for changes in exchange

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rates as their favorite method of adjustment to international pressures, the main purpose of the plan would be defeated. The circumstances in which a nation can benefit by major changes in exchange rates are rare. England undoubtedly did benefit from the depreciation of the pound in 1931, partly because it had been seriously overvalued when she restored the gold standard in 1925, and partly because the change occurred in the unique circumstance of a world-wide depression. The depreciation of the pound undoubtedly deepened temporarily the depression elsewhere and forced other countries to depreciate. It was one step, though not the first, in the vicious circle of depreciation which is one of the chief dangers of the process. That it enabled England to base her own recovery in part upon cheap imports is one of those paradoxes which could happen only in the buyer's market conditions of a great depression, and probably even then only when practised by a country occupying a central position in world trade. But it did give relief from the tyrannical pressures of the preceding six years, and has stood ever since as the landmark of England's recovery of a reasonable degree of control over her internal affairs.

The counterpart of the undue emphasis upon flexible exchange rates is the emphasis upon the need for protecting the internal cost-price structure from external pressure. The classical economists in discussing the interplay of national price levels under the gold standard did not regard the price adjustments as inflationary or deflationary. This may have been because prices were then less rigid, or because they left the business cycle out of their analysis. For some time I have not been satisfied that price changes played so large a rôle in the adjustment process of the gold standard as the classical theory pretended, and ascribe more importance to capital movements and to income changes. Undoubtedly, however, whenever serious maladjustments persist, we are brought down to a choice between making cost-price adjustments or changing the exchange rates, that is, unless we resort to the third alternative of directly controlling exchange transactions and the balance of payments.

The tendency in modern monetary and fiscal theory to treat the stability of the cost-price structure (or at any rate avoidance of any downward pressure on it) as the *force majeure* to which all policies must be adapted, is the most striking element of conflict between what I earlier called the closed economy economics and the classical world system. Granting that the

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latter made too much of the need for price adjustments, I question whether a multilateral trade system can ever be attained along with adherence to a rigid internal cost-price structure. In England's case in 1925, the adjustments would have had to be too sweeping; the mistake was in overvaluing the pound. After this war also the first major task will be in general to adapt the exchange rates to the price levels, rather than the other way round. But for the continuing operation of the system, once reasonably stable currency relationships have been found, cost-price adjustments must also play a part.

Whether such adjustments are deflationary depends upon how they are combined with other policies. In the great depression, Sweden and Australia were able to combine substantial downward adjustments of wage rates and other costs with expansionary monetary and fiscal measures, and with exchange rate adjustments designed to improve their international position and to stimulate recovery. It is noteworthy, too, that these are progressive countries and that the measures in question had the support of a majority of organized labor. In Britain today, and in some other countries, the development of a conscious state responsibility for social welfare, the plans for improving social security, the political as well as the economic emphasis upon the maintenance of full employment by measures under national control rather than in response to international forces whose control must be shared with others, provide ample explanation why fears are felt of too rigid currency plans. But unless a reasonably stable multilateral trade system can be worked out the internal objectives will probably be jeopardized as well.

IV

As for the United States, it is entirely understandable that we should approach the currency plans with a preference for the gold standard. Our brief departure from it in 1933 showed that in severe depressions even we might depreciate the currency if others did, but it indicated no lasting desire for a variable exchange rate. What it may have done (I have the influence of the farm bloc particularly in mind) was to close the door permanently to any possibility of appreciating the currency, which is one of the remedies for maladjustment recommended by Lord Keynes to creditor countries.

The reproaches leveled against this country during the interwar period — particularly in the twenties — for its failure to

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perform its rôle as a creditor country presented a confusing picture and were bound to cause us some uneasiness about undertaking such a responsibility again. The uneasiness is not lessened by the frequent references we read as to how well England performed the task when she was the leading creditor prior to 1914. Some of the main causes of the monetary chaos after the last war were, quite apart from any relations that would normally exist between creditor and debtor countries, mistakes that we must hope will not be repeated, such as the reparation payments and the inter-Allied debts. The failure to achieve political and economic stability in Europe was mainly responsible for the recurrent panicky flights of capital to this country. The raising of our tariffs in the face of a world which was required to repay its debts to us brought down upon us, and rightly, more condemnation than any other single action; but was quite in line with the action of other countries that were demanding reparation payments from Germany. As for exports of capital, they occurred, particularly to Germany and Latin America, but were misdirected and mismanaged, and they are commonly listed as elements of disturbance in a troubled decade. The reproach that we were "burying the world's gold in the vaults of Washington" after England's return to gold was mistaken. There was no lack of expansion here; we were already embarked upon the boom which ended in the crash of 1929, though its development was obscured by the fact that it showed itself not in a rise of commodity prices but in security prices and incomes. Our attempt to redistribute gold by reducing interest rates in 1927, after consultation with the European central banks, ended in increased security speculation and a return flow of the gold. Reviewing the decade as a whole, and in the light of the ideas then held, we find a confusing picture. It is not one to suggest that the rôle of a creditor nation in a postwar period is simple.

As for the analogy with England in the nineteenth century,[3] there are some rather striking differences. One is our mixed agricultural-industrial economy. There is much more likely to be a divided national opinion in this country than in a more predominantly industrial country where capital exports and receipts of interest are matched naturally by industrial exports and agricultural imports and where controversies about tariff policy

[3] Of major importance for England, of course, were such factors as her central position in world trade and finance, the use of sterling as the world currency, the London discount market as the international clearing mechanism, and the Bank of England's control over interest rates.

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are less likely to arise. This point should not be over-emphasized. I have often pointed out that foreign trade is largest between the industrial countries with high purchasing power. But it is a troublesome feature of our situation, and after the war may be intensified by our production of synthetic rubber and other substitutes for products formerly imported.

Another peculiarity is that though we are a creditor country we still have the power of attracting capital for investment and speculation as well as for safety, under favorable conditions, and in a boom may easily switch from being a net exporter to being a net importer of capital. In such a case, expansion here does not relieve but only intensifies deflationary pressures upon deficit countries, and probably leaves them no effective remedy but direct control of capital exports.

Prior to this war, England was a creditor on income account, with a characteristic excess of merchandise imports. Her foreign investment was for the most part made by leaving her income abroad, reducing her import balance rather than creating an excess of exports. In our case, tourist expenditures and remittances to foreigners have been offsets to our receipts of interest, and they are likely to expand after the war. To them will be added at some stage the export of capital. The prospect is thus for an excess of exports for some time to come. Whether this difference between our creditor position and England's earlier position raises any problems for currency stabilization and the future of world trade I am not sure. Theoretically, it would seem not to matter. Ability of foreign countries to buy from us would be furnished by our capital exports, with no effect upon their debit-credit position in the stabilization fund or clearing union. A country is probably in a better position to control its balance of payments, however, if it has an excess of imports. This advantage has often been pointed out in discussions of a country's ability to benefit from bilateral trade, but it would seem to apply also when the problem is that of a creditor country's responsibility for controlling a multilateral trade system. The application to our own case is that whereas, as a country with a net excess of exports, we have a particular interest in a multilateral system, we are in a less favorable position than England formerly was to make such a system work effectively.

After this war England will need greatly to expand her export trade. Some writers estimate that she will need an expansion of 50 percent and that she will have to couple it with a strict control

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of imports. Whether there will be room for both Britain and the United States to expand their export trade, and for the other debit-balance countries to do so too, is an interesting question. It suggests, of course, the desirability of a marked expansion of trade all round. While there may be no theoretical difficulty so far as concerns currency stabilization, one of the main purposes of which is to bring that about, there may be danger of excessive rivalry for markets or of a wave of protection against foreign goods such as occurred after the last war.

It might be better for the outside world to have our capital but to get its imports from Britain or other countries, and under conditions of high production and employment here that might suit us too. Avoidance of the practice of tying loans to the exports of the lending country would be one step in this direction. But for it to go very far, there would have to be something equivalent to one-way gold flow from this country, or in terms of Keynes' clearing union, a deliberate piling up by us of debit balances. Such a movement, coupled with a rise of our price-level relative to outside prices, might achieve the purpose, and some writers have even suggested a deliberate restriction of our exports to help bring it about. But these are heroic measures. Except possibly for the rise of prices, they seem improbable. Certainly there is nothing in the plans to suggest that such actions are expected.

One of the peculiarities of the inter-war period most remarked upon was the persistent demand for American goods and the chronic shortage of dollars to pay for them. This suggests foreign buying in excess of our capital exports and perhaps also misdirected spending of the borrowed funds. One service we could do to foreign countries would be to restrict our lending to the really necessary demand for foreign goods in the borrowing country. Expenditures for domestic labor and resources should be financed at home. This need not mean that the foreign borrowing should be limited to producer goods; it could include essential consumer goods producible more cheaply abroad than at home. By talking of "satisfactions," an economic theorist could probably convince himself that any disposition of the proceeds is justified; but his case would wear thin if the loan were spent, for example, on foreign grand pianos to entertain the Chinese workers on a Yangtze River Development project financed with foreign funds. One cause of the strong demand for American goods in the inter-war period, and of the persistent bias in our favor of the international accounts, was undoubtedly the attraction of

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American durable consumer goods. It suggests that there is room for the application of some homely principles of household economics to international trade between creditor and debtor countries. Another probable cause of the dollar-exchange shortage, however, was technological change; this gave our exports a persistent advantage beyond the power of foreign investment to overcome, despite its theoretical tendency to equalize costs. How to neutralize such a persistent advantage in the interests of international stability is not readily apparent, and suggests again that the task of the creditor country under present conditions is not simple.

I conclude again, as in my previous article, with the statement that the greatest contribution we can make to world stability is to maintain high production and employment here at home.[4] This would maximize imports and create the most favorable conditions for reducing tariffs, though it probably would not, by itself, lessen exports. The advantages of a high level of production for currency stabilization are sometimes overstated to imply that international trade adjustment could be made a one-sided process of expansion in the high production country. If the expansion could go on indefinitely without danger of a boom this might be true, though there is always the difficulty of a reversal of the capital movement and the feeding of expansion in the creditor country by deflationary pressure on the outside world. That this is not a fanciful fear is shown by the fact that our attraction of foreign funds in the late twenties is often cited as one cause of the world depression which later ensued.

V

The main question about the British and American currency plans, as I said earlier, is whether we are prepared, on either side, to adopt them in our present divided state of thinking. Any solution acceptable to both nations will have to involve some fairly drastic compromising of national attitudes. Whether this can be achieved by a formal plan, at one stroke, and with all the elaboration of an international governing body with votes and quotas, is one of the chief problems. Whether the corrective measures prescribed by the experts would have teeth, and whether if so the countries would join, are parts of the same

[4]The maintenance of high employment at home is, however, a problem no less complex than that of international currency stabilization. On the methods to be employed national opinion is far from united, and government planning for the postwar period seems less advanced than on the currency problem.

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problem. It is a nice question whether once the scheme was in operation moral pressure would keep it going and compel the necessary compromises of conflicting viewpoints. Perhaps it would. But a breakdown would be tragic.

My own preference has been for a more gradual approach based initially upon the currencies most essential for world trade, and providing criteria as to the conditions under which currencies could be brought into some more comprehensive scheme. But, as I indicated earlier, these different approaches are not entirely irreconcilable. My present attitude is one of wanting to see how national attitudes and the currency plans themselves develop. Whatever plan is followed, the essential prerequisites for its success are a completely separate plan for handling the problems of transition from war to peace and a thorough going British-American understanding.

This paper must conclude like the last one by pointing out that the currency stabilization plans were announced as only one part of a larger program embracing commercial policy, long-term and medium-term investment, and measures for stabilizing the prices of primary products in international trade. Before final decisions are reached, at any rate before legislation is adopted, we ought to see the whole program. Only then can one form a mature judgment on the currency plans themselves.

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WORLD INSTITUTIONS FOR STABILITY AND EXPANSION

By Alvin H. Hansen

THERE has been widespread debate in technical journals, and to some extent in the public press, of the international currency proposals put forward by the United States and British Treasuries and by the Canadian Finance Minister. By and large, however, the public generally has displayed relatively little interest in them. This is no doubt in part due to their technical nature; but it is also due to the sound insight of the public that good monetary arrangements, important as they are, cannot and do not insure the achievement of the economic goals that the public wants.

What are those goals? They are stability, and full employment with rising real income standards. We miserably failed to reach them in the two decades between World War I and World War II. In varying degrees in different countries throughout the western world we suffered violent price fluctuations, catastrophic movements in the level of income, prolonged intervals of mass unemployment, and very serious undermining of property values leading in some countries to widespread bankruptcy and in others to a serious deterioration of the middle class. We shall not succeed in establishing a secure political world following this war unless we solve our economic problems. High levels of employment and a high degree of economic stability are basic for the success of all other programs of international relations. They cannot be reached by letting things take their course. A positive program must be undertaken by all the leading countries together.

I believe there will be need in the postwar years for three new international economic institutions, one to take care of monetary stabilization, a second to expand international capital investment, and another for the control of prices of primary products.

The first institution, to provide for the international currency arrangement, though less important than the others, is necessary. A failure to provide satisfactory monetary arrangements could frustrate and defeat the other programs. It would be fatal (as the experience between the two wars abundantly shows) to return to a rigid and mechanical gold standard and to put forth as an end in itself the inflexible and rigid fixation of exchange rates. The monetary lessons of the last quarter century point, I think, to the

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conclusion that there should be no return to an international gold standard which automatically and directly acts as a regulatory mechanism. The control of the international monetary system which we hope will emerge after this war should be a conscious and rational one, carried out through international collaboration. A system of flexible yet substantially stable exchange rates can be realized within the framework of an expansionist program designed to promote full employment in the industrially advanced countries and to raise the productivity in the economically backward areas, and with institutions designed to minimize cyclical fluctuations. This should be the goal of the new international monetary arrangements.

II

My purpose here, however, is to describe the other two international institutions which seem to me necessary if we are to reach the two goals of stability and expansion. They are: (a) an International Development and Investment Bank; and (b) an International Commodity Corporation. The former could act continuously not only to promote economic stability but especially to promote development and expansion. The latter would be especially concerned with counter-cyclical policy, that is to say, with combating deflation or inflation.

In a previous issue of this review [1] I proposed an International R.F.C. Other suggestions along similar lines have since been published. The United States Treasury has made public a summary statement of guiding principles for a proposed United Nations Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Bank is intended to encourage private financial agencies to provide long-term foreign capital investment, and to coöperate with and supplement private capital when such support is needed. According to the Treasury proposal, the Bank may guarantee loans made with private capital to any foreign member government and through such government to its political subdivisions and to business located in the foreign country in question. The Bank may participate in loans made with private capital or it may make loans out of its own resources, but only when the borrower is unable to secure private funds on reasonable terms. The payment of interest and principal on all loans which the Bank guarantees, participates in, or makes from its own funds must be

[1] "The Economic Tasks of the Postwar World," by Alvin H. Hansen and C. P. Kindleberger, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1942.

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fully guaranteed by the government of the borrowing country. The developmental project must be investigated and approved by a competent committee; the terms of the loan must be reasonable; and on guaranteed loans the Bank must be compensated for the risk assumed.

The proposals advanced in the following pages are a development of the idea expressed in embryonic form in my earlier paper. The major function of the International Development and Investment Bank, I feel, should be to provide funds for development projects and for capital outlays on equipment and plant necessary to develop the agriculture and industry of the economically backward areas. To achieve this, it is important to lay a sound basis for private capital lending and investment in foreign countries. This the Treasury proposal also stresses as a guiding principle. Under proper arrangements, the bulk of foreign capital investment should and can consist of private loans and investments. But, in addition, loans and investments should be made by the Bank itself in cases where private funds cannot and will not enter. Indeed, in the absence of basic developmental projects, financed by public funds, private investments in many cases could not be undertaken.

Private funds could be encouraged to go into foreign loans and investment by two types of procedures already made more or less familiar to us through the Federal Housing Administration. As is known, that body has proved extremely effective in directing the private investment funds of financial institutions such as life insurance companies, savings banks, and commercial banks into the private house mortgage field. Under the F.H.A. plan, the prospective individual home owner who is contemplating building a new house must supply 10 to 20 percent of the total investment as equity money; the remainder may be financed by mortgages insured and guaranteed by the F.H.A. The prospective owner engages to pay an arranged rate of interest, plus a service charge including an insurance premium. These insurance premium payments are pooled by the F.H.A. and serve as a first buffer to guarantee the mortgages held by the lending institutions. If this insurance pool should be exhausted in a serious deflation of the real estate market, the Federal Treasury engages to guarantee the mortgages. The owner of the mortgage is, however, required in the first instance to foreclose on the property; only if the foreclosure does not adequately protect his mortgage will the insurance and guarantee be utilized.

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A similar procedure could be used in the international lending field. The International Development and Investment Bank could insure and guarantee the various loans, charging the borrower an insurance premium and a service charge in addition to interest. Such a program would go far to create confidence in foreign financial investment.

In addition, provision should also be made for the encouragement of equity investment. It has been suggested that the F.H.A. might well offer a yield insurance on the entire investment for large apartment house projects, in which case there would be no mortgages whatever. A life insurance company, for example, would erect a large apartment house and the F.H.A. would be authorized to insure the recovery of substantially all of the original investment and a minimum annual return of, say, 2 percent for a period of, say, 30 years. Such a provision would offer insurance companies a strong incentive to undertake large projects of this character. The company would, of course, anticipate and reasonably expect a return of perhaps 4 or 4.5 percent, but it might not feel inclined to undertake the venture at all without a minimum guarantee. Similarly, in the international field, equity capital could be induced to undertake large projects if a minimum guarantee were assured.

As already noted, however, the International Development and Investment Bank itself would have to undertake to make loans and participate in direct investment. This is necessary if foreign investment is to be undertaken on an adequate scale. Such loans and participations would be made for approved capital projects in foreign countries. The projects would be undertaken by the foreign government itself or by private industry guaranteed by it.

The funds thus provided by the International Development and Investment Bank could be raised in two ways. In considerable measure, doubtless, the bank would be in a position to issue guaranteed bonds in the various private capital markets of the world. A second source would be the Bank's own capital funds subscribed by the various participating governments.

The question may well be asked why there is any need for anything further than the insurance of private investment funds. The answer is that loans and investment by the Bank are necessary because many projects which deserve development cannot in fact earn sufficient returns to induce private investment. It does not follow that such development projects are economically

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unsound. In the first place, it may simply mean that certain basic development projects requiring a vast amount of fixed capital, such as electric power, river valley development, port facilities, and transportation facilities of different kinds, cannot be undertaken unless funds can be obtained at very low rates of interest. The Bank could sell guaranteed bonds in the private capital markets at lower rates of interest than would prevail for private or foreign country issues. Loans and investments which are feasible at a low rate of interest, therefore, could be financed by the device of guaranteed bonds of the International Development and Investment Bank.

In addition, however, I believe it is important to recognize — and I must emphasize that I am stating merely my own personal views — that many basic development projects are profitable and thoroughly sound economically, viewed from the standpoint of their effect upon the economy as a whole, even though they cannot return the principal plus the market rate of interest. They may even be sound should they fail to return any interest or the whole of the initial principal. It is generally agreed that the public investments thus far made in the Tennessee Valley and in the Columbia River Valley in the Pacific Northwest have profoundly influenced the economic development in those areas and will do so increasingly in the years to come. They have opened up new private investment outlets which would not have existed without the basic development by public funds. The effect of opening up private investment outlets, of increasing productivity and of raising income and purchasing power is such that the public outlays are thoroughly sound from the economic standpoint and may be considered highly profitable to the economy as a whole even though the Treasury does not get back one hundred cents on the dollar, or any interest at all. Indeed, it may well be that in the long run the Treasury will profit directly through the enlarged taxable capacity of the nation as a whole.

Precisely the same analysis applies, I believe, to basic development projects in the foreign field. It must be recognized, however, that the foreign government stands to gain from the favorable repercussions upon its own national economy flowing from these basic developments. It therefore is true that it should be able in most instances to guarantee the principal and a moderate rate of interest, even though the direct returns to it from the investment will be less than one hundred cents on the dollar. While this is true, it must not be overlooked that the International Develop-

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ment and Investment Bank might well share some of the loss of principal and interest with the foreign government in question. The member countries participating in the International Development and Investment Bank will indirectly benefit from these projects through the export stimulus which the foreign investment will provide; particularly would this be the case if such loans and investment were made in depression periods. Investment outlays of this *low* direct yield character would have to be made from the capital funds of the Bank itself.

If we are really going to achieve an expanding economy and provide full employment and higher income standards, I am convinced of the necessity of searching out development projects which, from the standpoint of a private business, would not yield satisfactory returns and hence could not be undertaken by private investment, but which nonetheless are profitable and sound from the standpoint of the economy as a whole. For such projects only public funds can be found. Only the government can take the larger view. Only it can take account of the induced and indirect repercussions upon the whole economy — upon private investment outlets, productivity, employment and real income.

In the domestic sphere, public outlays need to be made in the area of urban re-development, river valley development, and transportation so that adequate new private investment outlets may be opened up. International investment outlets of a similar basic character would constitute important supplements to these internal development programs.

From the cyclical standpoint, the International Development and Investment Bank could act in a powerful manner to offset declines in private capital outlays in the leading industrial countries. At the onset of such a decline, the Bank should enter vigorously with development projects. It is especially in such periods that the Bank could afford to assume larger risks and, indeed, face the prospect of some direct loss, rather than permit large-scale unemployment of the capital goods industries in the leading industrial countries.

III

Equally important from the standpoint of preparing a world-wide attack on deflation would be the work of an International Commodity Corporation, designed to buy, store and sell international raw materials and to act as a buffer in the raw materials market. In the event that a deflation of raw material prices

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seemed to impend, the International Commodity Corporation should make large purchases of storable raw materials. It would permit the free play of market price forces within upper and lower price ranges for each commodity. Buying operations would be indicated as soon as the price pierced the lower limit, and selling operations as soon as it rose above the upper limit. These upper and lower limits should be the subject of continuous study by the Corporation and should be adjusted from time to time according to fundamental trends of normal demand and supply. An important part of the Corporation's function would be to search for new uses for basic raw materials, and to coöperate with the various national governments to facilitate the movement of resources out of submarginal areas in an effort to adjust normal supply to normal demand.

At the onset of an impending world-wide depression, the International Development and Investment Bank, the International Commodity Corporation and the International Stabilization Fund would each be expected to play an important anti-deflationary rôle. The action of the three institutions in exerting a counter-cyclical control might well be coördinated through an International Economic Board acting in close collaboration with each of these international institutions. Such an International Economic Board should seek to induce not only effective coördination between the three international agencies indicated, but also coördination of internal policies of the various governments designed to maintain high levels of employment within each country. The policies of the various international bodies must be coördinated if they are to achieve the greatest possible effect on world economy. Moreover, the acts of the various national governments need to be subjected to international scrutiny in order to prevent "beggar-your-neighbor" policies. The common purpose is the promotion in various countries of those expansionist programs consistent with the best functioning of the world economy as a whole. Concerted action by the various governments and by the international economic agencies is necessary when depression threatens. It also is essential if inflationary tendencies in some parts of the world are to be checked without forcing deflation and unemployment upon other parts.

In analyzing this program of international lending and investment, many readers will raise the very pertinent question of transfers of currency. Can the transfers of interest and dividend payments which the proposals entail be made from the borrowing

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countries to the lending countries without creating an impossible foreign exchange situation?

Intellectual honesty demands the answer that there is no assurance that this problem can be solved with complete satisfaction. There is indeed nothing certain about any program to be undertaken in the very difficult decades lying ahead. We must proceed in part by an act of faith. But I do feel that there is enough reasonable ground for confidence that the transfer problem can be solved to warrant taking the risk, particularly in view of the fact that inaction would involve a greater risk. It seems to me that the transfer problem is an entirely different thing in a world which is seriously depressed, where each country is engaged in cut-throat competition, than it would be in a prosperous world with high levels of income and employment, a strong world demand and a high volume of world trade. If we succeed in solving the problem of full employment and thereby developing a strong demand for imports in the advanced industrial countries, the relatively small marginal demand for foreign exchange resulting from the payment of interest and dividends on foreign capital will not present any seriously difficult problem. Our first concern must be to achieve high levels of income and world trade. A program of foreign lending and international investment will contribute greatly to this end and will thereby itself promote conditions favorable to a solution of the transfer problem.

There seems to be a fairly large consensus among thoughtful people in many countries that an international program should be undertaken in the three fields here briefly indicated. The organizational details of each of the international bodies which I have discussed will need to be worked out in an international conference. None of the leading governments has as yet committed itself to any program. What ultimately emerges may well prove very different from the outlines sketched here. Meanwhile, public discussion and thinking are needed to help guide government officials aright towards workable solutions.

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ARGENTINA:
THE THIRTEEN-YEAR CRISIS

By Ysabel Fisk

THE Argentine Revolution of June 4, 1943, marked a new phase in a crisis — political, economic, and even moral — that has been growing worse without apparent solution for more than 13 years. For several months now the United States has been watching the government of General Pedro P. Ramírez with mingled disapproval and bewilderment, just as for the last several years it had been watching the government of Ramón S. Castillo. To most Americans, Argentina is a riddle.

The internal change which Argentina has been undergoing is one of the most significant in the country's history. The political crisis we have been witnessing is a surface phenomenon, and will not be solved until the deeper issues are settled. In the interests of understanding, let us forget for a moment what is obvious in the present de facto government — the unfriendliness to the United States, the Fascist bent of the military — and look at the situation out of which it arose. The Ramírez revolution is a product of the critical 1930's. And the 1930's are the product of a profound social change in the structure of Argentine society.

Argentina has two major parties, the Unión Cívica Radical, or Radical Party, and the Partido Demócrata Nacional, or Conservative Party. The parties historically represent different classes, different policies and different interests. Until 1916, all governments were Conservative, and elections were controlled. The 19th century Conservative governments represented the landholding class, particularly the landholders of the richest and biggest Argentine province, which is Buenos Aires. The landowners, who held seignorial tracts running into the hundreds of thousands of acres, grew wealthy on the rise of land values, and lived by their trade with Europe, most particularly with England. They stood for free trade, cheap money, easy credit. They were against tariff barriers and against the industrialization of Argentina. For them, the nation's colonial position as a producer of foodstuffs and raw materials, and consumer of manufactured products, was the ideal; and *La Prensa* was one of the outstanding free-trade organs of the world.

The Radical Party, on the other hand, is a middle-class and urban party. It began in the city of Buenos Aires among the

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merchant class, the small tradesmen who lived not by exporting meat and cereals but by importing European goods. The Radical Party came into being as a protest against aristocratic government from which the middle class was excluded by electoral fraud, and as a protest against the depreciation of the paper peso, which was ruinous to the merchants. Between its founding in 1890, and its triumph in 1916, Radicalism snowballed, until it came to have a clear and overwhelming majority among the Argentine people. Its leader, and an early conspirator against the Conservative oligarchy, was Hipólito Irigoyen; and after the Sáenz Peña electoral reform, which accorded Argentina universal free suffrage, Irigoyen was elected the first Radical president in 1916.

Irigoyen served from 1916 to 1922. He was succeeded by another Radical, Marcelo T. de Alvear, who had a brilliant term. The twenties were years of great prosperity for Argentina, and the fears which the landed conservative class suffered due to the rise of Radicalism were softened somewhat by the profits in meats and grains. The *estancieros* — the owners of the great cattle and sheep farms, or *estancias* — thought, like everyone else, that prosperity was going to last, and that land would not stop rising in value. They mortgaged their *estancias* heavily in anticipation of a wiping out of the debt by further increment in value. They had been doing this for seventy-five years, and they felt no premonition of economic disaster. Banks gave too easy credit, and mortgages furnished money to build chateaux in France, where most of the aristocracy spent most of the year.

In 1928 Irigoyen ran again for president, and was overwhelmingly elected. He was the most popular president — the only popular president — Argentina had ever had, and the devotion of his followers was fanatic. But Irigoyen was an old man in his eighties, and his mind was visibly failing. His second term was a disaster. For two years, as the old man got feebler in mind and body, the government passed into the hands of the worst element in the Radical Party, and the nation was treated to a spectacle of plunder and inefficiency such as it had never seen. By 1930 it was evident that the government was intolerable, that Irigoyen must go. In September 1930 a military revolution headed by General José F. Uriburu overthrew the Radical government and instituted a provisional military government, with the approval, and to the general relief, of the great body of public opinion.

In April 1931 provincial elections were held in Buenos Aires.

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The Uriburu government was so sure that with the memory of Radical misgovernment still green the Conservatives would win that it allowed free elections. To its dismay, not the Conservatives but the Radical and Socialist opposition had the majority. For four months the government hesitated, not knowing what to do. The Provisional Government argued: we have made a revolution to put the Radicals out of office, and they win the first election; if we do not annul this election, the revolution has failed. Finally Uriburu scratched the April elections and called new ones. The elections of April 1931 were the last free expression of popular will in Argentina. Since then fraud, combined with continual intervention in the provinces, has made Argentine elections a machine for the renewal in office of the party in power. That party until June 1943 was the Conservative Party.

The Uriburu revolution played very rapidly into Conservative hands. The reason lay in the fact that the only political alternative to Radicalism was Conservatism, and the military in Argentina are a group distrustful of popular majorities. Furthermore, the Conservatives now had a great deal at stake. The breakdown of world trade in 1930 brought economic disaster to the agricultural class, first because deflation made their mortgages unpayable, and second because closing markets made it impossible to sell their beef and mutton. Family after family went down in the general ruin, including names that had stood for fabulous fortune. The *estancieros* who did not sink sold some of their land and mortgaged the rest. From the débâcle very little was salvaged. Certainly, the economic base of the landed aristocracy was gone, and apparently forever. It was at the very moment that the economic bases of the landholding class were slipping away that this class sought to save itself by taking political control of the Argentine Government. To understand the policies of this minority government for the thirteen years it was in control one must not lose sight of this fact. Argentine foreign policy becomes very clear if you consider, not the national interests of the country, but the special interests of the group in power. Its economic life was at stake, and it was fighting for itself, not for Argentina.

When the Uriburu interlude ended, the Conservatives elected as president General Augustín P. Justo, leader of the anti-Irigoyen split of the Radical Party, known as the Anti-Personalistas. The Anti-Personalistas were in coalition with the Conservatives, and made a good pseudo-popular front. It is

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worth noting that at no time did the Conservatives ever nominate a Conservative for president. The Conservatives took the vice-presidency. This indicates very well what was the real popular feeling towards Conservatism. Justo served the Conservative interests well. His six-year term exemplifies all that the ruling minority stood for in the serving of special interests, in venality, in corruption.

II

It is worth noting that the world depression, with its breakdown in trade and the increasing emphasis everywhere on autarchy, in Argentina struck only the agricultural class. There were other interests that were well served by the paralysis of trade — the sugar men of Tucumán, for instance, who needed high protection for their sugar; the wine producers of Mendoza, who could not compete in a free market with Chilean and European table wines; and above all the embryonic industrial class, ambitious to make textiles, shoes, hats, tableware and electrical equipment. All these groups wanted protective tariffs, and were in a state of economic civil war with the cereal and meat interests. They wanted to shut out British textiles, French wines, Cuban and Javanese sugar. On the other hand, the agricultural class, fighting for its life, wanted Argentina to buy at all costs abroad, and especially from England, so that it would have a market for its meat and grain surpluses.

It was at the depth of the depression, when many of the *estancieros* had seen the fortunes of several generations swept away, that a new, a more terrible disaster threatened. This was the possible shutting of the British market to Argentine meats as a result of the Imperial Preference agreement at Ottawa in 1932. The British Commonwealth of Nations signed pacts agreeing to put all non-member nations on a quota basis in products produced within the Empire. Almost immediately the Argentine quota was set, and month by month it was whittled away, until the British market was almost entirely closed to Argentine beef. For a black moment Argentina thought the world had come to an end. The life blood of the country was its relationship with Britain: selling beef in the Smithfield market, buying woolens and whiskies and machinery. More specifically, this reciprocity was the life of the agricultural class. The alarm of the Conservatives could be gauged when President Justo sent his Vice-President, Julio A. Roca, to London to negotiate with the British.

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The British, like the Argentine *estancieros*, had some very special interests at stake in Argentina. Great Britain for more than a century had been the largest foreign investor in Argentina. British capital built railroads, electric light companies, municipal street railways and meat-packing plants. But by the 1930's all but the packing houses were in bad shape, physically and financially. The railroad cars were obsolete, and getting worse by the day. Bonded indebtedness was so heavy the rolling stock could not be renewed. The tram companies were worse. In Buenos Aires, the Anglo-Argentine tram company had cars that *averaged* twenty-five years old, and with each year it lost more money. Utility companies were in the same condition. Automobile competition was daily taking more passengers away from the dirty wooden trains and the slow streetcars. British investors were getting no dividends from their Argentine railway stocks, and with the financial condition of the companies getting worse every year there seemed little possibility they ever would.

Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, had many complaints to make to Roca when he came to London in 1933 looking for a meat agreement. If Argentina did not want to be shut out entirely from the London market she would have to make concessions. Certain concessions were included in the treaty; others which were political dynamite are reported to have been made verbally. The following is what Argentina seems to have agreed to do. Argentine packing houses would not have more than 15 percent of the Argentine packing business. The rest would go to the great British and American packers. Argentina would stop building motor roads to compete with British railroads, and confine its road construction to feeder lines for the railroads. Argentina would pass a transport coördination law taking over the busses that competed with British railroads. Argentina would confiscate the Argentine-owned micro-busses that competed in Buenos Aires with British trams, and buy out the almost bankrupt Anglo-Argentine tram company. Argentina would give Great Britain favorable rates of exchange with the peso. Argentina would buy more from England and less from the United States. In return, Great Britain agreed not to reduce its quotas on Argentine meat any further than it already had.

The unfortunate thing about this agreement is that it tried by pressure to save a structure which might well have been saved simply by better business methods. The British railroads in Argentina were so old and gave such bad service, and their real

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capital value was so much less than the companies tried to make it appear, that only a stringent reorganization could have rescued them. They needed new rolling stock, yet had so little money that they were taking from the employees' pension fund to keep going. When automobile transportation came in, the answer of the railroads was not better service to compete with the busses, but a memorial to the Argentine Government, signed by all the railroads, protesting against the construction of highways.

Similarly, the Anglo-Argentine tram company, instead of trying to compete with the fast lines of micro-busses, called *colectivos*, pressed the British Government to urge the Argentine Government to confiscate the *colectivos*. Subsequent to the Roca agreement, the Argentine Congress passed the Transport Coordination Law. The capital of the Anglo-Argentine was recognized by law, and the company was guaranteed 7 percent on it. In lieu of taxes, the Argentine Government took shares in a new street railway monopoly to be made up of the Anglo-Argentine and other lines. Public indignation led to many acts of violence against the streetcars. Significantly, the first spontaneous act of the Argentine mobs when the June revolution broke out was to attack streetcars and burn them.

The Transport Law led to other abuses. The Compañía Hispano-Americana de Obras Públicas y Finanzas, a subway, was incorporated into the newly-created municipal monopoly. In an investigation organized by the Ramírez government the charge was made that the company's capital had been watered by 50 percent when it went into the municipal system. One thing is beyond dispute, and that is that this curious company was built 90 percent on bond issues. Yet the capital structure was recognized by the Justo government.

One incident under the Justo régime which attracted great attention involved the Buenos Aires electric light company, called the C.A.D.E. (Compañía Argentina de Electricidad), which is formally Belgian but seems to be controlled from New York. The Buenos Aires city council extended the company's franchise 15 years. The franchise, which was to expire after 50 years, stipulated that at the end of that time the company, with all its installations, was to be turned over free to the municipality. The council voted that when the franchise expired, the city had to *pay* the C.A.D.E. for its installations, which would run into millions. The day this ordinance passed, the papers spoke openly of how much each councilman had been paid for his vote. There was a dramatic

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scene in the council chambers after the vote. A spectator, who had been in the visitors' gallery, descended to the floor and stood before one of the councilmen. "Sold!" he screamed. "You have dishonored our father's name! You grafter!" It was the councilman's brother, a member of the same political party.

The corruption of the period, the concessions to foreign capital, and especially to British capital, were not accidental. The agricultural interests were paying the necessary price to keep the market open for their meat and cereals. The price included the strict maintenance of Anglo-Argentine bilateralism, and this involved shutting down the Argentine market to American goods. Before the Roca Pact, the United States was the largest seller in the Argentine market: after the Pact, England was, and the United States found itself shut out by every means at the disposal of the Conservative government. Exchange controls were instituted. People who wished to buy British goods could get pounds cheap. If they wanted to buy American automobiles, however, they paid 20 percent more for dollars. American goods were put on quotas, and finally more than a hundred items were embargoed altogether. The government also juggled trade figures to show that it had less dollar exchange available than it really had. The United States was angry, but protests evoked the reply: "You will not buy our beef. We buy from those that buy from us."

The economic hostility of the Conservative government towards the United States was reflected at every Pan American conference. What the Americans did not seem to realize was that the men in power had a vital stake in maintaining trade bilateralism with Great Britain. On the day that Argentina bought in the United States instead of in England, that day the meats and cereals of the agricultural class would cease to have a market.

The policies of the government nevertheless had enemies, and these became daily more numerous and more powerful. In spite of all its best endeavors, the government could not stop Argentine industry from mushrooming in the 1930's, when world trade came to a stop. Argentina began making all the light goods it had once imported, and the manufacturers grew rich. As their wealth grew, so did their power. Today their interests are directly at variance with the interests of the *estanciero* minority. They want to break Anglo-Argentine bilateralism. They want to buy heavy machinery in the United States and industrialize. They have their allies in the sugar and wine men.

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This has been the underlying battle in all the political confusion of the thirties.

III

The average man-in-the-street was embittered and disillusioned by the spectacle of the corruption and fraud of the Conservative governments. The government bureaucracy, which is filled on the spoils system, was swept clean of the opposition and filled with incompetents who were friends of Conservative politicians. The touchstone to success was pull. With it, the most incompetent and dishonest man was made. Without it, no one, no matter what his education, no matter what his intelligence, could get so much as a clerical position. The young people who came of age in the decade 1930–1940 were a frustrated generation. Politically and economically they were ciphers. Graduate engineers, graduate chemists, graduate teachers found every avenue closed to them. Cynicism became the fashion, and this generation was so thoroughly, so effectively submerged that it has almost no representatives in Argentine politics today.

The opposition was scattered and confused. There was the small, hard-working, progressive Socialist Party, which habitually carries the national capital in elections. But its leaders are old, and young men do not join it. The Communists had a brief flurry in the early 1930's, when they were especially active in the universities. But they do not seem to be important now. At the other extreme were the nationalist groups favoring an Italian type of totalitarian-clerical state. They, too, were numerically small. Both extreme right and extreme left were united in denouncing the concessions to foreign capital, which became the great political issue of the day. Nationalism made strong headway in Argentina, and its whipping-boy was the foreign companies that were getting the unjustifiable concessions at the public's expense.

The great failure of the decade was the Radical Party, still the representative of the disorganized majority. The Radicals were demoralized and leaderless after the loss of Irigoyen, who had held them together by the sheer force of his personality. Without him their leadership was mediocre and corrupt. Radical deputies and councilmen were conspicuously involved in every financial scandal of the Justo régime. Instead of fighting Justo they came to an understanding with him that his successor would be Roberto M. Ortiz, another Anti-Personalista whom the Radicals

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had hopes of winning back to the party. Ortiz succeeded Justo in 1938, and began a strong campaign to restore honest voting to the country. For two breathless years the public watched as President Ortiz cleaned up province after province, and the Radicals, with honest voting, won back their majority in the Chamber of Deputies. But in 1940 Ortiz fell ill; diabetic and blind, he had to turn the government over to his arch-Conservative vice-president, Ramón S. Castillo.

Castillo brought back all the old frauds and corruption of the Justo régime, and with interest. In the face of this new blow, the Radical Party was again without leadership. The most it was capable of was unlimited obstructionism in the Chamber, tying up even such necessary measures as the budget. The public was disillusioned and cynical.

So blind was the hatred of the United States felt by Castillo and his Foreign Minister, Enrique Ruiz Guiñazú, that even at a time when it was the only nation in the world able to furnish Argentina with steel, coal and machinery, they preferred not to buy at all but retire their dollar debt and pile up a gold surplus. The results of this short sighted policy are now felt. Argentina has no stockpile of steel, machinery, telephones, electrical equipment, cars, or any of the other things it could have bought two years ago. The pinch is getting severe and will get worse. But the Conservative government to the last was true to its tradition: if it could not buy in England, it would not buy at all.

For 13 years Argentina watched its government grow worse without a single opposition party making its strength felt. The Radicals did nothing to express the popular resentment at what was going on. One of the most brilliant political figures of recent Argentine history, Lisandro de la Torre, who was the leader of a small agrarian party of the province of Santa Fé, made an exposé of the foreign packing house monopoly on the floor of the Argentine Senate that lasted two months. His revelations were sensational, so sensational that an attempt was made to shoot him on the Senate floor (the assassin instead killed his fellow-Senator from Santa Fé). Most of the big newspapers played down de la Torre's report, and it led to nothing. In 1939 he put a bullet through his heart.

The 13-year rule of the Conservative Party came to a fitting climax in 1943 when President Castillo chose as his successor a man whose landholdings in the north of Argentina ran to over a million acres. This powerful Conservative politician was reputed

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to have had a debt with the Banco de la Nación of approximately 20,000,000 pesos. He was known as an exploiter of Indian labor, which he transported from plantation to plantation in cattle cars. When it became apparent that he would be the next president there was deep anger, but so great was the political inertia that there was no chance of effective action. The President-Designate was referred to as "that *negrero* — that slaver."

It was in this atmosphere of frustration that General Pedro P. Ramírez, Minister of War in the Castillo government, overthrew the President, and, a few days later, assumed the executive power.

Just before the revolution the Radicals and Socialists had been dickering over the formation of a united front against Castillo in the coming presidential elections. The negotiations had gone on for several months, and had finally come to nothing. In the crisis, neither party was capable of sacrificing its petty interests to defeat the Conservatives. The Radicals blamed the Socialists, the Socialists the Radicals. In any case, one thing only is certain, and that is that the Radical Party finally abandoned the proposed Democratic Front and decided to offer its candidacy to General Ramírez, the Minister of War. The reason for the move was simple. All that had kept the Conservatives in power was army support, and the Radicals were making a play for the army in a last desperate attempt to get into power.

Castillo heard of the negotiations with his Minister of War almost at once. He called on Ramírez to explain. The General, instead of explaining, and instead of accepting the Radical candidacy, decided to strike against Castillo and forcibly take power. His hand was forced, and the only alternative was resignation. The coup, as everyone knows, was easy, popular and successful, and the rotten and thoroughly disliked Castillo government fell almost without a push. For a few dizzy weeks the Argentine people thought that their troubles were over and that they had a popular government at last. Ramírez made a clean sweep of venal office holders, began investigations of all the foreign concessions, lowered rents and food prices, and made pronouncements in favor of democracy and coöperation with the Allies.

The failure of the Ramírez government to live up to its promises is too well-known to need repeating. Gradually it has turned to the extreme nationalist right for support, and coincidentally has moved from popularity to unpopularity. Its investigations have become muddled, government functions have been tied into

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a knot by the well-meaning intervention of military men who know nothing about politics, and it has made one diplomatic blunder which may cost it its life. That was the note of Admiral Storni to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. The Hull reply, which was one of the most calculated slaps-in-the-face in diplomatic history, immeasurably weakened the Ramírez government. At the moment it has lost its cabinet members of most prestige, and is wobbly, uncertain and unpopular. Worse, it is laughed at by the Argentines. Even Castillo was not held in as open contempt as are the *militares*.

One thing seems certain, and that is that there are great political changes ahead. The June revolution may have ushered in only an ephemeral régime, but it broke the almost unbearable paralysis of will that seemed to hold the Argentine people powerless to act. Opposition leadership is as uncertain as ever. The Radicals are tacitly supporting Ramírez in the forlorn hope that in some miraculous way, and without effort on their part, they will inherit his revolution. But the Radical Party, like similar parties in Europe, has lost its reason for being. It no longer represents any dynamic economic or political interest. The dead hand of the Conservative agricultural interests seems to have been pried loose at last. That much the Ramírez coup accomplished at any rate.

And for the future? The great political question is not: Will Ramírez last? It is: Who will take his place? Perhaps Argentina will create an industrialist-protectionist party, analogous to the Republican Party of the American nineteenth century, to mold national policies to suit new interests. Perhaps it will create a working class party to speak for the wage-earners. For the moment there is only a political vacuum, and the attempts of military men to fill it are vain. Some day, from somewhere, the solution will come. It will mark a fundamental change. This change will originate among young men and in a class that is moving forward, not one that is clinging desperately to the past. The outcome of the world conflict will affect its course profoundly. The Argentines themselves see this. Perhaps this in part explains the deep passivity in which they have been waiting.

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BRITAIN LOOKS TO THE LAND

By L. Dudley Stamp

FOUR years of war have brought profound changes in the way Britain uses her land. Some of the reversals of previous trends in farming practice and agricultural production may be called revolutionary; but evolution is a better word to describe the procedure as a whole. Under the urgency of the need for more food, the adjustment of farming methods to the progress of scientific research has been immensely speeded up. Some of the changes are undoubtedly temporary. For example, there is a wartime emphasis on the production of cereals, for which the climate of Britain is not primarily suited, and there is a drive toward self-sufficiency in directions which are not economically justified. But other changes are destined to leave a permanent mark on the face of Britain and to give a definite shape to future developments. The increase in mechanization is one: with 125,000 tractors and tractor implements for 16,000,000 acres of tillage, British farming is now the most highly mechanized in the world. Less dramatic but of great significance is the broadening of fundamental agricultural policy to include emphasis on proper nutrition, a change which is in line with the world objectives discussed at the Hot Springs Conference. Most important of all, perhaps, is the growing awareness that for national efficiency and health, as well as to foster national amenities, the use of land for farms, factories, towns and parks must not be left to haphazard decisions. Britain has begun to plan her national estate.

Geographers very wisely draw their distinction between Highland Britain of the north and west and Lowland Britain of the south and east. Highland Britain, which includes Scotland and Wales, has heavy rainfall and acid soils. The areas suitable for cultivation and settlement form discontinuous tracts; there are large stretches in Scotland virtually uninhabited by man or beast. In Lowland Britain, embracing some two-thirds of England, few points reach a thousand feet above sea level. Soils are fertile, rainfall is moderate to low, and cultivation and settlement are continuous except for "islands" of moorland and heathland. The British coal fields all tend to be located on the margins between Highland and Lowland Britain. The population is concentrated in the Lowlands.

The way the land is used in Britain is the result of the long

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influence and interaction of three great sets of factors — the geographic, historic and economic. The geographic or natural factors, elevation and relief, weather and climate, are immutable and have determined the broad pattern. The moister west favors grass rather than crops, the drier east favors four to five-course arable farming — that is to say, crop rotation. The cool short summers of the north limit the range of crops, the mild winters of the southwest permit specialized early vegetable growing. There are often tiny but significant differences of microclimate, such as free drainage of air, which determine success or failure in such enterprises as fruit farming.

The present use of land frequently reflects its past ownership. The great landowners of the past often deliberately selected the poorer land for their parks. The remnants of manorial common lands form the village greens of today, though most of the larger common lands which escaped enclosure did so because of their inherent poverty. In many parts of the country farm holdings are fragmented into isolated groups of fields, an uneconomic arrangement suggesting long-forgotten quarrels regarding the division of the family inheritance.

Economic factors are in large degree responsible for the high proportion of Britain's acreage which has been kept in permanent grass — 42.8 percent of the total in England, 41.8 percent in Wales and 8.3 percent in Scotland, according to the official statistics for 1933. Land under grass is less productive than land under the plough, but for many years prior to the war the sure market and steady price for milk contrasted with the wild fluctuations of corn prices. In addition, the lower labor costs on grass land made it easier to be sure of an income from a grass farm. Grass farms commanded higher rentals and there was every incentive to both landlords and tenants to keep land in the less productive form. But the very best soils, capable of intensive cultivation under market garden crops or of a good yield of farm crops, have remained under the plough despite the economic vicissitudes of the past 150 years. The maximum of change has been on land of intermediate quality.

Before the war Britain was producing less than 40 percent of her essential food requirements. It is difficult to give an exact figure, because much that was produced — of milk and meat, for example — was dependent upon imported animal feeding stuffs. Many so-called dairy farmers were not dairy farmers at all but cow-keepers, relying entirely on purchased concentrates and using

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land only for running their cattle. Britain was fast becoming a land of idle acres and derelict farms. In 1938 the arable acreage was the lowest ever recorded; much formerly improved land had passed through neglected drainage to "rough grazing," hedges were untrimmed, gates and fences were broken, farm buildings in decay and equipment antiquated or unserviceable.

The turn came with the Munich crisis of September 1938, when a "plough-up" campaign was initiated. The emphasis was on the plough partly because of the growing acceptance of Stapledon's theory of ley farming — keeping each field under crops for two or three years and then three to seven years under grass. This program, popularized under the slogan "taking the plough round the farm," was championed in opposition to the traditional idea, prevalent in many parts of Britain, that good pastures should never be broken up. In time of war ploughed land is also more flexible. Crops of wheat, barley, oats, rye, peas, swedes and potatoes can be used either as animal feedstuffs or human food.

The County War Agricultural Executive Committees have held a key position in the war program. These are appointed bodies, consisting of prominent local farmers and landowners, or others with agricultural knowledge. At an early stage all farmers were secretly graded A (good), B (average), and C (bad or poor). Every effort has been made to eliminate the C farmer — by providing him with equipment, material and guidance, giving him extra labor if he was hampered by age or infirmity, or in extreme cases by taking over the working of the farm.

The Committees have organized and carried out the counties' share in the national program. One of their most spectacular jobs, though not necessarily their most successful, has been to bring under cultivation some thousands of acres of hitherto unused common lands. Whether or not these are to be allowed to revert to unimproved common land may be one of the major postwar disputes. The County Committees have also supervised the distribution of mechanical implements, keeping a central pool for their own use or for lending.

Prices for agricultural commodities have been controlled to give high payments to farmers. Even the small and relatively inefficient producers have been able to make money or at least to break even. The big units have been making enormous profits: no one is troubled about that because the profit all flows back to the Treasury in the form of excess profits tax. In many cases producers have received a higher price from the Government than

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the Government has allowed the ultimate consumer to be charged. The poultry farmer has received 3s. a dozen for eggs; the consumer has paid at the rate of 2s. 3d. a dozen. Some will say it is a mad form of subsidy. But it is an excellent deterrent to black marketing and there are good grounds for believing that the tax payments of the farmers to the Treasury considerably exceed the total subsidies paid out.

Under this program, Britain produced between 70 and 80 per-cent of her food in 1943. It afforded the priority classes — expectant and nursing mothers and young children — and the lower income groups, a more nutritious and better balanced though possibly less palatable diet than they had ever enjoyed before. Under it, also, a large proportion of farms have become self-contained units: they produce on the farm all the essential feeding stuffs for their herds. This has been done without augmenting the labor force. Indeed, experienced male labor has been largely replaced by the 75,000 members of the Women's Land Army.

II

The growth of democracy in Britain, as the great estates break up under taxation, is shown in the increase in the number of land and property owners. Between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000 heads of households have become owners of their homes through Building Societies alone. With more owners has come even greater need for land planning. The old country gentry were often extreme autocrats, but they had a great pride in their possessions. They sometimes prevented legitimate improvements, but they also barred the way to the undignified sprawl of villas and bungalows which has since ruined both the beauty and the amenity of much of the country. Democracy has still to learn how to plan.

The first Act of Parliament to control land development dates only from 1909; it was not until 1932 that the Town and Country Planning Act was passed. Under that law some effort has been made to regulate building construction, but despite its name the Act is merely a town planning measure. It affords no protection to agricultural land as such. Another measure, the Restriction of Ribbon Development Act, attempted to cope with the problem of towns sprawling out along the approach roads, but failed. What should be open highways for fast traffic are lined on each side by a continuous ribbon of building for miles on end.

The thirties left the problems of traffic and of housing, of the location of new industries or the future of old ones, in a state of

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chaos. Britain has perhaps the finest network of secondary roads of any country in the world. The smallest by-lanes, though narrow, are tar-macadamed and have a good surface. But there is scarcely a good truck road in the country. One finds only the patched-up relics of medieval coach roads. Sometimes they have been widened for a stretch; then they will pass into some hopeless urban bottle-neck, or sweep round an old town by a ridiculous semi-circular by-pass; and this more than likely is already cluttered up with new villas. A limited number of main through routes of parkway type, avoiding all towns, is badly needed.

The need for national as well as local planning has been forced on the national conscience, though many fear it means "rule by the bureaucrats." The gravity of the situation led the Government to appoint a Royal Commission on the Geographical Location of the Industrial Population, under the chairmanship of Sir Montague Barlow. The outstanding conclusion of its report was that the great cities, London and Birmingham in particular, had grown too big and that there must be a dispersal of both industry and population. The report was issued in 1939. Before action could be taken on it war had already began to decentralize industry under its own inexorable laws.

A natural corollary of the Barlow recommendations was the appointment of a Committee on Land Utilization in Rural Areas. This Committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Justice Scott and with the writer as vice-chairman, was instructed to inquire into the conditions under which building should be permitted in country districts, consistent with the maintenance of agriculture, the preservation of amenities and the well-being of rural communities. It reported in September 1942, collecting into small compass recommendations covering all phases of life and development in the countryside. A third body, the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment, under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Uthwatt, attempted the solution of the financial problems. This report regards nationalization of land as impracticable but advocates state acquisition of all development rights in undeveloped land. A fourth Committee, the Land Transfer Committee under Lord Rushcliffe, has, in September 1943, just advocated the extension of the system of registration of land to cover the whole country. These are the signposts pointing the way.

In the spring of 1943 a separate Ministry of Town and Country Planning was created and charged with the specific task of coör-

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dinating land use. A delicate balance must be maintained between central guidance, in accord with the national plan and the maintenance of local initiative and authority. The regional unit, a wartime administrative division larger than the county, has turned out to be a useful and promising link between national and local powers. The Ministry of Town and Country Planning has appointed regional planning officers in each of the eleven regions. Similarly the Ministry of Agriculture, which must look after all interests affecting rural land, has set up a Planning Division with a chief adviser on rural land utilization and with regional officers. These regional officers are men of standing, well-known in their respective areas, advisers but not full-time civil servants. This coöperation between town and country, between town planning and agriculture, is a happy sign of the new spirit of planning.

III

The essential uses of land may be grouped under six headings. Land is needed for industry to provide work for the people; for housing to provide shelter; for agriculture to provide food; for forestry to provide an important raw material; for open spaces both large and small to provide recreation; and for roads, railways and airports to provide means of communication and transport.

Of the industries which are fixed or immobile, the mining industries form an obvious group. From the point of view of land planning they fall into two categories. There are those whose resources will eventually be used to the point of complete exhaustion. Coal and iron ore (above a certain grade) are clear examples. In the coal fields and iron ore fields getting the minerals out of the ground must be an overriding consideration in planning. There are some very attractive town planning schemes which would, unfortunately, sterilize hundreds of thousands of acres of mineral-bearing land. These plans must be classed as luxuries which the nation cannot afford. On the other hand, far more attention ought to be paid to the rehabilitation of land after the extraction of minerals; a tax comparable with the annual premiums on an amortization insurance policy has been suggested to build up a fund to reinstate land after mining or quarrying. In some of the older mining areas, notably the famous Black Country, where minerals have already been worked out, there are thousands of derelict acres awaiting a process of levelling and

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general tidying up — it may be for industry, for housing, for recreation, for afforestation or even for farming. Britain also has mineral resources which will never be used up. Limestone, chalk and cement, clay and shale for bricks and tiles, slate for roofing and stone for roads are examples. The areas where exploitation of such minerals is permitted are capable of planning control.

Other industries besides the mining ones are relatively fixed, often by physical factors. Shipbuilding and heavy iron and steel are instances. Industries like oil refining and flour milling tend to be situated at the ports which receive the raw materials. Other industries are tied one to another (the so-called linked industries) and so must be located at the larger industrial centers. Many others are more or less firmly held by labor supplies and tradition: the cottons of Lancashire and the woolens of Yorkshire, for example.

Industries which are definitely mobile or "footloose" are limited in number. Recent studies have shown that some idealists who picture new factories located in the open countryside or in villages — supposedly to promote the health of the workers — ignore both essential conditions of industry and the desires of the workers. Modern factories are on such a scale that if one is located in a village, the village becomes a small town; and a single factory is liable to cause great disruption should it fall. Hence new or existing towns and not the open country are the right locations for industry. Land must be made available accordingly.

The standard of housing in Britain has risen, but 4,000,000 new dwellings are still needed, and it is provisionally planned to build these at the rate of 400,000 a year. One house in every five throughout the whole country has suffered damage from bombing and there is much replacement to be done. There is much overdue slum clearance, not only of town slums but of laborers' cottages in the country. Though the population has practically reached its peak and a decline may be anticipated, its age composition has changed: smaller families mean more houses for the same total population. In addition, huge numbers of houses are just "old-fashioned" and lack all modern conveniences. They ought to be scrapped. The popular demand is for detached or semi-detached houses of five or six rooms with a garden — at 8, 10, 12 or at the most 16 to the acre. Britain's postwar housing program alone may absorb some half million acres. It presents great questions. Should the large cities where the traffic problem is acute be limited by "green belts"? Should new building be in

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satellite towns and dormitory suburbs? Should wholly new towns be laid out? Or should efforts be concentrated on slum clearance in existing settlements and rebuilding?

Although agriculture is the greatest user of land, in the past it has been the Cinderella. When land has been wanted for housing or industry its agricultural importance has scarcely been considered. Unfortunately, the best agricultural lands — level or gently undulating and well-drained — have also been the "best" — or at least the most easily developed — for other purposes. Such land has been disappearing under an avalanche of bricks and mortar at a truly alarming rate, a form of slow national suicide to which the national conscience seems awake at last.

Looked upon merely as an industry, agriculture presents certain fundamental demands. It must have land which is accessible and of a quality which repays expenditure on cultivation and manuring. The land must be in units of a proper size. A balance of different types of land must be devoted to agriculture. Stability of conditions and an abundant supply of cheap capital are essentials; and farm land must not have sections cut off at the whim of urban developers.

But agriculture cannot be considered simply as an industry. The farmers and landowners are the custodians of the national estate, the nation's unpaid gardeners. Nine-tenths of the people live in towns, on less than one-tenth of the land, but they enjoy the pleasures and beauties of the whole. Moreover, it is of importance to the whole nation that they eat rightly. We now perceive that national expenditure on fresh food and a properly balanced diet is money spent on preventive medicine, an essential health service. The home farmer is a kingpin in such a concept. And in a further sense farming is more than a business: it is a way of life, deliberately chosen by many independently of financial gain. It is imperative to see that those whose hearts are in the land do not find themselves, as many have in the immediate past, in inferior social, educational, medical and material positions.

With a climate which is essentially a forest climate and where trees grow magnificently it is a national disgrace that forest and woodland occupy only 5 percent of the surface of Britain — less than in any other country of northern Europe. Even so, much of the woodland is neglected or ill-managed. After the last war, when the acute shortage of timber had been a serious embarrassment to the war effort, the Forestry Commission was established with the primary object of planting about one and three-quarter mil-

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lion acres against a future national emergency — a task only partly completed when the Second World War broke out. Afforestation must not encroach on improved farm land, but it is a solution for the fuller use of much submarginal land. In 1943 the Forestry Commission published proposals for a 50-year program to replant two million acres of old woodland and establish three million acres of new planting, half in Scotland and half in England and Wales. There is some opposition to the plans, but even if they are completed Britain will still have only six million acres of forest and woodland, covering only some 11 percent of the surface. It is unfortunate that more people from Britain do not know the glorious redwoods or the British Columbian forests or the forests of Finland. If they did they would realize what beauties could be added to their own country.

Much land is needed for recreation, apart from relatively small areas for urban parks and playing fields. Large tracts of wilder country find their highest use, speaking nationally, in the facilities they offer for climbing, walking or just lounging. Fortunately the lands most suitable for such purposes are the lowland heaths — of hungry sandy soils drying very quickly after rain and covered with attractive heather or a light growth of pine and birch — and mountain moorland.

In Lowland Britain the commons of poor land which escaped enclosure provide a network of open space to which the public has general rights of access. Of the high areas of moorland, some are open, others closed by water supply companies, and vast areas are strictly preserved as grouse moors or deer "forests." Deer "forests" alone cover four million acres in Scotland; they are, of course, not forests, being treeless. The Forestry Commission is steadily acquiring plantable areas of moorland. Out of the 18,000,000 acres of "rough grazing" about one-third is plantable and one-third capable of improvement for sheep and stock. The remaining third should, as at present, be used primarily for public and private recreation, including shooting, and — very different — nature reserves. But despite long continued agitation, Britain has as yet no national parks as understood in America. There are proposals to establish some, especially in the Lake District, North Wales, Dartmoor, the Derbyshire Dales and the Cornish Pembrokeshire coastal areas.

Any considerable extension of railways is unlikely. The need of land for roads will be chiefly for some road widening and a limited number of new main parkways. At present, huge areas of land are

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occupied by the Air Force, the Army and the Navy. The future of such land cannot be foreseen. Apart from that covered by concrete runways, hangars and buildings, and allowing for a certain interference with drainage, the land now given to airports can readily be restored to agriculture; but clearly there will be a continuing demand for some land for aircraft. The growth of air transport will, incidentally, render accessible, especially for holiday resorts, such places as the sunny islands off the west coast of Scotland previously most difficult to reach.

Such are the uses which Britain could make of her land.

IV

Amid all the changes of the past 75 years there has remained one apparently constant feature. That, surprisingly enough, is the size of the ordinary British farm. In its survey of 1939 the Ministry of Agriculture distinguished 17 types of farming, all closely related and interdependent but each with its own requirements of type of land and size of farm. If, however, one were asked to name a typical British farm one would probably say the family mixed farm of some 100 to 150 acres — mixed in the sense of being partly arable and partly grass and also of being dependent both on stock and crops. The labor force consists of the farmer (a "dirty boot" farmer), his wife who in particular looks after the dairy and the poultry, his family, and probably one or two hired men. In the poorer lands of the west or north the area of the farm may be increased by several hundred acres of hill grazing; on the chalk downs and wolds it becomes an all-arable farm of large fields; on the richest lands it is an intensively cultivated market garden holding. There are other farms of most varied size and type, but the small or medium sized family farm, more often worked by a tenant than an owner, is the backbone of British farming. Although the Government has not committed itself to a long-term policy for agriculture, manifestoes by the several political parties and other bodies show a remarkable general agreement. Only a small minority visualize great changes. It is they who see the future in terms of small, intensively cultivated holdings for the production of vegetables and other protective foods and the rest of the country occupied by big, completely mechanized "prairie" farms with large fields, and great cattle "ranches." But this would be a backward step. Those who advocate it ignore the fact that world trends are away from extensive monoculture toward balanced rotations of English type, the kind of farming

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which builds up soil fertility and which eliminates soil erosion.

What is amazing is that the average small British farm has remained for so long an individual unit. Voluntary coöperation among such individualists has not proved conspicuously successful; and many fortunes made in business or on the stock exchange have been lost in large-scale farming. On the other hand, in the few rare cases where large-scale farming has been organized on company lines there have been some outstanding successes. The rarity of such enterprises is due in large measure to the small return on the large capital involved — less than half that normally sought by the investor — and the uncertainty caused by the wide fluctuations in prices of farm produce.

One may hazard the suggestion that the future will see five types of farms. The first will be the ordinary family farm as at present. The second will be individual farms which coöperate voluntarily. The third will be scattered groups of farms each under a manager, the whole controlled by an expert board of directors with a central pool of machinery and technical skill. The fourth will be large contiguous blocks of land controlled in the same way. The fifth may be tracts of land farmed by the state, directed by an Agricultural Commission perhaps, with power to acquire and work land as the County War Agricultural Executive Committees do at the present day. Only by some grouping of resources can the most effective use be made of technical skill. The inestimable boon of adequate machinery available from a central pool on exactly the days when conditions are right for ploughing or harvesting has only been realized during the war.

Even so the farm *units* are likely to remain small. Fields of 10 to 20 acres are the ideal size because they are large enough for mechanical implements but not too large for controlled grazing if under grass. Much realignment of hedges to get rectangular fields and removal of hedgerow trees is needed. Eight or ten such fields can be used either as a four or five-course arable or for a unit in ley farming. There is similarly a move toward flexibility of farm buildings: barns convertible either to grain storage or to cow sheds. Such a farm unit is ideal for individual management.

The British farmer dislikes subsidies as much as does the British taxpayer. If he is given reasonably stable conditions he may be trusted to practise good husbandry. Prices agreed upon in advance which show a modest margin, and a guaranteed market, are the two essentials for stability. The solution for the future lies either with the Ministry of Food, or with a central buying

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organization which takes over its functions, closely connected with the Ministry of Agriculture. Prices must not be pitched too high, for there is no room for the C farmer. The nation has a right to expect efficiency if it provides stable conditions.

Such a program would be in line with the international agreement reached at Hot Springs. The proper feeding of the people takes first place. In Britain this will be achieved by home production of foods best consumed fresh (with others being produced incidentally to obtain a balanced rotation) and the importation of those most easily transported and stored. Where subsidies are needed it is the *consumer* who must be subsidized to enable the lowest income groups to obtain the right foods. Give the farmer stable prices and he will play his part.

Another form of stability is needed for successful farming: security of tenure. This implies that landlords will not speculate in land, and that owner-occupiers will not be tempted to sell building plots and raise crops of bungalows instead of corn or cattle. The state purchase of development rights over all undeveloped land as proposed by the Uthwatt committee is one answer. A simple solution, put forward in an appendix to the Scott report, proposes a "standard valuation" for all land and property, to be used both as the basis of taxation and death duties, and of claims for compensation when land is acquired by public authorities under pooling or planning schemes.

There is nothing incompatible between a full development of British agriculture and a great expansion of international trade. Those who cry "cheap food" and demand that it be imported, regardless of what happens to the home farmer, forget how much of the imported cheap food was produced by robber economy in the past. A stiff bill will assuredly be presented, in time, for food made "cheap" by spoliation of virgin land elsewhere, or at the cost of soil erosion, or by the denial of decent living conditions to labor. In the past such "cheap food" was dumped, at less than cost, on those who could pay something for it. Meanwhile half of all mankind — a thousand million people in India, China and elsewhere — were living at or below starvation level. The welfare of the British farmer, the welfare of the British people as a whole, and the welfare of the other peoples of the world, are intimately linked together. That primary fact must be the starting point for all plans for the use of land.

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THE STORY OF SINGAPORE

By Sir George Sansom

THE fall of Singapore undoubtedly marked a turning point in Far Eastern history. It showed that the position of western Powers in the Far East was no longer secure, and that consequently the whole relationship of eastern and western peoples had entered upon a new phase. What was at stake was the future of all western interests in the Pacific, since the Japanese attack threatened not only colonial territory and trade but also the life of independent states like Australia and New Zealand. It challenged not only the military strength but also the political principles and prestige of occidental peoples.

No doubt it was this aspect of the fall of Singapore, which gave it a far deeper significance than that of a retrievable military disaster, that caused public opinion to shrink from the wider issue and seek an explanation in purely local circumstances. It was perhaps natural that, in the consternation caused by the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, the failure in Malaya should have been ascribed to the shortcomings of its defenders rather than to the general position of inferiority of United Nations forces in the Pacific. Press and public, in the United States and also in Great Britain, charged the military commanders and the civil administration of Malaya with gross incompetence and neglect, while they overlooked the larger framework of world politics and world strategy of which events in Malaya were but a part.

Some of the accusations levelled against the military command can be disposed of out of hand. The most common of these is the statement that British plans for the defense of Singapore did not take into account the possibility of an attack from Thailand down the Malay peninsula. This is plain nonsense.

The strategic conception upon which Singapore was founded was that it was a protected naval base from which a powerful fleet could operate. It was therefore defended against attack from the sea by fixed coastal defenses. To say that "the guns pointed the wrong way" is absurd. The heavy coastal artillery firing both armor-piercing and explosive shells was intended for a specific purpose and was not of the type designed for repelling attacks by land (although in fact some of the guns could be brought to bear upon the mainland, and were actually so used). Mobile

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artillery and other forms of defense were needed against an enemy approaching from the mainland. All these were provided in fair quantities. Plans for defense along the Malay peninsula were worked out when the base was completed. They were developed and revised as the general strategical position in the Far East changed, and particularly as it became clear that, in the event of a European war, the main strength of the Royal Navy would be required in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Nor was the development of air power overlooked in these plans. Military airfields were constructed at a number of points on the island of Singapore and throughout the peninsula.

New plans for defense against a Japanese attack either from Thailand or from landing points on the Malayan coast were drawn up by the general officer commanding in Singapore in 1940 and revised in the light of new conditions by his successor in 1941. But a plan is one thing, and the force with which to carry it out is another. The plain truth is that, when the Japanese attack was delivered on December 8, 1941, there were not enough men or machines to meet it, because everything which Great Britain could spare had been sent to the Middle East and to Soviet Russia. On that day there were in the whole of Malaya not many more than 100 front-line aircraft, most of which were of an obsolete type — Brewster-Buffaloes, Wirraways, Wildebeestes, a few Blenheim bombers; no Hurricanes or Spitfires. There were about three divisions (say 50,000 in all) of British troops, in about equal proportions from the United Kingdom, from India, and from Australia. There were a few light cruisers and destroyers but, beyond *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, no powerful warships; and hardly any small fighting craft of a type which could be used to prevent landings in small force by the enemy for infiltration purposes.

The Japanese, having for the time being eliminated the threat of the American Navy (which they would have had to take into account as a potential menace on their flank even had the United States not been at war with them), and having on December 8 destroyed a great part of the American Far Eastern Air Force in the Philippines, soon had effective command of the sea and the air in the Malayan theater and were secure from attack in their bases in Indo-China and Thailand. According to their own accounts, their initial landings were made by two divisions, one at Singora in Thailand, and one at Kota Bahru, which is on the northeast coast of Malaya, close to the Thai border. The first

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landed without opposition from the Thais, who indeed appear to have connived at preparations made by the Japanese in the summer and autumn of 1941 for landing on the Kra Isthmus. The second met with instant and vigorous resistance by British forces (a part of one division), which were established in strong positions along the beach, with an elaborate system of pillboxes, trenches, entanglements and under-water obstacles. Neither at Kota Bahru nor at Singapore were the British forces unprepared for the Japanese attack. It has often been alleged that they were taken by surprise, but that is not true. Their fingers were on the trigger. The bombers which attacked Singapore at four o'clock on the morning of Monday, December 8 (December 7 to the east of the international date line) were met with strong antiaircraft fire. The landing craft which at about the same hour left the transports off Kota Bahru and made the assault on the beach were met with intense machine-gun fire and a strong barrage from the beach defense batteries. Some assault troops did nevertheless manage to get ashore.

Japanese reports admit that their casualties were very heavy, and we know that at one moment the Japanese commanders thought that they were near to failure. What saved them was the intense gunfire from their heavy cruisers and destroyers which were concentrating on the destruction of the British artillery and machine-gun positions along the shore. Even then, at sunrise, nine British bombers from the Kota Bahru airfield came in from the east over the Japanese transports, and sank several ships. Unluckily the bombers were too few, and were soon destroyed either by antiaircraft fire or by Japanese aircraft operating from Thailand or from carriers — in waves of about 50 machines at a time. The British troops in northeastern Malaya were therefore fighting without air support, without air reconnaissance, and in greatly inferior numbers. They counterattacked the landing party at noon and succeeded in halting the Japanese advance that day, thus enabling the main British force by a very skilful night manœuvre to withdraw in good order so as to take up a position further south. The Japanese were unable to follow them, since they were disorganized and exhausted; but they knew that in two days their main forces would arrive. On December 9 several Japanese convoys began to bring to Kota Bahru more infantry divisions, one mechanized division, and other specialized troops. The high command in Singapore was aware of these movements, and decided to take desperate measures.

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Admiral Phillips thought that if he could get among the Japanese convoys in a dawn attack with his big ships, he might do such damage as to defeat the Japanese invasion plans. Critics have said that he was blind to the importance of air strength, but this is grossly mistaken. He was aware of the risk which he was taking. His plan was to take advantage of cloudy monsoon weather and, making a wide circuit, to proceed toward the northeast coast unperceived, so as to approach the Japanese transports under cover of darkness, which would diminish the danger of aerial attack and at the same time give him some advantage in combat with the escorting Japanese warships if he should encounter them. Before leaving Singapore he signalled "We are going out to look for trouble, and no doubt we shall find it."

He steamed out of Singapore on December 9 under low clouds and drizzling rain. Throughout the day the *Prince of Wales*, the *Repulse* and a small destroyer escort had seemingly been unnoticed. Unluckily toward dusk the weather cleared and through a gap in the clouds they were observed by a Japanese reconnaissance plane. This meant that they could no longer count upon the element of surprise. The transports in the Japanese convoy would have scattered and the enemy would be waiting with warships and aircraft. Admiral Phillips thereupon decided to abandon the operation, and at 9 P.M. he signalled accordingly to his ships. The squadron then turned southeast to get into open sea out of reach of medium bombers which might be expected at dawn.

Next morning early a signal was received from Singapore, saying that a Japanese landing was reported on the east coast about 150 miles north of Singapore. The squadron thereupon stood in toward this area, sending the destroyer *Express* inshore to search for landing parties. But nothing was found and the voyage back to Singapore was resumed. At 11:15 Japanese aircraft began to attack the two capital ships. There were several waves of high level bombers and later of torpedo bombers in the first attack. One high level attack by nine bombers was repulsed before the torpedo attacks, and two high level attacks (one on each ship) later on. At 11:44 the *Prince of Wales* was hit astern by a torpedo, and began to list. After the second high-level attack (at 11:58) the *Repulse* signalled to the flagship to report that so far all torpedoes had been avoided. At 12:20 a second wave of aircraft appeared. Shortly afterward the *Prince of Wales* was hit by torpedoes three or more times, and began to founder. The

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Repulse was next hit by three torpedoes, and began to sink at 12:30, all her guns firing incessantly until the final list.

This was the tragic end of a bold, if desperate, undertaking which failed. Had it succeeded — as well it might — it would have altered the whole course of the Malayan campaign. Most British naval officers who can be induced to discuss the question consider that the risk, however great, had to be taken. It was in the tradition of the British Navy to make such a venture; and it is pretty certain that, if the British squadron had remained in harbor, it would have been accused, and justly, of skulking behind the guns of Singapore, as a liability and not an asset to the defense of Malaya. As for the suggestion that Admiral Phillips was ignorant of the importance of air cover, it is necessary only to recall that he had lately come from the Naval Staff in London, that he was an extremely able, alert and experienced officer and had certainly not failed to appreciate the danger of torpedo bombing to unprotected warships. It was, after all, British naval bombers which attacked the Italian fleet with torpedoes at Taranto in 1940, when he was in a responsible position at the Admiralty.

The fact is that there were very few fighter aircraft available in Malaya. There was urgent work for them to do on the peninsula, their range was short, and the Admiral, in full knowledge of these facts, had for purposes of concealment maintained strict radio silence until the last possible moment. Fighter cover had been originally arranged for the morning of the 10th, but the loss of the Kota Bahru airfield made this impossible. When later it was clear that the Japanese air attack was developing upon a formidable scale, the *Repulse* made an emergency radio report to Singapore Air Headquarters at 11:50. Available fighters took off from Sembawang on Singapore Island without delay after the receipt of this message. Unhappily they arrived too late; but for this no blame attaches either to the naval command or to air headquarters. They did their best with the limited resources at their command.

While land and sea fighting was in progress on the east coast, a large-scale Japanese attack was developing on the west coast. This was delivered by a striking force consisting of a mechanized division with tanks and specially trained infantry support, which landed at Singora in Thailand, crossed the Kra Isthmus and entered Malaya along the line of the railroad from Bangkok to Singapore. It was essential for the British command to attack

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from the air the convoy which was landing this division at Singora. An attack was delivered and several transports were sunk by the British bombers, which, however, were subsequently nearly all shot down by fighter aircraft from a Japanese carrier. All these tasks were a heavy strain upon the very small air force at the disposal of the Malaya command, and it is therefore not to be wondered at that they had difficulty in meeting all needs, including those of the Navy. The Air Officer Commanding had an impossible and thankless task, which he discharged with great ability and courage. It was part of Japanese strategy in this campaign to concentrate upon obtaining air superiority. They bombed airfields day and night continuously, and sacrificed all other objectives to destroying British aircraft on the ground or in the air. This they were able to do by sheer weight of numbers. It is not known how many machines they had at their disposal, but it must have been several hundred front-line aircraft with plenty in reserve. Their daily raids upon Singapore airfields alone were made by massed squadrons of 54 or 108 machines, at a time when bombers and fighters were being used freely in support of their infantry and artillery at many other points in Malaya. They had heavy losses, but toward the end of the campaign, although some reinforcements of Hurricane fighters had reached Singapore, the R.A.F. was not able to put a dozen machines into the air at the same time. The Japanese had almost complete mastery of the air within a week of December 8. They were able to retain that mastery despite the very skilful arrangements made for flying machines into Singapore and for assembling crated planes rapidly after arrival. The R.A.F. could not keep pace with an unavoidable wastage of aircraft caused by the heavy demands upon its planes and the difficulty of assembly and maintenance under constant bombing of airfields and repair establishments.

The Japanese division which landed at Singora and crossed into Malaya was followed immediately by further divisions, so that by the time the mechanized division had reached a point level with Penang, there were (according to some Japanese sources) four more divisions behind them, some being held in reserve at the railhead in Singora.

These Japanese sources of information are not entirely reliable. They are not official sources, but scattered statements appearing in Japanese journals, press accounts of interviews with Japanese officers and men, and similar data. When we piece this material together it appears that the Japanese had as many as nine divisions

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either engaged in Malaya, or in reserve for the Malayan or other theaters. This figure does not square with the general opinion of the British military authorities, whose picture of the strength of the Japanese forces involved in the capture of Malaya is much more modest. They estimate that the Japanese used in their advance down the Malayan peninsula three full divisions, one tank regiment, and a large number of independent engineer and other units. This would give a total strength of from 80,000 to 100,000 men. On a purely numerical count, there was not very much difference between the total strength of the Japanese forces employed, and of the British forces at their maximum. It must, however, be remembered that the British command was unable to deploy the whole of its forces at any one time. Moreover, it had a very long coastline to watch and the base itself to guard. The British forces were outnumbered at all critical points of the campaign. Taking all factors into account, we are safest in saying that the British forces in Malaya faced a Japanese army consisting of brilliantly trained and seasoned troops, probably the highest quality in the world at that time for the type of warfare in which they were engaged, and numbering not more than 100,000 men.

The superiority in numbers of the Japanese in the earlier engagements in the northern parts of Malaya was probably much greater than is suggested by these figures. It is known that Japanese divisions were used in alternation, so that tired British troops could be faced with fresh Japanese troops.

The continuous retreat of the British forces, from the border until they crossed over onto Singapore island, has been ascribed by critics to the incompetence of their commanders and even to a lack of fighting spirit in the British troops. Leaving aside for the moment the question of the competence of the command, it may be said without any hesitation that the bitterness of the fighting and the strength of the resistance offered are amply proved by the casualties which the British forces suffered. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, over 800 strong, after fighting down the peninsula, crossed over to Singapore with less than 100 effectives. These proud and indomitable veterans had the post of honor protecting the rear when the main body of British troops withdrew to Singapore island. They were the last to cross the causeway, a sad remnant, piped over to the bagpipe strains of "Jenny's Black E'en" by their comrades of the Gordon Highlanders. The Gordon Highlanders suffered on a similar scale. The Leicester

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Regiment and the East Surrey Regiment were so reduced in numbers that when the two were reformed into one unit it was below strength — in other words they suffered over 50 percent losses. The Gurkhas were almost cut to pieces. The Indian brigades suffered cruel losses, and so did the Australian forces.

Last, but not least, is the story of the Malay Regiment. It has been said that the authorities of Malaya would not make use of Malayan forces. This is not correct. It is true that the authorities, both civil and military, were against raising large levies of indigenous soldiers, but this was not from any fear of disloyalty but principally because there was in Malaya not sufficient modern equipment with which to arm them. There was one regular Malay regiment officered principally by Englishmen who knew the language and customs of their men and who took great pride in their achievements. Perhaps the following extract from an account by a Dutch planter living in Malaya, who became an officer in this regiment, will show that the Malays were not unwilling to fight with and for the British. He says: "These boys certainly put up a show, especially during the battle for Singapore. We were in the thick of it from the beginning. When we were given the cease fire, there were not 100 alive, including wounded, of the original 846 of our battalion . . . we were fighting at great odds — had no guns or planes, and the Japs had lots of everything. We were continually dive-bombed and shelled at the rate of 17 a minute on a front of approximately 500 yards."

As to the competence of the military command, there is room for differences of opinion. Probably they were taken unawares by the strength of the Japanese attack, and by certain new tactics and fighting methods which the Japanese had worked out. The Japanese tactic of infiltration behind the lines was certainly an important factor in the defeat of the British forces, and it may be that more imaginative and less orthodox methods would have delayed the Japanese advance. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether they would have done more than this. The most disastrous cases of infiltration were those where Japanese forces were conveyed down the coast by sea in small craft and then landed in estuaries whence they proceeded inland to points well behind the British lines. It was usually impossible to prevent this action because of lack of reconnaissance planes and light-draft armed vessels which could have patrolled the coast.

The geography of Malaya was peculiarly advantageous to the Japanese, since it presented a long coastline parallel with their

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line of advance, indented by numerous river estuaries up which infiltering forces could proceed. The defense of the Philippine Islands was similarly hampered by a shortage of warships and aircraft suitable for preventing coastwise infiltrations. Even on the Bataan peninsula — where the terrain, being rough and mountainous, was suitable for defensive lines, and where landings were not possible except at two or three points — what contributed most in the long run to the collapse of a stubborn and protracted resistance was probably a night landing behind the American front line, which caused the defending force to fall back from the strong point on which their left flank rested. Subsequently the Japanese were able, after bringing up mechanized forces, heavy artillery, and bomber squadrons, slowly but relentlessly to push back the American line across the Bataan peninsula, and to demolish its tenaciously held and strongly protected defensive zones one after another by terrific artillery fire, and constant pounding from the air. Here, as in Malaya, it was command of the air which ultimately broke down a courageous and well-planned defense by the piecemeal destruction of the defenders' artillery.

It should be added that Japanese tactics in Malaya, though skilful and successful, were not original. Similar methods had been employed by General Cunningham in his conquest of Abyssinia, when he used to locate the head of enemy resistance on a road and then send his forces into difficult country on one side or the other to attack the road far back from the enemy's foremost troops. In such tactics in Malaya the advantage was with the Japanese, largely because of their greater adaptability to jungle conditions. They could easily disguise themselves in Malay costume, they could easily live upon Malay food, and they were, moreover, accustomed in their own countryside to moving about lightly clad and shod. The ordinary British soldier was hampered by heavy boots and equipment and too dependent upon his supply wagons. He could not disguise himself as a Malay and could not live on rice. British officers who fought in Malaya say that a soldier without experience of local climate and topography was for about six months a liability rather than an asset, and that even the best troops without special jungle training were of limited value. The Japanese had realized this, possibly through their experience in fighting Chinese guerrillas, and for months before the Malayan campaign they had been giving their already seasoned forces special training.

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The original British division, which had to meet the first Japanese attacks, was also well prepared. It had been long enough in Malaya to become acclimatized, and some units in particular had been put through very severe training. The reinforcements which arrived shortly before and just after the Japanese attack had not had time to adapt themselves to new and trying conditions; and even the troops which had been in Malaya through two years or more of debilitating tropical heat were, though seasoned, beginning to feel the strain. Yet, in spite of such handicaps, these latter were able, when occasion offered, to meet the Japanese successfully with their own tactics. The Argylls time after time ambushed Japanese assault companies and wiped them out, the Gurkhas did the same and so did the Australians. The losses which these units suffered were heavily paid for, sometimes tenfold, by the Japanese. There is no warrant whatever for saying that the Japanese established any but a numerical superiority over these British troops in the field.

As the campaign progressed, the less experienced British soldiers began to adjust themselves better, but by then the Japanese had established themselves well down the peninsula and were in occupation of the most important airfields. The British troops were exhausted, as they had fought without respite and without air protection for weeks, whereas the Japanese could always withdraw a tired division and throw a new one into the line.

These soldiers — English, Scottish, Australian, Indian, Gurkha or Malay — always outnumbered and often outmanœuvred, were never outfought. It is a curious thing that the full story of their gallantry and endurance has never been told and the Malayan campaign was represented merely as a somewhat inglorious retreat. The public in Britain and the United States learned only of the general course of the fighting, together with such scanty stories as the war correspondents could pick up and get through the censorship. This resulted in an emphasis upon failures and an almost complete silence as to successes. The best known regiments, such as the Australians and the Scottish, sometimes figured in the news, and always deservedly; but the ordinary infantryman from the English county regiments was scarcely ever mentioned. Yet these were always in the thick of things, brave and enduring. All the war correspondents who saw these men in action were full of praise for their courage. The most severe critics of the military and civil authorities never failed to give credit to

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the fighting men from the British Isles. One such critic (O. D. Gallagher in his book, "Action in the East") said of these troops, "They are seldom commended, often disparaged, but they fight and die and suffer as few other men do."

One common allegation is that there was a large fifth column of Malays who assisted the Japanese troops. It is true that, during the southward advance of the Japanese forces, Malay villagers sometimes gave them help and guidance, but this was usually done under threats of violence from the Japanese. There are few if any proved instances of deliberate and spontaneous fifth column work or sabotage by the Malay population. There are on the other hand many instances of loyal and courageous assistance to the British troops given throughout the campaign by the Malay and Chinese inhabitants of the country. This was the general rule. In the city of Singapore, which was subjected to bombing by day and night throughout the campaign, the conduct of the civil defense groups, the air-raid precaution services, the auxiliary fire fighters, the medical aid units and the volunteer police, in all of which Malays, Chinese, Indians and British worked side by side, was most praiseworthy. One of the most striking sights in Singapore was the stream of people of all races who thronged to the clinics to give their blood for transfusion. All were represented — white, yellow and brown — in great numbers. The morale of this mixed population was very high. If toward the end some of them became despondent and bewildered, this was due not to a failure of the administration, but to the overwhelming nature of the calamity which threatened them.

It is worthy of note that the largest and the most effective fifth column activities in Malaya were those of Chinese supporters of Wang Ching-wei, head of the Japanese controlled puppet government at Nanking, who were sent to Malaya with Japanese connivance. The permanent Chinese community domiciled in Malaya was loyal and extremely energetic in resistance to the Japanese, not only in passive defense services but in guerrilla activities, in intelligence work and in many other ways.

II

By the end of January 1942 the defending forces had been pressed back to the southern tip of the Malayan peninsula and had crossed the causeway from Johore on to Singapore island. The fighting had been severe, and in a number of separate local actions the British troops had got the measure of the Japanese.

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Time after time desperate attacks by a whole Japanese division were thrown back by smaller British forces, and it is quite likely that the advance of the Japanese down the west coast could have been stemmed, despite their superiority in numbers and fire power, if infiltration from coastal points could have been prevented by the navy and the air force in combination. Thus in one important engagement, for the defense of Kuala Lumpur, the Japanese brought to bear all the artillery of one division, aided by flame-throwing tanks, upon a narrow British front, attacking for three days unceasingly, and using fresh troops every day; but they were unable to penetrate beyond the outpost line and a fresh British column was coming up to counterattack when, owing to a threat on the flank by a new Japanese detachment from a division just landed on the west coast, the British commander decided to fall back to new positions farther south. Here again the British troops were able to stand off assaults and to counterattack, but again their commanders, in view of the threat from the coast, decided to withdraw and to abandon Kuala Lumpur. This was not done until an attempt had been made to prevent further landings on the coast. It was not possible to spare many troops for coastal garrison duty, owing to the heavy frontal attacks which the Japanese were delivering on the line before Kuala Lumpur, but some air reinforcements had by now reached Malaya, and bombers were sent to break up landings. They succeeded in taking the Japanese by surprise, and destroyed a sizeable landing force as it was making for the shore in open boats. Subsequent attempts of this nature were unsuccessful, since the Japanese brought in very strong fighter aircraft protection and also dive bombers to attack the beach defenses. The R.A.F. then sustained heavy losses which they could not make good.

The last stand of the British troops on the mainland came on a line across the southern tip of the peninsula in open country where the Japanese were able to use all their forces together. The defense of Gemas by Australian troops was a very fine performance, and in general the fighting on this line, despite local setbacks, was fierce and bloody. Japanese accounts say that their heaviest losses were suffered in these engagements, and they threw into the fighting here the Imperial Guards, which are the élite of the Japanese army. But again the defense was broken down, partly through lack of aircraft for spotting and bombing Japanese artillery positions or for attacking Japanese bombers,

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but principally because of landings on the coast. By January 30 the main British forces had withdrawn and crossed over the Johore Straits to Singapore island.

On January 31 the Japanese had secured complete control of the mainland, and were facing the naval base, only a mile away. They could have reduced the island by investment and continuous air and artillery bombardment in a few weeks, since its entire area was within range of their guns, but they were anxious to capture Singapore quickly, on grounds of prestige and because they wished to release forces for fighting in the Indies and the Philippines. They therefore brought up two fresh infantry divisions and a great quantity of siege artillery, including new howitzers. On the British side, reinforcements[1] amounting to nearly one division had arrived late in January and had been thrown at once into the fighting on the peninsula. They had been several weeks at sea, and were not acclimatized. Their feet were soft, and they had no jungle training, so that their fighting value at that time was small. About 50 crated Hurricanes had arrived on January 12, and a batch of these was at once rapidly assembled under bombing attacks. They took the Japanese air force by surprise when they first went up, and did fine execution, but later were gradually reduced in numbers in air combat against superior force or by destruction on the ground. By the time the Japanese had reached the straits of Johore and were facing the island, the Singapore airfields were all but untenable and the defending air force reduced to a handful of Hurricanes, flown by exhausted pilots, and the last two or three Wildebeestes, which were more dangerous to their flyers than to the enemy. Even Puss Moths and similar training machines were brought into service, flown by valiant members of the Malayan Volunteer Air Force for reconnaissance work.

For the first few days of the bombardment the British artillery was able to direct accurate and punishing fire against the Japanese, since all ranges had been plotted in advance. But day by day the British fire grew weaker, as Japanese bombers were able

[1] It has often been asked why this division should have been landed when the position in Malaya was hopeless. It was a difficult question for the Commander-in-Chief. What probably governed his decision was the fact that to divert the convoy that brought these troops would have been an extremely dangerous operation in view of the inadequacy of naval forces. The supplies which the ships were bringing were badly needed, and the successful convoying of the transports through the narrow seas into Singapore (in spite of Japanese air superiority and the proximity of Japanese warships and submarines) was a brilliant and hazardous piece of work by the Navy and the Air Force in combination. But to repeat this operation in reverse, by sending out the transports laden with troops, would have been to take a very great risk, in view of the wholly inadequate sea and air forces at his disposal.

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to fly continuously overhead, and their reconnaissance planes could signal the location of every British gun. The most intense artillery attack came on February 7, when it seemed as if all British artillery and machine gun posts must have been destroyed. Late that night enemy landing-barges made the crossing, and the Japanese were surprised to find that their bombardment had left so many men alive. The first wave of landing troops was repulsed, and there were few Japanese survivors; but the few remaining guns on the British side were gradually destroyed, the searchlights shattered, and before dawn on February 9, Japanese assault parties gained a foothold on the northwest shore of the island.

A counterattack was delivered and the landing party pressed back, but Japanese reinforcements were brought across and overwhelmed the defense at this point, establishing a beachhead. Another landing was made on the northeast shore in similar circumstances, and by daylight three or four thousand Japanese troops had secured a foothold. Confused and desperate fighting continued for six more days, during which the British forces were broken up into isolated groups by Japanese columns advancing from several points on the northern shores of the island. One by one these groups were surrounded and their resistance collapsed under incessant bombing and artillery pounding. When the fighting reached the suburbs of Singapore, and the enemy had control of the water reservoirs, the British command had to decide whether to capitulate or to prolong a resistance which was in any event hopeless and would involve the destruction of the city and the death of many of its population of half a million Malays, Indians and Chinese. Small isolated groups of British troops were still fighting in pockets in various parts of the island, but all powerful centers of resistance were now broken up and practically all air strength and artillery had been destroyed. The commanding general therefore decided to surrender, and Singapore passed into Japanese hands on February 15, 1942.

The number of British troops on the island at that time was probably between 70,000 and 80,000 including the unseasoned reinforcements that arrived in the last weeks of the campaign. Of this total, effective front line combat troops were perhaps not more than 45,000, many of whom had to be posted on the foreshore and at vulnerable points along the coastline (which was some 50 miles in length) and also, in readiness for parachute landings, at points inland. At their skilfully chosen points of

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attack the Japanese appear to have had a local numerical superiority, which they were able to maintain and increase as soon as they secured a foothold; but what was needed on the British side was not so much men as equipment — more aircraft, more mortars, more anti-tank and antiaircraft guns, even more rifles with which to arm more volunteers.

Charges of vacillation and blundering were freely levelled at the civil administration, and no doubt mistakes were made, just as mistakes were made in peaceful European countries when they were suddenly subjected to the strains and surprises of war.

It is almost impossible for a civil government, whether national or municipal, to plan adequately in advance for all contingencies which may arise in modern warfare. Experience in England, with a homogeneous and politically experienced people, has shown us how difficult it is to do the right thing, to foresee what is essential and what is unimportant, in such matters as food rationing, the best use of civilian personnel, air raid precautions, fire-fighting and auxiliary medical services. These difficulties in Malaya were multiplied by local circumstances — in particular the racial composition of the population.

The rôle of Malaya had been given to it early in the war. It was to put all its effort into producing rubber and tin for war purposes. The administration had to keep this object in mind, and at the same time to see to preparations against eventual attack. It had to plan in advance for all passive defense services which must be undertaken by civilians, to furnish an armed volunteer force, to control shipping, trade and exchange, to provide emergency stocks and to ration food and other commodities, to accelerate production, and to watch over the interests, sometimes not easily reconcilable, of a mixed population of Malays, Chinese, Indians and Europeans. In the discharge of these difficult tasks, what was surprising was the degree of success, and not the degree of failure, which they attained. When the test came, most of the arrangements worked well. Stories have been spread of "whisky-swilling planters" and "hidebound officials" who would not abandon their habits in the face of emergency. These stories are mostly false. No doubt there were a few deplorable exceptions, for there are self-indulgent and unimaginative people in all communities. But the great majority of civilians in Malaya rose at once to the occasion. The male European population to a man was liable for service up to the age of 55, most of the younger men were in the armed services, and all

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had their appointed duties in addition to their normal civilian employment, which was governed by the rulings of the Man-power Board. When the whole story of the Malayan crisis comes to be told, it will be found that the planters, the businessmen and their families played a creditable and often an heroic part. Since many of them met their death while they were at their posts of duty it is an unseemly thing for those who had the good fortune to escape to blacken the memory of those who cannot reply.

Most of the criticism of the colonial government centers about Penang. It has to be admitted that the collapse at Penang revealed some weaknesses in local civil administration and military control. Japanese bombers attacked the city on December 11, and took the whole population by surprise in a series of terror raids, during three consecutive days. Casualties were terrible, from both bombing and machine gunning in crowded streets. All essential services broke down and most of the native population fled to the hills. The town was in flames, hundreds of corpses lay unburied in the streets, the native police had mostly disappeared in order to put their families into safety, looters swarmed through the shopping districts, and there was no labor, apart from a few volunteers, to cope with fire fighting, sanitation or the burial of the dead. The place was in utter confusion and panic, so that it is understandable, if not excusable, that hasty and mistaken decisions should have been made. However that may be, there was a precipitate evacuation of the white population of Penang, apparently on orders from the local military command. Certainly the news of this evacuation caused great surprise and consternation to the civil government in Singapore, because its effect upon Asiatic opinion was grave. It was alleged that the white population had fled, leaving Asiatics to their fate. The facts are obscure, but the results were plain.

Stories of Japanese atrocities in China, and of the deliberate humiliation of English men and women in Tientsin, added to the fears of the white people that they would be selected as victims. The local military command presumably felt that, since it was impossible to evacuate the whole population of Penang at one time, they were justified in ordering the white residents to leave first — the more so as the Japanese were in their propaganda inciting the Asiatics to murder, urging them to "burn up the whites in a blaze of victory." The civil authority could no longer function in a fighting zone under attack, and its officers also withdrew in concert with the military, who had instructions to

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evacuate the island and join the forces on the mainland. Dr. Evans, the Government Chief Medical Officer, however, remained behind, as did the Rev. Mr. Scott of the Church of England, the Rev. Brother Paul of the Roman Catholic Church, and Adjutant Harvey of the Salvation Army. Had the civil functionaries in any number stayed behind, they might have been able to arrange for an orderly evacuation of Asiatics who stood in particular danger from the Japanese. Many of these did in fact get away, since the Japanese did not resume their attacks for some days after the first bombings; but the damage was done, and the effect of this blunder was deplorable. It did, however, bring home to the officials in other parts of Malaya their special responsibilities; and it must be said in justice to the colonial civil servants that a number of them asked to be allowed to go back to Penang to take care of the native inhabitants, if only as a symbolic act. The lesson of Penang was useful. It showed the nature of the enemy, the need for concerted decisive action in an emergency and the importance of prompt execution of the scorched earth policy which had already been ordered by the home government.

The War Council in Singapore considered questions arising out of the scorched earth policy almost daily throughout the campaign, and sent out most categorical instructions with regard to the destruction of stocks of oil and rubber and other important materials, of mining plant, of machinery, and other objects likely to be of use to the enemy. Their task was not an easy one, since they had to consider the effects of destruction upon the native population. These were hard matters to decide, and there was sometimes disagreement between the civil government, who thought in terms of the welfare of the native peoples under their care, and the army command who thought in terms of military necessity. Military necessity prevailed. Rubber trees were not destroyed because it would have been physically impossible to cut down or burn them.

III

The fall of Singapore was a great military disaster, but to explain it simply by the incompetence of military commanders and the mistaken policy of colonial administrators is to misunderstand its lessons. Advocates of colonial reform have argued that, had the people of Malaya been given political freedom, they would have fought vigorously on the British side and saved the

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country from the Japanese. This criticism overlooks the gallant part played by the Malay Regiment as mentioned above and ignores the outstanding exploits of Indian and Gurkha troops not only in the Malaya campaign but in a hundred other campaigns in which they have fought shoulder to shoulder with their British comrades in this and previous wars. The brotherhood in arms of British and Indian soldiers is a tradition in which both take pride. It seems just to recall these facts when noting that in the Philippine Islands Filipino soldiers of the national army fought bravely alongside their American comrades, and played a great part in resisting the Japanese attack. Nobody can deny that men will usually fight more vigorously for their own country and their own institutions than for a cause in which they have no obvious direct political interest, but unfortunately political freedom alone is no guarantee against conquest. It has to be supported by political unity and by great armed strength, not only in manpower but also in modern weapons, as many free countries have learned to their cost. Unity in an independent state of Malaya would have been hard to attain, seeing that its population consisted of two million Malays, two million Chinese, and nearly one million of Indian and other races. It is certain that Malaya, without the protection of a western power, would long ago have fallen into the hands of Japan and been subjected to a tyrannical exploitation alongside of which British colonial rule would appear absurdly benevolent. The Filipinos themselves, despite their national army and the powerful aid of the United States, could not hold out; and it is even possible that they would have fallen earlier than they did, had not the Japanese strategical design called first for the reduction of Singapore. The Japanese themselves have stated that they regarded this as the key to their strategy, and that they planned to use troops and aircraft released from Malaya in the final attacks on the Dutch Indies and then on Bataan.

But in the Philippines, as in Malaya and the Indies, what brought about defeat was not shortage of men but rather lack of machines and munitions and, notably, lack of air and sea power. Political freedom, though it may in favorable circumstances contribute to the effective use of weapons, is not of itself a weapon. We shall be deceiving ourselves if we think that only by furthering the growth of free institutions in Far Eastern countries we shall have gone far toward solving the problem of their security. We may have our individual views about the rights and

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wrongs of colonial administration; but what was wanting in Malaya, as in the Indies and the Philippines, was not ballot-boxes but bombs and bullets.

The reason that these were not available in sufficient quantities is simple enough. It is that the governments and the peoples of the western democracies hoped against hope that the pen was mightier than the sword, that treaties could take the place of armed strength. The battle of Malaya was perhaps lost in London, Paris and Washington before the Pacific war began.

At any rate, when France fell and England stood alone in 1940, she had to choose where she should use the little armed strength left to her after Dunkirk. At that moment, one of the darkest in her history, the British Government made a bold decision, which subsequent events have justified. They sent an armored division, which they could ill spare from the defense of Britain, to the Middle East for the defense of Egypt, and they had to take the risk of not reinforcing Singapore. The Japanese, taking advantage of the French collapse, moved into Indo-China and threatened Thailand. This move radically altered the whole strategical situation in the Far East. It produced circumstances which had not been taken into account when the Singapore base was planned. It had been assumed that in any conflict with Japan in the Pacific area, Great Britain could rely, if not upon the active support of France, at least upon her neutrality. The fall of France brought an entirely new set of conditions. Not only was France not an ally, she was a potential enemy. French Indo-China was in fact an ally of Japan, providing her with a near base for attacks in the South Seas. At the same time, the defection of the French fleet forced Great Britain to retain all her naval strength in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Subsequently, in 1941, when Germany attacked the U.S.S.R., it was necessary to send all possible aid to Russia. This, and the demands of Egypt, made it practically impossible to furnish further aid to Malaya.

Warships which could have faced the Japanese in the Pacific, bombers which could have destroyed their transports, small armed vessels which could have broken up their landings on the coast of Malaya, fighters and reconnaissance planes, guns and tanks which could have broken their air and artillery attacks — all these were sent to meet the enemy elsewhere. The choice was made, and Singapore had to suffer. But when the history of the whole war is written, it will surely be seen that this decision, however painful and regrettable, was inevitable and right.

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THE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF ITALY

By Mario Einaudi

AT the peak of Nazi power in 1941, when the Axis governments were still entertaining well-founded hopes of victory, five leading Italian economists published, in Italy, a postwar economic program for that country. It is a prophetic document. Its conclusions, stating clearly some of the fundamental issues confronting the nation, may well serve to introduce a discussion of the problems of Italy's economic reconstruction.

The main reasons for the deepening economic malady which had overtaken Italy during the last 15 years, said these five economists, were two: (1) disregard of international trade as a chief source of economic strength for Italy; (2) the policy of self-sufficiency which had led to the development of costly and unprofitable enterprises and to the suppression of undertakings which did not fit into a preconceived framework of power and privilege.

Italy had been forced to wear the heavy garment of total control, they boldly continued. Fresh energies had been kept from poaching upon the private hunting grounds of big vested interests. They cited the Fascist law which regulated the establishment of new industrial plants as a typical illustration of how the protection of an alleged public interest is transformed into the furtherance of monopolistic privileges. That law allowed no publicity for the proceedings of the committee which passed upon applications for permission to open new factories. Obviously the public interest could be protected solely through the most careful scrutiny of the committee's deliberations. And the law required the committee to give no reason and present no documentary evidence to justify whatever decision was reached.

Economists throughout the world will agree, they continued, that the complex economic structure of a modern industrial society does require a large measure of state intervention. The decisive question is what type of public economic control shall be imposed. Is it to be the judicial type, which places in the hands of independent public servants the enforcement of clearly defined standards of private conduct? Or is it to be the political type, with decisions made following the dictates of changing pressure groups and interests? The choice of the latter type of control by Fascism had blocked sound economic development in Italy.

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All this must go, they concluded, if Italy is to resume her forward development. Her national economy must be in harmony with the laws of her past economic growth and with the need for international coöperation. An open economic system must take the place of autarchy. Italy must look beyond an integrated German-inspired and German-dominated continental system. She must look beyond the oceans to fulfill her economic rôle and to attain the satisfaction of her most pressing national needs. The German plan of *Grossraumwirtschaft* is unhistorical and unrealizable. Its designs are based on the industrial preponderance of one country. It does violence to the vital interests of individual nations and to the larger truths of the interdependence of the world community. No nation will ever freely suspend its own way of life and hold in abeyance its natural productive abilities. To force it to do so not only violates the principle of human freedom but also denies the right of every people to develop its economic life in harmony with its traditions, possibilities and inclinations.

The views thus summarized reflect a tendency which we may presume will be very strong in Italy after the war. They lead to the rejection both of the Fascist policy of self-sufficiency and of the suggestion that the solution of Italy's economic problems may be found primarily within some kind of European framework. Italy's economic health cannot be restored by the creation of regional groupings. It depends upon the reëstablishment of a truly free and stable international economic system.

II

The solution of specific Italian problems must be examined in the light of the economic and financial conditions which Italy must fulfill as a country defeated in war, and of the systematic destruction to which she is being subjected by the Germans.

Neither factor can now be measured exactly. The full armistice terms signed on September 29 include political, economic and financial clauses. They have not been revealed. And, of course, no one can estimate the damage which German troops will be able to inflict upon the country. The figure of 20 billion lire given in August 1943 by the new Minister of Finance in the Badoglio Government represented the estimate of the damage caused by Allied bombings. This figure will have to be multiplied several times to reach the total of war damages. But it may be permissible to assume that the conditions imposed by the United Nations take into account the need for a full and balanced economic re-

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covery of the country. And however great the impairment of the physical plant, there will be powerful economic and moral factors to speed up recovery: the rapidity with which it is possible today to restore destroyed capital goods, the reborn faith in a tolerably safe and stable future which, one must hope, will accompany the triumph of the United Nations, and the inherent strength of the social structure of the Italian people.

Currency and price problems come first. Fascism went down ignominiously, not to the thunder of the guns of its non-existent defenders, but to the thunder of the printing presses. Toward the end of the régime, circulation of currency was going up at the rate of 10 billion lire a month. It had been less than 20 in 1939 and about 16 in 1935. By August 1943 it amounted to approximately 100 billion lire. As a result of currency inflation, the breakdown of price controls, the scarcity of goods and uncertainty about the future, prices increased between 300 and 400 percent from 1935 to 1943. Black market prices, of course, went far higher.

The problem of stabilization has a domestic and an international aspect. The elimination of political fear and uncertainty within Italy will do away with the greatest single cause for the increase in prices. There will be no need for any marked deflationary policy; and even "a moderate amount of new inflation, a few more billions of currency in circulation, could, if used to create credit in an atmosphere of confidence, promote employment and the combination of inactive productive elements to create income and facilitate recovery." [1] Italy's future productive capacity and the loss of purchasing power suffered by the other leading currencies of the world in the past five years should be taken into consideration in fixing the value of the lira. The stability of the rate will depend upon the soundness of Italy's internal economic policies and of her international economic relationships. Obviously, it will be necessary for Italy to participate in any plan of international monetary stabilization. It may be surmised that Italy would most favor a plan which guaranteed the equality in principle of participating countries. Italy would hope that the plan did not make substantial capital contributions a requisite for a voice in the management. She would hope also that any restrictions on national sovereignty which the plan entailed would be the result of deliberate political decisions and not just of economic pacts based upon such factors as gold and foreign trade.

[1] Luigi Einaudi, "Ma non occorrono decenni," *Giornale d'Italia*, August 22, 1943.

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Even while these policies are being debated and the first attempts being made to carry them out, Italy will be faced by the problem of raw materials. The Fascist program of self-sufficiency began with agriculture and was extended to industry; but it left the basic deficiencies in coal, copper, cotton, fats, oil and lumber unchanged. All these will be needed in great quantities. And there will be a demand for machine tools and other equipment to remedy the destruction wrought by the Nazis.

When the fighting stops, Italy will not be in a position to offer much in the way of finished products to pay for these commodities. But she will have a surplus of manpower which the United Nations might usefully employ, either in Italy, or in other parts of Europe, or throughout the Mediterranean basin and Africa. There will still be a manpower shortage in those early postwar days. Military occupation will continue for long periods in many parts of the world, and problems of supply, maintenance, repair and shipping will still be acute. Italy can use her manpower to help repair the damage which the Fascist régime inflicted upon peaceful neighbors and to begin paying for the raw materials she will need to restore her own economy.

Promotion of Italy's internal stability and of the interests of the United Nations both suggest that raw materials for the textile and allied industries should come first. Normal economic conditions can be restored in Italy to a notable degree through the relatively simple process of calling these industries back to life. They are more important to Italy than to any other large country, and they suffered more than any other industry from Fascist economic policies. In 1938, nearly 1,500,000 people were working in the textile and clothing industries, which include the leather industry — about 20 percent of the sum total of the population over ten years of age gainfully employed in industry plus those employed in transportation, communication, trade, credit and insurance. These textile industries will not be faced by any serious problem of conversion. Their workers will not have to be retrained, and they are distributed in thousands of small establishments, in precisely those regions where the repercussions of the transition from war to peace will be the greatest. A revival of the textile and allied industries will provide a firm foundation to any program of economic rehabilitation in Italy.

Only moderate amounts of cotton and of wool will be required to get them going. And that is not the major issue. After the first year, when very urgent domestic needs will have to be met, the

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Italian textile industry will again look abroad. It has always been an exporting industry. For the 11 years ending in 1938, it accounted for more than one-third of all Italian exports, even though the silk industry was suffering from Japanese and artificial silk competition during most of this period. Cotton and woolen textiles, artificial fibers, silk, hemp, and linen goods went from Italy to practically every market in the world. In many of these markets Italian exports met with increased tariffs, quotas and other trade restrictions — the familiar prewar story. Substantial relief will be afforded if postwar years see a movement for a freer exchange of goods among nations.

Silk is a special problem. Mulberry trees by the millions were cut down in Italy in recent years, partly because Japanese silk was cutting heavily into the Italian export trade, partly because the Fascist policy of autarchy offered artificial inducement to grow wheat. To rebuild silk production in Italy will not be easy, but it can be done. It could be done rather quickly if there were good foreign markets for silk. The United States is the greatest consumer of silk in the world, having used from 50 to 70 million pounds a year before the war; and the United States can probably absorb a far greater proportion of Italian silk than in the past, if Japanese silk continues to be shut off. An increase in American consumption of Italian raw silk, let us say from 1 to 5 million pounds — a vitally important increase for Italy — would perhaps be feasible, even allowing for greater Chinese exports and for wider use of new artificial fibers.

A new general colonial settlement, with a wider acceptance of the principle of trusteeship, might have an important bearing on the question of Italian exports. Under it the policy of the Open Door, which has received halting and partial recognition in the past, and of free trade for all mandates, colonies and protectorates might be extended to benefit the entire colonial world. This would be a development of great significance for Italy. In the past her markets in colonial lands were important to her; and they could assume an even greater significance in the future.

It might be thought foolish to expect victorious nations to forego privileges and rights in order to improve the position of a defeated enemy. But there is a growing feeling throughout the world that the old period of colonial empires has ended and that we are on the threshold of fresh developments in this sphere. May not nations which have not hitherto shared largely in the benefits of trade in colonial areas be admitted to that trade?

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These questions of economic policy cannot be solved until after certain political issues have been decided. If the United Nations wish a democratic Italy to use her strategic situation in the heart of the Mediterranean to help maintain the peace of the world, then it is to the general advantage that Italy be economically strengthened. In that event the desirability of the economic policies listed above should be obvious. They represent the steps by which Italy's industrial system can be detached from the autarchic conceptions of Fascism. They would strengthen the industrial groups inside Italy which have always been most liberal and internationally minded.

III

The question of population pressure is outstanding among long-range Italian economic problems. Italy's population has been increasing steadily. Today it may be estimated at some 46,000,000, or over 10 percent more than the population of France. But the problem of over-population is not so great as it appeared 20 years ago. The rate of increase is becoming less rapid. The net surplus of births over deaths has been sharply reduced. It is only a little more than one-half what it was some 15 years ago. A yearly population increase of a quarter of a million indicates the continued vitality of the Italian people and not the existence of an unmanageable problem. And the need for manpower to fill the gaps caused by the present conflict and to help in the task of reconstruction will be such that no great issue of over-population could arise for several years.

Within the limits noted, however, a population problem does exist, and it must find at least a partial solution outside the boundaries of Italy. There is no need to speculate on the likelihood of drastic changes in United States immigration laws or on the desirability of mass emigration to northern Australia. Europe, and some Latin American countries, will probably present adequate opportunities for Italian emigration. An understanding with France could offer most of the needed relief, and it is indeed gratifying to observe that, according to some of her most responsible spokesmen, France realizes the need for a sound immigration policy. "When France is free again," André Istel has written, "a carefully considered liberal immigration policy would be the most speedy and effective method for increasing the French population. Population is the most vital French problem. The solution of it requires a coördinated plan of economic and legisla-

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tive measures to increase natality, improve public health and favor immigration."[2]

A full Franco-Italian understanding is one of the bases of European stability. Nothing will strengthen the bonds between the two countries more than the help which can be given to France by Italian farmers and traders who come to settle on French metropolitan or African territories. It goes without saying that no attempt should be made to continue the privileges which Italian emigrants enjoyed until recently in Tunisia. Fascism had transformed those privileges into aggressive weapons, and in any case they have no place in the postwar world. If mandated territories and colonies are to be administered by international bodies, those territories may offer some possibilities for the absorption of surplus Italian population. Emigration of that kind would also satisfy any legitimate claim of the Italian people to share, in the degree justified by its numbers and technical abilities, in the work of developing the African continent.

IV

Italy is a peasant country and the problems connected with the land are of fundamental importance in any plan of reconstruction. Practically everybody agrees by now that no sweeping solution of the "agrarian question" can be found. No simple piece of legislation decreeing that the land be turned over to the peasants can solve the problem; and the upsetting of the delicately balanced agriculture of the plains of Lombardy and of the sharecropper farms of Tuscany and Piedmont would be a serious mistake. A continued use of the century-old instrument of land reclamation offers the best way of meeting the problems of land improvement and redistribution which wait to be solved in many regions. Properly used, it is the best method of establishing the peasant more firmly and equitably on the land. And it is more than the drying-up of swampland. As conceived today, it implies providing for all the technical and social arrangements necessary to profitable agricultural operations. The process is a complex one, as Don Sturzo noted in the April issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "involving a real attempt at internal colonization."

Land reclamation has been going on for many centuries, and some of the most fertile and most highly developed parts of the country, such as the plains of Lombardy, are reclaimed land. But the task at hand is still huge. Out of a total of 77.5 million acres of

[2] André Istel, "The Reconstruction of France," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1943, p. 116.

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land surface in Italy, no less than 42.2 million acres were declared by the 1928 Land Reclamation Act to need new or additional government-promoted permanent improvements. Of this total, 22.7 million acres were included within the boundaries of reclamation projects, and 19.5 million within those of mountain reconditioning projects. Ten years later, in 1938, work was in progress on 7.6 million acres. Public improvement had been completed on 4.25 million acres, while all public as well as private improvements had been completed on 2.25 million acres. Work had still to be started on 28.1 million acres.

There cannot be any doubt as to the advantages of land reclamation. In the hands of a democratic government it is the most flexible and useful instrument of agrarian reform. It diffuses direct peasant ownership. It strengthens farmers' marketing coöperatives. And it is an effective means of combating unemployment. It is one of the "must" enterprises of the resurgent Italy. At the rate of one million acres of improved land per year, it will continue for a generation. Its total cost will not be prohibitive and will be amply repaid not only in terms of increased production and government tax revenues, but in terms of social stability and human happiness and welfare. Once the phase of government-sponsored improvements is over, the farmers themselves will take up the endless task of adding to the productivity of the land, just as the farmers of the Lodigiano are today still increasing the value of the lands around the Muzza irrigation canal, which the communes of Lombardy first opened in 1220. And the land reclamation program will provide a splendid opportunity for coöperation between Italy and the United States through exchange of technical and other information, through American sale of heavy equipment for reclamation purposes and through greater Italian exports of specialized agricultural commodities such as hemp, wines and olive oil.

Land reclamation is the major positive agriculture task of postwar Italy. Untangling the results of the unhappy Fascist experiment with wheat growing is the chief negative one. Under Fascism, at a fairly large cost, Italy attempted to attain self-sufficiency in the production of wheat. Although important results were achieved, the attempt failed. Only in three unusually favorable years, 1937–39, did Italy produce enough to meet her needs. In the ten years from 1930 to 1939 production averaged 266 million bushels per year, or 10 percent less than the country's normal requirements.

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Total land under wheat cultivation is excessive. There is some reason to believe that the actual increase in land under wheat may be slightly in excess of the 5 percent increase officially recorded between 1909–13 and 1938. With the effective increase in that period equal to perhaps 9 or 10 percent, prewar wheat acreage amounted to a little more than 13,000,000 acres. Since 1940, one million additional acres have been devoted to wheat. In several southern regions, such as Puglie, and in Sicily and Sardinia, "dust bowl" conditions either exist or will soon appear. Too much pasture land has been ploughed and too much emphasis has been placed on crops, such as wheat, which impoverish the soil. Wool and meat production have suffered.

A normal domestic price structure would be a partial remedy; it would automatically eliminate many high-cost producers. All incentives which have been offered farmers to stimulate wheat production should be dropped and the policy abandoned. The program which seeks to promote better cultivation methods and the adoption of better seed varieties should be strengthened. Farmers should be encouraged to plant soil-protecting crops. The Tennessee Valley Authority program of distribution of phosphatic fertilizers is a model for this. The response of Italian farmers to such a program would undoubtedly be very favorable.

How large a reduction in acreage could be achieved? At a rough guess it might come to 15 to 20 percent, equivalent to a drop from 14 to 11.5 million acres. That would bring the total acreage given to wheat down about to the pre-1914 average. It is possible that in coming years the wheat acreage might increase again, taking into account probably future developments in Italy. One of these will be the increased number of small peasant-owners, as a result of a more intensive policy of land reclamation, leading for instance to the breaking up of the Sicilian latifundia. In all likelihood it will prove impossible to persuade these peasants not to grow some wheat on their own land; but the amount can perhaps be held down if they perceive that other crops will bring them more money. This readjustment in wheat acreage will lead to much needed changes in the diet of the Italian people. It will encourage crops better adapted to Italian soil. This program will be facilitated by the fact that almost every serious agricultural expert in Italy has in recent years considered the one-sidedness of the Fascist wheat policies a mistake and has condemned as undesirable for Italian economy the concomitant sharp decrease in the number of livestock.

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V

In the field of Italy's economic relations with other nations, it has sometimes been argued that raw materials which she needs to reconstitute her economy, including oil, coal, cotton, rubber, iron and tin, should be made available to Italy from a United Nations pool, not in the degree that she is able to pay for them but according to her reasonable peacetime needs. Before the collapse of the Fascist régime this proposal might have deserved some consideration as a weapon of psychological warfare against the enemy. As a solution of Italy's actual postwar economic problems its merits are not apparent. It seems to be based on some of the old fallacies concerning the balance of international payments. Fascist theorizers used to point to Italy's declining gold reserves as the final proof that in a world divided between haves and have-nots Italy was reduced to a slow economic strangulation. They were unaware that even official government documents published during the Fascist era had refuted their thesis.[3]

The reserves of the Bank of Italy decreased from 12.1 billion lire on January 1, 1928, to 5.8 billion lire on December 31, 1934. But the decrease was not due to the deficit in the trade balance. If other influences had not intervened, the gold reserves might even have increased. During the period 1928–1934 Italy's trade balance showed a deficit of approximately 26 billion lire; but revenues from freight and shipping services, tourist trade and emigrant remittances, during the same period, mounted to almost 25 billion lire.

Knowing this, the Governor of the Bank of Italy, in his 1935 report, properly ascribed the reason for the decrease in the reserves of the Bank of Italy to the investment of capital abroad, attracted by the greater *net* yield of foreign investments. The word *net* deserves our attention. In that cryptic word the Governor summed up the difference in risk between investments in free countries and in a totalitarian country.

The conclusion is unavoidable that under a free régime the causes which played havoc with Italy's economy would largely disappear and that, after a while, Italy would be able to buy and pay for all the raw materials and other commodities needed for the normal operations of her economic machine. No system, however benevolent, based on the curious idea of "buying" the peace of the world, is needed.

[3] *Cf.* the 1935 report of the Governor of the Bank of Italy, Signor Azzolini.

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The program of the International Reconstruction Bank contains, on the other hand, the promise of international coöperation and planning in fields where such action is really needed. In the reconstruction and expansion of Italy's electrical industry, for example, the Bank would probably play a vital rôle. The task would not merely be that of rebuilding ruined power plants or of increasing the output of energy. It would also include flood control and reforestation, land improvement and the welfare of the human beings who live on that land. Some have smiled at the thought of a TVA for the Danube. But actually the world needs scores of TVA's, and Italy will look with an anxious eye for measures of international coöperation which will facilitate the gradual solution of those postwar problems which no nation alone can hope to master.

The issue is not one of national self-reliance versus an international WPA. It does not present a choice between private competitive enterprise and collective endeavor. These clean-cut distinctions, so dear to the heart of the dogmatic theorist, are today largely meaningless. We need both approaches, in varying measures, according to circumstances. Their correct use will be the true mark of statesmanship.

Italy will also be dependent upon new trade treaties which will permit a rational and full employment of her productive capacities. She needs stability in the prices of the raw materials upon which her industries are based. She will unquestionably be eager to coöperate with whatever international agencies are working toward those objectives. Italy will lower her own tariff barriers. With the disappearance of the high fever of nationalism and with the hope of steadier international prices, her high wheat tariff should largely disappear. There is good reason to hope that under a democratic government much can be accomplished to put Italy's industry on a competitive international basis and to open Italy's markets to foreign goods.

Under a democratic government, Italy's international economic rôle will be constructive. Italy is a small nation, and she is not a one-commodity importer or exporter. She is not an important debtor or creditor. Her traditions make her very much a member of the international community. Reborn to new political life, she will be a stabilizing rather than an upsetting influence in world affairs.

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RADIO AFTER THE WAR

By John B. Whitton

IN the early days of radio, some believed with General James J. Harbord that broadcasting was destined to become the greatest medium ever known for international understanding. "More than all the peace conferences of history," he said, "radio will serve to make the concept of 'Peace on Earth, Good Will Toward Men' a reality, and, taking the world by the hand, will lead it one big step further down that trail that ends in Utopia." The subsequent development of radio by the Axis nations into a viciously effective weapon for dividing and inflaming the people of the world made a mockery of this idea. But the potentialities of broadcasting as a means of bringing men together in peace and understanding are still great.

How can radio be harnessed to the colossal task of occupation of Germany and world reconstruction? What steps should be taken to bring this instrument of perversion and terror under effective control, or, even better, to make it into a powerful medium of international reconciliation? These are among the post-war questions which demand consideration now.

I

After Hitler has been defeated, Germany, according to present plans, will be occupied and administered by the victorious nations for a period of years. This task will be monumental. It will call for the most careful and intelligent preparation, an extensive knowledge of German psychology and of local conditions, and, in addition, great tact, patience and firmness.

In connection with every aspect of the problem radio can play a useful rôle. In Germany, as nowhere else in the world, radio has been developed into an all-pervading means of mass-persuasion. Under Hitler, the number of receiving sets increased from 4,307,700 in 1933 to 9,087,454 in 1938. In 1941, Germany was second to the United States in the number of homes with radio sets, there being approximately 29,000,000 in this country and 15,000,000 in Germany. Moreover, every factory, café and public square in the Reich has its loud speaker, and group listening is intensively organized. Each of 39 party regions has its leader in charge of radio, and another official is assigned to each of 1,000 radio districts. As a result, 75 percent of the population listens in to important broadcasts. Nowhere in the world are people so "radio conscious" as in Germany.

This unprecedented opportunity should not be neglected by the occupying authorities. In this connection, we can learn much from the Nazis. One of the first moves of the invading German Army was to seize the local radio stations, turning the "miracle of radio" into an efficient means of ending all opposition. When the Nazis marched into Vienna in March 1938, for example, they immediately broadcast programs which they had recorded in advance. Subsequently Hitler made the Austrian poor a gift of 25,000 receiving sets.

Will it be possible to deflate the Nazi ideology and to eradicate from the German youth the poison of ten years indoctrination? The present writer is skeptical about the feasibility of a "reëducation" program, in so far as it is imposed from the outside, although certain measures will be practicable and

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useful. For example, we must try to eradicate from the school curriculum those textbooks and courses which indoctrinate Nazi theories of race, blood and force. Teachers whose convictions make them unsuitable for the new Germany will have to be gradually eliminated. But the liquidation of Nazi doctrines, and the delicate and complicated task of preparing Germany for eventual independence, must be left mainly to the Germans themselves, although the United Nations, during the period of occupation, may accomplish much in encouraging and facilitating this movement. Much can be done as a natural consequence of the restoration of a free press. But the most beneficial results of all might follow the reëstablishment of a free radio. A free radio — but naturally a radio free within the limits imposed by good taste, public morals, public order and the legitimate demands of the occupying forces. Radio will have a predominant rôle because the immediate problem in Germany is one of *adult* education.

The German people must eventually work out their destiny; no outside force can do it for them. Former statesmen, political scientists, and economic experts should meet with other outstanding leaders to deliberate on Germany's future polity, working in consultation with statesmen and scholars from the United Nations. Speakers chosen from among these could discuss the basic problems over the radio. Using as a model the system of open forums and "town meetings" so popular in the United States, discussions could be broadcast in the form of "round tables." This would be an excellent way to inform the people concerning the principles and processes of self-government.

The first rule to govern broadcasts to the German people during the period of occupation must be to tell the truth. That is the only way to gain the confidence of a people suspicious of everything heard from transmitters known to be under foreign direction. We shall have facts to offer, misstatements to correct, and it is proper that we should broadcast such information as compellingly as possible. But a campaign with the minimum of indoctrination will in the long run carry the most conviction. At all events, the contrary policy — a campaign of pro-United Nations propaganda — seems sure to fail. If a "no-propaganda" policy seems wisest, a policy of *truth* seems indispensable. Such a standard would gain tremendously through comparison with the Nazi tactics, in which truth is not an object. The only goal of Goebbels is persuasion. Lies are resorted to when they promise to be more effective. This appears from even a cursory study of the items reported from the Reich, the nature of the omissions, and from the tone of Nazi broadcasts. *Zeitgeschehen* — discussions of political, economic and cultural problems of the day, including interviews with prominent Germans or even foreigners — constitute seven percent of the broadcasting time on German stations, as compared with ten percent given to the news. The *Zeitgeschehen*, steeped in propaganda, are replete with misstatement, distortion and falsehood.

Current German radio programs, especially those directed to the home population, are extraordinarily one-sided. There is never an admission of any wrong, any error, on the part of the Reich. Whether the matter discussed be the origins of the war, war aims, or the bombing of cities, Germany is always in the right, the enemy always in the wrong. In Britain and in the United States the commentator, despite the censorship, often indulges in criticism of the war effort, both as to strategy and war production; but not the German speaker. The Nazi armed forces, for example, are invincible, an exalted body of men free from the ordinary human frailties, imbued with courage, chivalry and self-

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sacrificing patriotism. All this is contrasted with the alleged brutality and perfidy of the enemy. At the top is a military machine, smooth, elaborate, all-seeing, with a Supreme Command of godlike foresight and invincibility. Against such a background, the German propaganda chiefs have a happy time in victory; but in defeat they are hard pressed to explain. When the United Nations man the transmitters at Zeezen or Munich, a policy of truth, objectivity and fair-mindedness will stand out in convincing contrast with the former Nazi radio, and in the long run would be the surest instrument for delivering the death blow to Nazi doctrines and the myths of Nazi superiority.

The German radio has some admirable features which should be retained. Naturally we should keep intact the fine system of radio chains. Before the war, they were without a peer in technical efficiency and ingenuity, with the possible exception of the American system; and so far as foreign broadcasting was concerned, the Nazis far outstripped the United States. The United Nations would likewise do well to keep in office the army of trained personnel, with the exception of those in the higher positions who have been directly connected with policy-making and propaganda. The German listener is accustomed to pay a rather high annual license fee (24 marks), and it would be unwise to disturb this system, as the proceeds are used not only to meet the expense of radio services, but also to subsidize theaters and orchestras, frontier schools and popular libraries. Also, the present policy of issuing some 1,200,000 free licenses to families unable to pay the annual fee is worth continuing.

There is much in German radio technique, too, which should be retained. For instance, the Nazis have gone out of their way to make their programs dramatic, realizing that a dull radio yields few listeners. In this they have had considerable success, so much so that during the period of the *Sitzkrieg* numerous French and British listeners tuned in to the more dynamic German stations — the hours of whose programs were obligingly inserted in British papers — in preference to their own dull and uninspired offerings. Thus, while avoiding the hysterical and subversive features of the Nazi radio, the United Nations, dealing with a people accustomed to dynamic speakers and lively reporting, should avoid acquiring a reputation for dullness. Here is a challenging task — to remain rigorously objective, and yet give the programs interest and appeal.

In this connection, certain other features of the Nazi radio could well be copied. For one thing, the Nazis avoided the outstanding fault of the French radio, which was too highbrow. The Nazi radio has provided something for every class. For the popular listener, they have had the spellbinder Herr Fritzsche, who assumed that the real desires of the German people were for peace and prosperity, although the new German youth was supposed to despise these ideals. At the same time, there was also Rear Admiral Luetzow, whose talks, containing much expert or even scientific material and abounding in classical illusions, appeal to a much higher intellectual class. High German or Low German, worker or scholar, people from all classes and all regions are given special attention. The United Nations radio, if it is to be effective, must have a similarly broad appeal.

II

Planners for the postwar order should prepare now to meet the dangers of radio propaganda as a peacetime weapon of perversion and terror.[1] Why take

[1] *Cf.* the author's "War by Radio," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1941.

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over the Luftwaffe, and force Krupps to return to the manufacture of typewriters and farm machinery, as was done in 1919, and yet do nothing about the instrument which, wrongly used, is no less deadly than cannon?

Long before the war broke out, much effort had been devoted to this problem. Beginning in 1925, when the potential dangers of broadcasting first became apparent, numerous resolutions urging action were passed by international organizations, and the matter was dealt with by the International Broadcasting Union and the League of Nations. The result was the conclusion of numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties dealing with the proper use of radio.

At the first meeting of the International Juridical Radio Congress, held at Paris in 1925, it was resolved that while "the ether is free," the exercise of this liberty "should not result in disturbing the public order" or "in inflicting injury to the security of states." In the same year the Council of the International Broadcasting Union recommended that its members do everything possible to avoid diffusing beyond their frontiers any propaganda susceptible of provoking political difficulties in other countries and all programs interfering with internal affairs of other countries.

These were typical of many similar resolutions voted between 1925 and 1939 by general peace conferences, or by specific congresses on matters such as the press, radio, international law and penal law. Specially prominent are resolutions condemning the publication of false news and matter likely to promote a war of aggression. The International Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, held at Paris in 1927, urged each state to pass laws for the punishment of individuals attempting to exacerbate public opinion in favor of an aggressive war. Later on a new idea appeared, namely provision for a right of reply. At Budapest in 1931, the International Federation of League of Nations Societies proposed "to establish, on behalf of any State about which a newspaper or a wireless broadcasting station shall have imputed a fact which is either inexact or calculated to disturb international relations, an international right of reply."

The rise of Hitler brought two major problems to the fore — first, how to harmonize the necessary restrictions with the right of free speech; [2] and second, how to prevent harmful broadcasting, not by individual radio chains, but by the government itself utilizing radio as a weapon of an aggressive foreign policy.

The grave, indeed terrible, menace presented by the perversion of radio which occurred under Hitler was foreseen by two international organizations in particular, and their persistent efforts finally produced the important Geneva Convention of 1936. These two organizations were the International Broadcasting Union (IBU) and the League of Nations, the latter aided by its associate at Paris, the International Institute of Intellectual Coöperation (IIIC).

[2] Such a restriction was proposed by the Polish delegation to the League of Nations in 1931. It would have required each state to take "severe measures . . . to deal with any person attempting to undermine the moral basis of world peace by a propaganda of hatred." At the Conference on the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, held at Geneva in 1932, the Polish Government made further proposals for "moral disarmament" and among other suggestions favored national laws defining acts by individuals "incompatible with satisfactory international relations and dangerous to the peace of the world, such as the inciting of public opinion to warlike sentiments, propaganda aimed at inducing the State to violate international law, and the deliberate spreading of false or distorted reports or forged documents likely to embitter the relations between States."

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The IBU was created in April 1925 by the representatives of government, semiofficial and private broadcasting undertakings from nine European countries.[3] Its work was done through the main office at Geneva, four committees of specialists entrusted with the study of technical problems, programs and relays, as well as legal and budgetary problems, and an International Checking Center at Brussels. The Checking Center was set up in 1927 to measure and control frequencies and to watch the stability of transmitters, a work which enabled it to suppress promptly interferences affecting millions of listeners. The IBU did not have any official status, its authority resting on voluntary coöperation and good will. While the major activities of the Union were along technical lines, notably the allocation of wave lengths, it likewise gave much attention to the problems of broadcasting and peace. From the positive angle, the Union encouraged the use of radio as a medium of interstate understanding, arranged for exchange broadcasts and for relays of important events and has organized world concerts. It mediated conflicts over the misuse of radio and fostered treaties for the control of propaganda. As early as 1926 the Union induced its members to sign a gentleman's agreement promising to see that their broadcasts should contain nothing, whether political, denominational, economic, intellectual or artistic, "to prejudice the spirit of good international understanding which is indisputably necessary for the international development of broadcasting."

These efforts brought results in 1931. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, both German and Polish stations indulged in broadcasts which were resented by the other side. An agreement inspired by the IBU settled the dispute. Both parties promised to refrain thenceforth from programs calculated to "compromise in any way the spirit of coöperation and good understanding which is necessary if broadcasting is to fulfill its mission of drawing the nations together." Needless to say, this fragile plant could not survive in the torrid atmosphere of *Lebensraum*.

It is highly significant that after Hitler came to power and organized the German radio into a single, all-pervading instrument of mass persuasion, the IBU relaxed its efforts to curb objectionable broadcasting. It had to choose between such activities and the loss of one of its leading members. But the fight against propaganda was continued by the League of Nations. This body was aided by the IIIC which, even before the Nazis came to power, had begun the study of the matter upon the request of the Eleventh Assembly. After making a series of studies, the Institute convoked a committee of experts which made its report and recommendations in 1933.[4] Thus was the road prepared for a world non-aggression pact in the field of psychological warfare.

Showing a spirit of realism, the experts believed that only messages of real gravity could be prohibited. The worsening of international relations was reflected in their remark that broadcasts specially addressed to foreign peoples deserved particular attention, above all when intended for a minority group and of a nature to foment sedition and civil war. Recognizing that the main

[3] On the eve of the war the IBU had 60 members, covering 900 stations reaching 300 million listeners. *Cf.* Huth, "Radio Today, the Present State of Broadcasting" (*Geneva Studies*, Vol. XII, No. 6, July 1942, p. 138 ff.).

[4] The report of the experts is published in *Broadcasting and Peace*, Paris, 1933. See also Thomas Grandin, "The Political Use of Radio," *Geneva Studies*, Volume X, No. 3, August 1939, p. 88 ff.

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problem was to check governments, not individuals, the experts dropped proposals for invoking local law and relied on international law. They proposed that each state agree to prohibit the broadcasting of matter intentionally designed to provoke feelings of hostility between nations, to interfere in their internal affairs, or to spread false news. Nor did they favor the individual right of reply, already referred to: however appropriate this might be for the press, they considered it ill-adapted to radio. They recommended, however, that governments take measures promptly to rectify any inaccurate statements which have been broadcast. Another excellent suggestion was that when a program contains news about a foreign country, the source of this information should always be given by the broadcaster.[5]

As a consequence of this report, in September 1933 the Assembly of the League authorized the Committee on Intellectual Coöperation to prepare a draft convention. It was drawn up by a committee of experts under the chairmanship of Dr. Arnold Raestad of Norway, the leading authority on the subject, and submitted to all states, whether members or not of the League. On the basis of the replies received a conference was convoked in Geneva in September 1936. This conference drew up the "Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace," consisting of 15 articles and 7 recommendations. It was signed by only 22 delegations, and later was ratified by only seven states, not including the United States. Those which ratified were in general states whose own broadcasting policy gave little cause for reproach.[6] Very significantly, the signatures of Germany, Italy and Japan were absent.

The Geneva Convention purported to impose a number of obligations on each signatory state with respect to radio propaganda. These obligations were:

(1), to stop without delay the broadcasting within its borders of any transmissions of a nature to incite the population of any territory to acts "incompatible with the internal order or security" of any signatory state.

(2), to ensure that its transmissions should not constitute an incitement to war, or to acts likely to lead to war.

(3), to stop the transmission of false statements likely to harm good international understanding, and, in addition, to rectify such statements at the earliest possible moment.

(4), to ensure, in time of crisis, dealing with international relations, that only information whose accuracy had been properly verified should be broadcast.

This convention, although vague in many particulars, was nevertheless a notable accomplishment. But it had no effect on the states most in need of regulation. And even if Hitler and Mussolini had adhered to this treaty it is not likely that their subsequent policies would have been altered in any respect; they would have violated the convention as soon as deemed "necessary."

[5] This, of course, is no panacea. Today Nazi broadcasters often give sources of news items, but these may be entirely fictitious. At other times the alleged source, upon being examined, will be found to contain no trace of the item broadcast.

[6] United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, India, Brazil, Denmark, Luxembourg and France. This result had already been foreseen by the Finnish Government. When consulted before the Geneva Conference, it remarked that "it is extremely probable that the signatory States would be among those which, even without being committed by such a convention, do not adopt, in the matter of broadcasting, an attitude contrary to the proposed stipulation." L. O. N., Doc. C.L., 44, 1936. XII, Annex, p. 5, footnote 1.

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III

The use of propaganda as a weapon of aggression is as old as warfare itself. What is new is the frank recognition that it is a weapon of government and the establishment of formal governmental departments to devise and apply it. Now that states have discovered the lethal possibilities of radio we can anticipate that this type of propaganda — the most dangerous of all because no frontier can halt it, and because it reaches into every home — will be continued unless some means can be found to check it. In periods of tension the use of radio propaganda is as inevitable as resort to financial pressure or a show of force. What remedies have been proposed and how feasible are they?

Would it be possible to induce the states of the world to confine their broadcasting activities to the home population? This would avoid some of the most objectionable practices; but it would also end a great part of radio's usefulness for good. Broadcasting right around the earth, like transoceanic flying, has come to stay.

Should broadcasts be permitted only in the home language? This proposal, too, if implemented, would undoubtedly have beneficial results, but here again many technical difficulties stand in the way. London sends broadcasts in English to the four corners of the earth to reach the Dominions, a legitimate means of promoting the unity of the Commonwealth; but there is no way to prevent such programs from being heard elsewhere, for example, in the United States. Countries like Switzerland broadcast to the home population in three languages: these programs inevitably can be understood in many parts of the crowded Continent.

One striking fact emerges from the history of the use of radio, namely that there is almost no instance of objectionable propaganda issuing from a state in which broadcasting is carried on by private companies. The reasons are obvious: the private stations would gain little profit, either moral or material, from the transmission of attacks against another country. Furthermore, in most countries in which private companies control the radio, the conditions of their charter, and the rules imposed by the broadcasters on themselves, are of a nature to discourage such programs. One solution, therefore, would be to return radio to private control. Theoretically this suggestion is sound, but in practice it would accomplish little. An aggressive state bent on conquest would not neglect to take over such a ready weapon for implementing its foreign policy: it would either operate the radio chains itself or force them to accept government programs designed to "prepare" the home population or "work" some foreign peoples marked for conquest. Thus Hitler, once in power, took over the relatively free radio of the Weimar Republic. This particular proposal, if accepted, would merely work out to the detriment of peaceful states and to the advantage of the aggressive ones.

Some authorities would leave it to the injured state to take measures to protect itself against foreign radio propaganda. This "solution" obviously abandons the problem altogether and merely approves of "radio wars" in advance, wars in which small states and those with non-totalitarian governments would be at a disadvantage from the start. "Self-help" also implies the attempt to blanket or "jam" the offending program, a tactic which is seldom effective and certain to deepen the "warfare."

Still another proposal is that an international treaty should set forth the

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obligation of each signatory state to prevent the broadcasting on or from its territory of any messages defined as harmful to good relations between states. This solution is represented by the IBU "Gentleman's Agreement" of 1926 and the Convention on the "Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace," signed in 1936, mentioned above. This would seem to be the most promising approach. What is the outlook for exploiting it further?

The problem really is double, for two distinct kinds of radio propaganda are involved — programs sent to the population at home and programs directed to foreign countries. With respect to the former, two categories of messages should be prohibited: first, false news of a nature to cause hatred of other nations or peoples, like the Nazi atrocity tales directed against the Czechs and Poles; and second, programs designed to incite the home people to war. Propaganda of the second type is hard to define but easy to recognize. In Germany, as a prelude to every Nazi conquest, the radio appealed to every base instinct and resorted to every argument, fair or foul, in the course of creating a frenzy of warlike spirit.

The bilateral treaty is not very promising, for it is easily by-passed when found to be incompatible with a dynamic national policy. The multilateral treaty, backed up by sanctions, seems to offer the only genuine solution. But it will be a solution only if all the major states, both victors and vanquished, both democratic and totalitarian, sign and ratify it. As in other parts of the field of postwar planning, any such effort is sure to fail without the effective collaboration of the United States. And here it seems likely that opposition will arise based on the fear of interference with freedom of speech. Many will contend that we cannot fulfill the obligations of such a treaty without censoring our programs. It might be mentioned, however, that several members of the British Commonwealth which are devoted to the principle of freedom of speech ratified the Geneva Convention. Furthermore, we already accept for our radio chains a degree of censorship which we have never applied, except in wartime, to the press. In fact, the power of the government, through the FCC, to license radio stations in the public interest has recently been upheld by the Supreme Court. Freedom of speech is not an end, but only a means. As Justice Holmes once remarked, the right does not justify crying "Fire" in a crowded theater.

The type of propaganda which amounts to intervention in the affairs of a foreign state, inciting inhabitants or minorities to revolt, is already prohibited by international law, provided that such pronouncements issue from the government itself. Thus when Goebbels incited Austrians to overthrow Schuschnigg, the broadcast constituted a violation of the law of nations; but if a speaker from a private French radio station did the same thing, the law would not cover the case. This is academic, for as we have already remarked, free radio chains rarely indulge in objectionable matter. Nevertheless, the law should be broadened, so that each state is under a legal duty to prevent within its territory activities tending to foment civil strife within the territory of any other state.

Provocative broadcasts sent across international frontiers might perhaps be limited with less protest from the upholders of freedom of speech than in the case of limitations on home programs. However, the radio is not in the same category as the press. It is physically possible to prevent libellous newspapers from leaving a country, and a state attacked in a foreign newspaper can shut out the offending periodical at the frontier. Not so with radio. By its very

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nature it crosses all frontiers. The right to prevent the sending abroad of messages likely to trouble foreign relations would seem to be a legitimate prerogative of government. Unfortunately, however, in the cases which matter most, the government does not want to prevent the message from leaving and is probably sending it itself. No solution which does not provide for some form of sanctions in the treaty would therefore seem really effective.

If we did not go so far, we might at least try to strengthen the organization already set up, the International Broadcasting Union, which has acquired great experience and authority as a clearing house for all radio activities. Through its "Police Service of the Air" at Brussels it could not only check interferences but could likewise be on the lookout for objectionable broadcasting. It might organize a vast listening center, such as that already in operation in Washington, where the Foreign Broadcasting Listening Post of the FCC monitors programs from all over the world, in more than 40 languages. All programs from all states could be recorded, and transcripts made when any harmful material was detected. Then the IBU could bring the matter to the attention of the state guilty of the infraction, attempting through friendly mediation to obtain a rectification of the false statement or a withdrawal of the false charge, and a promise to desist from further similar practices. If the matter involved a dispute as to the proper interpretation of the Convention, it might be submitted to arbitration.

There is no need here to elaborate upon the difficulties of sanctions. We may note, however, that the peculiar nature of radio opens up certain possibilities which are quite unique. If, for example, in spite of all peaceful efforts, an aggressive state persisted in sending out objectionable radio messages, the International Broadcasting Union might be empowered to cancel the frequencies granted this state by the telecommunications conventions. The offending state would thus in a sense find itself outlawed from the air. If other states then used its frequencies, the state in question might find it so difficult to continue even broadcasts to its own people that in its own interest it might prefer to cease the forbidden practices. This type of sanction would work better when applied to a European state surrounded by nearby foreign stations than if attempted against a country as vast as Russia or the United States, or as isolated as Japan.

The possibilities of the fruitful uses of international radio, as contrasted with the problems of control, can only be hinted at in this discussion. But no man of imagination can have failed to perceive them. According to reliable estimates, the world's radio audience already numbers more than 400,000,000 listeners. For this vast audience there are no frontiers. As a consequence of the discoveries of Hertz and Marconi, these millions may learn at their own firesides of the lives of distant peoples, and come to understand the problems of nations on the other side of the world. Through foreign news bulletins, relayed or exchange broadcasts, and other devices already well advanced in some countries (particularly, for example, in prewar Norway) radio can unquestionably accomplish great things toward the clarification of misunderstandings between peoples and for the promotion of good will.

We may hope that the international organization that will come out of this war will create a great radio center, through whose manifold activities the gospel of peace rather than of war may, like the short-wave radio signal, circle the globe seven times in a single second.

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BEHIND THE BRITISH VICTORY IN NORTH AFRICA

The Story of Supply

By A British Officer

MANY months ago the ill-fated General von Ravenstein, just captured while leading the German Twenty-first Armored Division, remarked to the young Scottish major acting as his escort: "The Western desert may be the tactician's paradise, but it is the quartermaster's hell!"

The first reaction of new arrivals in the Western desert always was: "What a wonderful place to have a war!" No houses to destroy, no mud, except for a couple of months in the winter, only one natural feature of any importance — the rock escarpment running parallel to the coast a few miles from the Mediterranean all the way from the now famous Qattara Depression to Sollum and, after a short gap, continuing once again to Tobruk and Derna. It was, at any rate, a wonderful place for the British, and then the Americans, to learn the lesson of supply. In Africa we went to school for Europe.

About two thousand years ago the coastal area of the Western desert was a grape-growing district with settlements of cultivators. It is now a brown expanse of inhospitable rock and sand, inhabited only by a few verminous Bedouin tribes, a rare gazelle and the usual collection of candidates for the Reptile House. There is no water, except that provided by the ingenuity of man.

When the war began a good metalled road ran below the rock escarpment from Alexandria to Sollum, the Egyptian frontier port. Close by it, the Egyptian State Railway stretched in peacetime as far as the Western desert's only port (apart from tiny Sollum) — Mersa Matruh. British and New Zealand military engineers, helped by labor companies from Mauritius, India and other parts of the British Commonwealth, extended the railway line first to the Italian frontier post of Fort Capuzzo, then to Belhamed and finally as far as the Cirenaican port of Tobruk. Similarly, the road was linked with the Italian "Littoriana" coastal road and eventually provided uninterrupted communication from Alexandria to Tunis and beyond, via Mersa Matruh, Sidi Barrani, Sollum, Capuzzo, Bardia, Tobruk, Derna, Tocra, Bengazi, Agheila, Buerat, Homs, Tripoli, Zuara, Mareth, Gabes, Sfax and Sousse. Each town, with the exception of Sidi Barrani, Capuzzo, Agheila and Tocra, was a port of sorts — that is to say, each had a jetty, although it was sometimes capable of berthing only one fishing smack. Tripoli, Bengazi and Tobruk, as well as Mersa Matruh, have harbors able to take ocean-going ships. What port facilities existed in any of these places before the outbreak of hostilities were almost entirely destroyed by the Allied and enemy air forces in the course of the fighting and by heartbreakingly thorough demolitions by both sides during the many retreats.

II

A few words about the military setting for the great events of October 1942. On July 2, Britain's Eighth Army, driven and harried by Rommel's Armored Army of Africa, had reached El Alamein. There it had dug its heels into the

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sandy ridges which divide the Qattara Depression from the smiling blue waves of the Mediterranean, and had turned around and fought like wildcats.

Rommel's men, no less tired than their quarry, made a few more efforts to reach the flat Nile Delta. But the distance to their nearest sizeable seaport, Tobruk, was 381 miles. The railroad which linked Belhamed, the nearest station to Tobruk, with their railhead at Daba, was denuded of locomotives and rolling stock and what little there was became a main target for the increasingly active Royal Air Force. To bring supplies up by road was a constant nightmare to the Armored Army's *Intendantur*, for the Germans and the Italians always suffered from a shortage of motor transport. Even by utilizing the captured vehicles they could not bring up enough supplies to mount an offensive of the intensity necessary to smash a way through Britain's lines. Rommel failed to reach the Nile.

The period between August 1 and October 23, 1942, was taken up with preparations for the British attack. It has been an accepted tradition that for cool, meticulously efficient and farseeing planning, one must go to the German General Staff for examples. Yet even the enemy are today unstinting in their admiration for the perspicacity with which the hitherto much-maligned British Staff Officer set about creating the requisite structure of supply and maintenance (quite apart from actual planning of operations) which enabled the "Desert Rats" to tear open the Axis lines and hungrily to stream across the wastes of sand and rock which stretch west from El Alamein for nearly five hundred miles.

Britain's forces had been planning an offensive when Rommel attacked with such devastating effect at Gazala at the end of May 1942. Consequently there had been a considerable accumulation of stores, fuel and ammunition as far forward as Tobruk and Belhamed. In view of the shipping situation, this material was not easy to replace. From the point of view of "Q" Branch, responsible for supplying fighting troops with the sinews of battle, the problem resolved itself into two parts. The first consisted of bringing up supplies to the front line in sufficient quantities to mount an offensive. Thanks to the shortened lines of communication, this was comparatively easy. The second was the problem which "Q" staffs of armies for many centuries had failed to solve — the problem of sustaining the momentum of an offensive along the Mediterranean littoral by a constant flow of supplies; and this problem automatically subdivided itself into questions of men, materials and means of transport. The last had to be available in increasing quantities.

All armored and infantry divisions, plus Fighting French and Greek Brigades, were reinforced in the course of August, September and October. The Eighth Army's vehicle allotment rose approximately to a third of the total in the whole Middle East Command. No wonder the eyes of Britain's military authorities twinkled good-humoredly when a misguided representative of a civilian firm of haulage contractors in England announced to the press that he thought the Eighth Army should take advice from his firm because it had experience in handling 500 trucks! A complicating factor in the planning of motor transport was that a large proportion of the divisions available were newly-arrived formations from the United Kingdom, equipped with trucks without four-wheel drive. Bitter experience had shown that such vehicles were not suitable for the desert.

Arrangements for dumps in preparation for the attack involved seven days'

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supplies plus three days' reserves. Hundreds of thousands of shells for every caliber gun were stacked at widely dispersed and well-camouflaged points. Enormous quantities of gasoline, with at least three days' supplies further back in reserve, were placed in position. The Western Desert Railroad worked as never before, delivering more than 60,000 tons of material to the Eighth Army in the first 20 days of October. To cite a few items: in the period September 1 to October 22 the Royal Army Ordnance Corps issued to the Eighth Army 35,000 pairs of socks, 19,000 pairs of boots, 45,000 blankets, 125,000 water containers, 610 portable cookers.

At 1,000 hours on October 23, 1942, gun position officers of artillery regiments from Qattara to the coast raised megaphones to their lips and shouted "Fire!" A colossal barrage signalled the beginning of the Eighth Army's 1,800 mile advance.

III

To maintain the rapidity of the advance railroad construction troops were moved up to be in a position to repair the Western Desert Railroad as quickly as possible. Heavy damage to the coastal road was to be expected as a result of the attention that the Royal Air Force would bestow on retreating Axis motor-convoys, and two road-construction parties equipped with excavators were brought up in readiness to repair damage to the road. Water supply, as usual, took high priority in the planning. Quantities of water-piping were moved up and buried, and a special party was equipped to repair the pipe-line at top speed. Other parties got ready with excavating plant to repair aqueducts then in enemy hands and later to build new ones. Well-boring sections were organized, 400 pumps were issued, and, in addition, water barges for the transport of drinking water by sea were accumulated at Alexandria.

While the road and the railroad might suffice for maintaining the Army in the initial stages of its advance, it was foreseen that with the lengthening lines of communication sea-transport would assume an increasingly important rôle. The Royal Navy pooled its resources with those of the Eighth Army's Chief Engineer, the late Brigadier Kisch, to open up ports on the prospective road of advance. The Army provided dock-operating companies and plant, while the Navy, in addition to undertaking to clear underwater obstructions, provided small self-propelled craft with a total capacity of 3,000 tons, plus tugs, dumb lighters and launches. Pontoons to enable light draught vessels to berth alongside big ships were constructed, and a pontoon bridge capable of handling 300 tons daily was prepared at Alexandria. Personnel were detailed for each of the first four ports along the line of advance, while ocean-going ships and smaller ones were loaded with mixed stores and made ready to put to sea as soon as a port had been occupied and made workable.

Nothing was forgotten. In the past it had been found extremely difficult to supply detachments cut off from the main force by the enemy. The obvious answer was supply by air and arrangements were made accordingly. One of the minor feats was the supply of the Army's daily rations by the Royal Army Service Corps at a time when the variety and quality of vegetables was at its worst; fresh vegetables were distributed on a wider basis than in any of the previous campaigns.

Britain's forces knew that fighting Rommel's hand-picked Afrika Korps would be no pleasure trip. To meet anticipated casualties, clearing stations

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with a total of 1,625 beds were established forward. More serious cases were to be evacuated to hospitals in the Delta. In the desert it is extremely important for wounds and burns to be treated as soon as possible, and, to obviate the necessity of long and painful journeys over sand ruts before wounded could receive adequate attention, eight field surgical units were formed and sent forward. To facilitate blood-transfusions a "blood-bank" in the form of a refrigerator truck containing 3,000 bottles of Group o/4 blood was attached to advanced units.

A feature of the coöperation between the Allies was the arrival of 21 Diesel locomotives from the United States for the Western Desert Railroad. Their superiority to the ordinary steam locomotive for desert use is considerable. The Diesel can be filled with 35 gallons of water in ten minutes and runs on it for 24 hours. The steam locomotive requires 250 gallons of the precious water



in the boiler and 4,000 gallons in the tender and gobbles the water up at the rate of 40 to 50 gallons per hour. Moreover, the Diesel needs very little maintenance, although when it does break down it requires expert attention. An American maintenance company which was sent out for that purpose did not arrive with the machines themselves and they had to be operated by British personnel in the initial period; but the American maintenance men performed yeoman service on the Western Desert Railroad later. How sturdy that service was is suggested by the fact that between October 23 and November 24 the railroad delivered 132,000 tons and that in the first four months of the advance, 37,780 items of heavy equipment were "doctored" in desert workshops.

IV

On November 13, 21 days after the opening of the offensive, Britain's armored cars entered battle-scarred Tobruk. The 381 miles of railway track between El Alamein and Tobruk were a shambles, as a result of enemy demolition and British gunfire and air-bombing. In addition, heavy rain caused serious flooding, and from Daba westward an enormous number of German "Teller" (plate) mines had been placed under the track. Further worry came from the necessity of providing sufficient water to keep locomotives

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working — it was a blessing to have the American Diesel machines at this time — and establishing signals communication along the length of the track. Yet 17 days after advanced units entered Tobruk (or what was left of it), a railhead was opened to serve the port. The Royal Navy had pledged to clear the harbor of mines within seven days of occupation by the Army, but, as at Mersa Matruh, they beat the Army by doing their job before the parties from Docks Operating Companies had arrived. Mersa Matruh port was opened on November 11 and within ten days 4,376 tons had been unloaded; even before the port was workable cargoes from two ships and two self-propelled barges had been discharged at neighboring beaches.

The water problem was no less difficult than anticipated. The water pipe running parallel to the railroad was damaged in 400 places, and the floods mentioned above prevented breaks from being located quickly. Twenty-five miles of piping had been removed by the enemy in the course of their occupation, and relaid elsewhere. Reservoirs were damaged. Nevertheless, except for one day, shortage of water never limited rail traffic. By November 13, wells had been drilled and were working at Daba, Fuka, Mersa Matruh and Sidi Barrani, and the following day saw aqueducts in operation at Bagush and Mersa Matruh. Six days later aqueducts were gushing at Buqbuq, Bardia and Tobruk.

The transport of wounded by air was the heaviest single item undertaken by the Royal Air Force and the British Overseas Airways Corporation transport aircraft. By November 13 a total of 11,066 cases of sick and wounded were evacuated by rail, 5,883 by road and 770 by air. It had been decided as a matter of principle that air transport could never supplant the normal methods of feeding troops in the field and could act only as an auxiliary to them.

The taking of Tobruk raised acutely the problem of the administration of lines of communication. It was too much to expect Eighth Army Headquarters to fight the Axis and at the same time to ensure that its rear was properly tidied up in a "smart and soldier-like manner." Generals Montgomery and Alexander had agreed in conference that G.H.Q. in Cairo should assume responsibility for the latter, and therefore, as the Army moved forward, Cairo provided commanders of Area and Sub-Area Headquarters with staffs, who were responsible for administering the lines of communication and facilitating in every way the dispatch of stores and supplies. In addition, they did extremely good work in clearing up the battlefields and collecting salvage.

Up to November 13, 2,400 new vehicles had been delivered to the Eighth Army; and, so far, lack of transport had not interfered with supply and the conduct of operations. But the problem of repairing and maintaining roads was becoming acute, although road construction companies were working flat out. As troops moved forward, the roads between Tobruk and Derna and the roads south of Bengazi, which had suffered severely from the rains, increased in importance. The advance had proceeded more rapidly than had been anticipated. To meet this situation all road maintenance east of Tobruk was stopped and the personnel and equipment available were rushed up to clear the roads serving the Army from the newly-opened port of Tobruk, and later, of Bengazi. Similarly, at an early stage of the move beyond Tobruk, the ports of Mersa Matruh and Bardia were closed down and the docks parties moved up to help at Tobruk and Bengazi. The latter town was occupied on November 20. Within six days, in spite of extensive enemy demolitions, which included gaps in the outer mole and craters in most of the remaining quays, two ships and three

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self-propelled barges were discharging their cargoes. High priority was given to vast quantities of cement and the breach in the outer mole was partially repaired, although the work had to be done in very rough weather. Day and night shifts of soldiers and seamen toiled in icy winds and rain, constantly in danger of being washed away by the huge seas which broke over the breach in the mole. While these efforts were gradually meeting with success the flow of supplies was naturally limited and a brake was put on the speed of the Eighth Army's advance.

The enemy had dug himself in at Agheila. At last the Army Commander deemed that supplies were reaching his men in sufficient quantities to allow for the assault to begin. On December 15 Rommel's men were driven out of Agheila and began their headlong retreat to Buerat. And on that day the tired but enthusiastic "Desert Rats" completed a further feat — a 478-mile advance from Tobruk in 32 days, in spite of highly complex supply difficulties.

In this period, November 10 to December 17, the solution of supply problems was based on the maximum use of the railroad up to Tobruk, pending the full working of Bengazi port. Although the railroad transported the major amount of war material, 102,131 tons, no small quantity came by sea.

One service sent supply ships from Alexandria to Bengazi direct. Another was available to pick up material brought by rail as far as Tobruk and carry it by sea to Bengazi, where it was off-loaded onto trucks which carried it to the troops by road. In this manner Tobruk (including a comparatively minor sharing of work by Bardia and Derna) handled 32,519 tons between November 10 and December 17, while Bengazi dealt with 33,545 tons — a total of 66,064.

The weight of material carried by air dropped from November 10 to December 17, owing to the distances involved and in conformity with the principle that air transport can aid normal means of supply only in times of difficulty. As before, sick and wounded constituted the greatest single item carried by air, 1,353 men being thus evacuated. Motor ambulance convoys dealt with an additional 3,796 cases while hospital trains and hospital ships transported 3,185 and 1,455 cases respectively.

At this juncture a South African and an Australian Division which had been withdrawn earlier arrived in the Delta and it was discovered that of the 3,000 vehicles originally issued to the South African Division only 20 were fit for immediate reissue. The vehicles of the Australian Division were in a similar condition. Such is the wear and tear of desert warfare; but the R.E.M.E., a newly-created Corps of electrical and mechanical engineers, rolled up their sleeves and, in spite of a heartbreaking shortage of trained personnel, sent these vehicles back "as good as new."

Although the enemy's retreat from Agheila before "Monty's tin-cans" was headlong, and although the Royal Air Force gave him no respite, Rommel turned round at Buerat and fought. On December 29, when advanced British units reached Buerat, another halt had to be called to gather enough kit and supplies to strike.

V

There was an air of suppressed expectation in the desert. Tripoli, apple of Mussolini's imperial eye, lay at last within striking distance. Word was sent out to the "supply merchants" to redouble their efforts to cope with the in-

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creased road-haul from Bengazi and to raise the capacity of the port. Red-eyed drivers roared along the deserted and storm-swept desolation of the "Littoriana." Over the horizon, out at sea, lookouts swept the wave-tops for sinister periscopes of U-boats, and the skies for the rakish shapes of Stukas. Far back, the railroad was doing well. Between December 18 and January 16, 62,875 tons were unloaded at Tobruk railhead.

The bad weather continued. The climax came on January 4. In the harbor lay a number of ships, their derricks unceasingly discharging tanks, guns, cases



of food, ammunition and spare parts into fussy lighters. Then it broke — one of the worst storms recorded in that part of the world. It seemed as if the elements had made up their minds to cheat the Desert Army of their prize. Huge seas crashed hungrily against the partially repaired breach in Bengazi's outer mole. The concrete, barely set, seemed to groan with agony. On the Spanish Mole a small group of anxious officers watched. The outer mole gave way under the strain and, roaring with triumph, the sea poured through the breach in mountainous waves. The vessels in the harbor seemed to bow their heads to meet the shock. Three of them were driven on the shore and wrecked, and several others damaged. Harbor installations, on which the Docks Operating Company had been toiling unceasingly, suffered in proportion. Lighter berths, vital in the process of transferring cargoes from ships to crane-denuded quays, lay smashed to matchwood.

On January 3, 2,500 tons had been discharged at Bengazi. On the next day, the storm prevented anything at all from being landed. The results of the storm became even clearer when on January 5 the figure was only 350 tons, in spite of every effort by both the naval and the military port authorities. Gangs of men toiled to make good the damage done by the storm. Two further gale warnings did not help and between January 4 and 31 the average daily discharge dropped

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to 1,530 tons. "Never say die" has helped Britain out of more serious situations than this in the past, and efforts continued unabated. In spite of its misfortunes Bengazi played a vital part in the preparation for the next stage of the offensive. Between December 18 and 27, 25,314 tons had been discharged. In the next ten days a further 13,348 tons were landed and between January 7 and 16, yet another 12,005 tons were safely piled up on the quays. In all, 54,067 tons of supplies reached Bengazi by sea between December 18 and January 16, including 2,600 tons unloaded from small craft on nearby beaches.

Now the supply staffs of the Eighth Army and of G.H.Q. had to start thinking how they were going to use the harbor of Tripoli. From the point of view of supply and administration the advance in the desert was taking on an entirely new shape. What had originally been an onrush of men and vehicles with everlengthening lines of communication across land now began to assume the character of an overseas expedition. Base installations began to be built around seaheads: the planners envisaged Tripoli as a prospective base port.

As soon as the Desert Army had pushed the enemy out of the Buerat position, starting him on the retreat which took him to the Tunisian frontier, he began demolitions in Tripoli harbor. A certain amount was known about the installations there, thanks to the painstaking collection of data from all sources, and it was also known that the German Command had ordered the sinking of blockships at the harbor entrance. The harbor suffered extensive damage, from both the enemy and the R.A.F., and for some time Bengazi, badly crippled though it was by the storms of January 4, and February 12 and 15, was the main port. Between January 17 and February 15, a total of 47,249 tons was unloaded there. But the Eighth Army entered Tripoli on January 23, and Tripoli soon began to pick up. Three days after its capture tank-carrying craft began to unload at the patched-up wharves, and 23 days later the material landed had totalled 30,041 tons.

Almost forgotten in this stage by the troops, the once familiar feature of the landscape before them, the Western Desert Railroad, was slogging on, maintaining the high standard it had set at the beginning. Between January 17 and February 15 it carried 61,799 tons. Part of this tonnage would then proceed by road, but the greater proportion would be loaded onto ships at Tobruk harbor and carried either direct to Tripoli, but more often to Bengazi, whence motor transport columns carried it onward. In this period supplies carried by motor road between Bengazi and Tripoli came to about 800 tons — no small amount when one realizes that 674 miles separate the two towns and that for the material to reach the troops then at the Tunisian frontier it had to travel another 100 miles. Perhaps a better understanding of the distances involved is obtained from the fact that it took 20 days to convoy vehicles from Delta base installations to Bengazi and another 15 from Bengazi to Tripoli. The months of January and February saw 3,340 new trucks reach the Eighth Army; and a steady stream of reinforcements went forward.

VI

In March and April the "Q" staff met a new problem — that of feeding the population of Tripolitania. The enemy had encouraged looting and hoarding of civilian stocks prior to retiring. Had it not been that the British had taken steps in advance to meet the emergency, the civilian population would have starved. To have allowed the civilian population to starve would

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have been quite in accordance with enemy methods, as shown in Greece, Jugoslavia, Poland and the U.S.S.R., but in Tripolitania civilians were fed.

Now the Eighth Army girded its loins and took on a job as hard as any that had come its way since the original break-through at El Alamein: the assault on the Mareth Line, followed by the capture of Gabes, Sfax and Sousse. Contact having been established with the First Army and the Americans, the chain of command underwent a drastic change with the establishment of 18 Army Group Headquarters to direct and coördinate the operations by the Allied Forces which culminated so triumphantly on May 14.

Looking back on the whole effort, from the point of view of supply, perhaps the most striking impression is the care with which Britain chose the men responsible for ensuring the flow of materials. New men brought new methods, new imagination, new energy. There lay the key to the saga of planning which began even before Rommel had driven the Eighth Army back to El Alamein.

Analyzing the lessons of the campaign from the point of view of administration and supply, Major General Robertson, the Eighth Army's Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, remarked with a mixture of earnestness and humor: "The Army Commander clearly is always looking ahead. He wants to know what he can do within the limits of administrative possibilities. The Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General must know sufficient of his administrative situation to be able to give an immediate answer in general terms. It is most important that this administrative answer should be reasonably accurate. On it the general will frame his plan in more detail and give his ideas on the date and weight of the attack. Having said what he is going to do, a commander must not cheat. He must not 'beat the pistol' nor 'wangle up' additional troops nor sneak his troops further forward than he said he would. A good administrative officer does not over-issue and cannot be cheated without unfortunate consequences. Some generals have no morals. Fortunately General Montgomery does not cheat — whether that is due to his innate honesty or the fact that I watch him like a cat does not matter — and moreover, he does not let other people cheat."

It has been noted earlier that the campaign gradually came to take on the character of an overseas expedition, with an ever-increasing proportion of supplies coming up by ship. The experience gained in the course of the campaign in opening up seaheads rapidly, of making good the damage done by enemy demolition and bombing, and in perfecting coöperation among the Army, the Navy and the Allied Air Force has been vital. The "supply merchants" of the Middle East did their apprenticeship for the invasion of Europe along the coast of Africa.

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By Robert Gale Woolbert

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WHICH KIND OF REVOLUTION? By W. D. HERRIDGE. Boston: Little, Brown, 1943, 162 p. $1.75.

A former Canadian Minister to the United States and early admirer of the New Deal expresses his deep concern over the possibility that the Anglo-Saxon countries will be manœuvred into an anti-Communist front — and thus into a third world war.

THE PASSING OF THE EUROPEAN AGE. By ERIC FISCHER. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943, 214 p. $2.50.

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The founder of the Pan-Europe movement reviews its history and reiterates his belief in the necessity of realizing its goals.

ATLANTIC MEETING. By H. V. Morton. New York: Dodd, 1943, 196 p. $2.50.

This account of Mr. Churchill's trip to Newfoundland to draw up the Atlantic Charter with Mr. Roosevelt contains no important political revelations.

THE ARMISTICES OF 1918. By Sir Frederick Maurice. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 104 p. $2.00.

This documented study, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, untangles the steps by which the armistices were negotiated with the Central Powers in 1918. There is also a chapter on the interval between the armistices and the peace treaties, as well as documentary appendices.

SECRET SOURCES: THE STORY BEHIND SOME FAMOUS SCOOPS. By Wythe Williams and William van Narvig. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1943, 326 p. $3.50.

Discreet revelations concerning the devious and ingenious means by which the authors have managed to smuggle valuable information out of Nazi Europe.

A FIVE-YEAR PEACE PLAN. By Edward J. Byng. New York: Coward-McCann, 1943, 184 p. $2.00.

In this "schedule for peace building" a correspondent for the United Press describes the supranational bodies which he believes must be set up to create a real peace.

FAITH AND WORKS. By Lionel Curtis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 120 p. 75 cents.

An English idealist and political thinker proposes the creation of a small federal system to include Great Britain and Northern Ireland, one or more of the Dominions, and one or more of the adjacent democratic states: Belgium, Netherlands, Norway. This experimental union would then serve as a laboratory for the inevitable supranational world government.

OUT OF THIS NETTLE, DANGER . . . By Harold W. Dodds. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943, 57 p. $1.00.

Essays based on a number of addresses delivered in recent years by the President of Princeton University. Their publication was inspired by a desire to counteract the prevailing pessimism about the future of civilized man.

PERMANENT WORLD PEACE. By Jeremiah S. Alguy. New York: Standard Publishing Co., 1943, 304 p. $3.00.

What is wrong with the world and how things can be improved.

SOLIDARITY: A PLATFORM FOR ALL THOSE WHO CAN HELP TO PLAN A BETTER WORLD. Edited by Jacques Métadier. London: Harrap, 1943, 4v. 30/.

These uneven essays by writers of diverse nationalities are intended to strengthen the political and spiritual ties between the United Nations.

THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS. By Czeslaw Poznanski. London: Routledge, 1942, 88 p. 5/.

A Polish writer opposes the current tendency to minimize, or even deny, the right of small nations to self-determination.

COMMENT GAGNER LA PAIX? By Pierre Francés. Buenos Aires: Quillet, 1943, 203 p.

How to keep Germany from getting out of bounds again.

PEACE AND RECONSTRUCTION. By Michael O'Shaughnessy. New York: Harper, 1943, 151 p. $2.00.

A Catholic layman's analysis of postwar problems — domestic and foreign — with reference to the principles enunciated by his Church in recent decades.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION CONFERENCES. By William O'Davoren. Geneva: Jullien, 1942, 166 p. Sw. Fr. 6.

Detailed advice on how to organize and run an international conference, by an expert.

WAR'S END AND AFTER. By Stuart Chevalier. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 337 p. $2.75.

An eclectic and rather rambling discussion of postwar problems.

WAR AND PEACE AIMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS: SEPTEMBER 1, 1939–DECEMBER 31, 1942. Edited by Louise W. Holborn. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1943, 730 p. $2.50.

A collection of materials — declarations, statements, speeches, etc.

WORLD PEACE PLANS. Compiled by Julia E. Johnsen. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1943, 281 p. $1.25.

Selected materials illustrating various proposals and points of view.

S. O. LEVINSON AND THE PACT OF PARIS. By John E. Stoner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943, 368 p. $4.00.

Mr. Levinson was a leader in the movement to outlaw war. This study is an examination of his part in this movement and of his methods in forwarding it.

GESCHICHTE DER KONFERENZ FÜR DIE HERABSETZUNG UND DIE BEGRENZUNG DER RÜSTUNGEN, 1932–1934. By Carl Loosli-Usteri. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1940, 867 p.

A circumstantial and documented account of the origins, unhappy course and final collapse of the Disarmament Conference.

THE DAY OF RECKONING. By Max Radin. New York: Knopf, 1943, 144 p. $1.75.

A professor of law at the University of California "reports" an imaginary trial of the Nazi leaders held in 1945 after an Allied victory.

THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920–1942. By Manley O. Hudson. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 807 p. $7.00.

An expansion and extensive revision of the authoritative treatise on the organization and history of the Court, by one of its judges.

WORLD COURT REPORTS. Volume IV. Edited by Manley O. Hudson. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1943, 513 p. $2.50.

This volume in Hudson's authoritative collection covers the period 1936–1942.

STUDIES IN GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. By James Wilford Garner. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1943, 574 p. $7.50.

Some of the more important scholarly pieces by an eminent American political scientist, for many years a professor at the University of Illinois.

PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Arthur Nussbaum. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 288 p. $3.50.

A copiously annotated text and reference work.

MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY: MILITARY THOUGHT FROM MACHIAVELLI TO HITLER. Edited by Edward Mead Earle. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943, 553 p. $3.75.

This valuable addition to the literature of war contains chapters by a score of experts who trace the development of modern strategic ideas as exemplified by the writings and teachings of the leading military thinkers.

ARMORED WARFARE. By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. Harrisburg (Pa.): Military Service Publishing Co., 1943, 189 p. $1.00.

A reprint, with additional notes, of a prophetic work laying down the principles of the new mechanized warfare. As in the case of de Gaulle's famous book on the same subject, the work of General Fuller was appreciated and studied more by the Germans than by the author's own countrymen and government.

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THE USE OF AIR POWER. By Flight-Lieut. V. E. R. Blunt. Harrisburg (Pa.): Military Service Publishing Co., 1943, 162 p. $1.00.

This unorthodox approach to the problem of air power stresses its limitations.

VERTICAL WARFARE. By Francis Vivian Drake. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 142 p. $3.00.

An illustrated and somewhat over-enthusiastic explanation of aërial warfare — its apparatus, tactics and strategy — by an American naval flier.

NAVAL WARFARE. By Commander John Creswell. Brooklyn: Chemical Publishing Company, 1942, 302 p. $4.00.

The revised version of a treatise on the strategy, tactics and law of war at sea.

SURPRISE. By General Waldemar Erfurth. Harrisburg (Pa.): Military Service Publishing Co., 1943, 200 p. $1.00.

A treatise on the element of surprise in warfare, by a German General.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE AND COMBINED OPERATIONS. By Admiral of the Fleet The Lord Keyes. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 101 p. $1.50.

The Lees Knowles Lectures for 1943, by a noted British naval officer and former Director of the Commandos.

WARPLANES OF ALL NATIONS. By William Winter. New York: Crowell, 1943, 418 p. $3.00.

A factual handbook profusely illustrated with photographs and drawings.

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1938. Volume II. Edited by Monica Curtis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 365 p. $7.50.

These documents dealing with "Germany and Her Neighbours" are divided under the headings: German foreign policy, the annexation of Austria, and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. The work is issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK 1943. Edited by M. Epstein. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 1469 p. $7.50.

In spite of increasing wartime difficulties, this old reliable reference annual is up to its usual high standard.

General: Economic and Social

COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS. By William N. Loucks and J. Weldon Hoot. New York: Harper, 1943, 918 p. $4.00.

A revised edition of a standard text embodying new wartime material.

THOSE RAW MATERIALS. By C. A. Ward. New York: Norton (London: Allen and Unwin), 1943, 392 p. $4.75.

Technical information for the layman concerning the world's principal materials — what they are used for, where they occur, and how they are prepared for market.

MINERALS AND WORLD AFFAIRS. By T. S. Lovering. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943, 394 p. $5.35.

A handy manual of the economic geography and the political significance of the world's principal minerals.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE NATIONAL INCOME MULTIPLIER. By Fritz Machlup. Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1943, 237 p. $3.50.

Does foreign trade promote domestic prosperity? If so, by what process? Dr. Machlup supplies the answers in this deductive study of the effects of changes in exports and imports on national income. His skillful mathematical apparatus will not prove an obstacle to anyone competent in high school algebra.

FROM ECONOMIC THEORY TO POLICY. By E. Ronald Walker. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943, 275 p. $3.00.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Keen essays, by an Australian economist, on the problems involved in the use of economic theories in making government policies.

REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY OF ANGLO-AMERICA. By C. Langdon White and Edwin J. Foscue. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943, 898 p. $4.75.

The economic geography of the United States, Canada, Newfoundland and Alaska — divided for specific treatment into some twenty regions.

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN TIME OF WAR. By G. Filipetti. Minneapolis: Author, 1943, 163 p. $2.90.

A factual survey of the effect of wartime conditions on such things as materials, labor, finance, management and the like.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON CONSERVATION OF MARINE RESOURCES, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE NORTH PACIFIC. By Jozo Tomasevich. Stanford University: Food Research Institute, 1943, 297 p. $3.00.

This documented study is the first volume in a new series sponsored by the Food Research Institute and entitled "Commodity Policy Studies."

THE WORLD COFFEE ECONOMY: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CONTROL SCHEMES. By V. D. Wickizer. Stanford University: Food Research Institute, 1943, 258 p. $3.00.

A thorough study of conditions of production and marketing of a world staple, throwing much light on recent Inter-American relations and on the problem of postwar commodity control.

FOOD AND FARMING IN POST-WAR EUROPE. By P. Lamartine Yates and D. Warriner. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 118 p. $1.25.

What Europe's postwar problems will be, with practical suggestions for meeting them.

LIBERTY, EMPLOYMENT AND NO MORE WARS. By Theodore K. Quinn. New York: Hastings House, 1943, 241 p. $2.50.

An advertising executive presents his suggestions for avoiding a postwar depression.

WHOSE FUTURE ANYWAY? By Dennis Sandelson. London: Quality Press, 1942, 123 p. 2/6.

A superficial criticism of current political and economic abuses together with a proposal for a quasi-collective society.

TRADITIONALISME ET SYNDICALISME. By Paul Vignaux. New York: Maison Française, 1943, 193 p. $1.50.

"An essay in social history (1884–1941)" in Maritain's "Collection 'Civilisation.'"

WERE THE MINORITIES TREATIES A FAILURE? By Jacob Robinson and Others. New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1943, 349 p. $2.00.

The authors analyze the shortcomings of the arrangements made after the First World War. They do not believe, however, that the treaties were a failure, and explain why.

LE DROIT RACISTE A L'ASSAUT DE LA CIVILISATION. By Ernest Hamburger and Others. New York: Maison Française, 1943, 137 p. $1.00.

Essays on various aspects of anti-Semitism by four German and French exiles.

LE CATHOLIQUE DEVANT LA GUERRE. Montreal: Radio-Canada, 1943, 142 p.

Thirteen talks delivered over "Radio-Canada" during 1943.

LA RÉVOLUTION D'HIER, D'AUJOURD'HUI ET DE DEMAIN. By Louis Marlio. New York: Brentano, 1943, 222 p. $1.75.

A French economist seeks a middle way between the extremes of laissez-faire and totalitarianism in the society of tomorrow.

A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR AND PEACE. By Mark A. May. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943, 284 p. $2.75.

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The Director of the Institute of Human Relations at Yale gives advice on how to lay a good psychological basis — particularly through education — for a peaceful world.

The Second World War

ATTACK CAN WIN IN '43. By Max Werner. Boston: Little, Brown, 1943, 216 p. $1.75.

A shrewd military observer, writing early in 1943, held that the Nazis could be forced to surrender in that year by vigorous and coördinated Allied action.

THE INVASION OF GERMANY. By Curt Riess. New York: Putnam, 1943, 206 p. $2.50.

How and where invasion should be undertaken set forth in considerable detail. The author takes account of economic and psychological factors, and makes it plain that a military occupation of Germany is indispensable for political reasons.

PREVIEW OF HISTORY. By Raymond Gram Swing. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 282 p. $2.00.

Selections from Mr. Swing's broadcasts, together with several longer occasional pieces, all illustrating his power of incisive comment and keen interpretation.

BUT SOLDIERS WONDERED WHY. By Frank Gervasi. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 267 p. $2.75.

The reactions of an enterprising American journalist to events witnessed and personages encountered in South America and Africa during recent months.

NARVIK. By M. J. Torris. New York: Brentano, 1943, 316 p. $1.50.

The author served in the *Chasseurs Alpins*, originally destined for Finland, which participated in the Narvik campaign. This is his account of that adventure.

ESCAPE FROM THE BALKANS. By Michael Padev. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943, 311 p. $2.75.

This is the highly personal story of the arrest, detention and escape of a Bulgarian journalist who got into trouble with the Gestapo-controlled police of Sofia because of his democratic, pro-Ally proclivities.

GREECE AGAINST THE AXIS. By Lieut. Col. Stanley Casson. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943, 150 p. $2.50.

A member of the British military mission attached to the Greek Army traces the story of the campaign in Greece in the winter of 1940–41.

AIRBORNE INVASION. By John Hetherington. New York: Duell, 1943, 178 p. $2.50.

A factual account of the Nazi conquest of Crete, by an Australian journalist.

THE GREEK MIRACLE. By Steven Lavra. New York: Hastings House, 1943, 144 p. $1.50.

The author's vivid description of the "winter war" in Albania and of the Nazi invasion covers both military and diplomatic affairs.

REMEMBER GREECE. By Dilys Powell. New York: Hastings House, 1943, 211 p. $2.00.

The author is the widow of the one-time Director of the British School of Archaeology at Athens and was for many years a resident in Greece. In this delightful little book she recounts the part played by the Greeks in this war and then describes the people, their country and their history.

THE SERBS CHOOSE WAR. By Ruth Mitchell. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 265 p. $2.75.

Like her famous brother, General "Billy" Mitchell, the author is not one to do things by halves. This account of her adventures in Axis-invaded Jugoslavia is highly colored by her liking for the Serbs.

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MARTYRDOM OF THE SERBS. Prepared and issued by the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada. Libertyville (Ill.): 1943, 301 p. $1.50.

A collection of documents, reports and photographs presented as evidence of the horrors endured by the Serbian Church and people under Axis occupation.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA FIGHTS BACK. By Cecily Mackworth. London: Drummond, 1943, 117 p. 6/.

Both this and the following item belong to the "Europe under the Nazis" series. Miss Mackworth retells the story of German rule in Slovakia as well as in Bohemia.

YUGOSLAVIA IN ARMS. By Milivoj J. Sudjić. London: Drummond, 1943, 128 p. 6/.

How the Axis has behaved in Jugoslavia and how the Jugoslavs have struck back.

AFRICA, THE NEAR EAST, AND THE WAR. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943, 212 p. $1.50.

Six lectures, two concerning the Near East and four dealing with Africa, by professors in the University of California.

IT'S A LONG WAY TO ADDIS. By Carel Birkby. London: Muller, 1942, 308 p. 12/6.

An authentic and well-written description of the part played in the liberation of Ethiopia by the South African forces, by a correspondent who accompanied them.

MEDITERRANEAN ASSIGNMENT. By Richard McMillan. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 332 p. $3.50.

A sober but not uncritical account of the war in North Africa and Greece as seen by a British correspondent who covered that theater of operations from 1940 to 1942.

BACK DOOR TO BERLIN. By Wes Gallagher. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 242 p. $2.75.

This is an account of the planning and execution of the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa, by an Associated Press correspondent who was on the spot. It is less personal and more comprehensive than the usual run of war books.

ONE CONTINENT REDEEMED. By Guy Ramsey. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 280 p. $2.50.

The story of the early days of the North African invasion, told by a British journalist who covered it.

THE BATTLE IS THE PAY-OFF. By Ralph Ingersoll. New York: Harcourt, 1943, 217 p. $2.00.

The former editor of *PM* gives a graphic account of an action by American troops in southern Tunisia in which he was a participant.

"WILD CATS" OVER CASABLANCA. By Lieutenant M. T. Wordell and Lieutenant E. N. Seiler. Boston: Little, Brown, 1943, 309 p. $2.50.

In telling their own stories of the American carrier-based air attack on Casablanca, these Navy fliers throw light on the intensity of French resistance in Morocco.

THEY SHALL NOT HAVE ME. By Jean Hélion. New York: Dutton, 1943, 436 p. $3.00.

Another French military prisoner manages to get out of Germany to record the somewhat over-long story of his captivity and escape.

DYNAMITE CARGO. By Fred Herman. New York: Vanguard, 1943, 158 p. $2.00.

A vivid story of a Russia-bound convoy that was attacked by the Nazis off Norway, by a seaman on one of the American vessels.

I SEEK MY PREY IN THE WATERS. By Squadron-Leader Tom Dudley-Gordon. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 297 p. $3.00.

Three officers in the R. A. F. — writing under a collective pseudonym — describe the varied work of the Coastal Command.

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HIGHWAY TO TOKYO. By Joseph Rosenfarb. Boston: Little, Brown, 1943, 117 p. $1.25.

This blueprint for victory in the Pacific calls for the destruction of the Japanese fleet and the recapture of the Philippines. The author leaves the reader to supply his own plan for administering the *coup de grâce* to Nippon.

JAPAN FIGHTS FOR ASIA. By John Goette. New York: Harcourt, 1943, 248 p. $2.50.

An American journalist formerly attached to the Japanese Army in North China rates Japan's powers of resistance high and urges his countrymen not to underestimate the difficulties on the road to victory in the Pacific.

THEY CALL IT PACIFIC. By Clark Lee. New York: Viking, 1943, 374 p. $3.00.

The author of this good book is an American journalist with prewar experience in both Japan and China. He was in the Philippines on December 7, 1941, and he reports the campaign there and also operations in other parts of the Pacific which he observed.

BLOOD FOR THE EMPEROR. By Walter Clausen. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 341 p. $3.00.

Journalistic snapshots of the "human side of the war in the Pacific."

BEFORE BATAAN AND AFTER. By Frederic S. Marquardt. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943, 315 p. $2.50.

The author was associate editor of the *Philippines Free Press* at the time of the Japanese invasion. In this book he reviews the history of the islands under American rule. Particularly interesting are his description and appraisal of the outstanding figures in Philippine political life.

THE FIGHT FOR NEW GUINEA. By Pat Robinson. New York: Random House, 1943, 183 p. $2.00.

A journalist's first-hand report on MacArthur's first offensive against the Japanese.

TORPEDO 8. By Ira Wolfert. Boston: Houghton, 1943, 127 p. $2.00.

The very human story of an American bomber squadron in the South Pacific, by a Pulitzer Prize-winning war correspondent.

THIRTY SECONDS OVER TOKYO. By Captain Ted W. Lawson. New York: Random House, 1943, 221 p. $2.00.

The thrilling story of the first American raid on Tokyo, by one of those who survived.

UNDERGROUND FROM HONGKONG. By Benjamin A. Proulx. New York: Dutton, 1943, 214 p. $2.50.

A Canadian businessman in Hong Kong participates in the poorly organized defense of that colony, is captured by the Japs, and finally makes his escape to Free China.

THROUGH JAPANESE BARBED WIRE. By Gwen Priestwood. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 197 p. $2.00.

A personal account of the author's life in a prison camp in Japanese-occupied Hong Kong and of her escape to Chungking.

BURMA SURGEON. By Gordon S. Seagrave. New York: Norton, 1943, 295 p. $3.00.

Before the war, Dr. Seagrave had for some time been a medical pioneer in the wilds of northern Burma. When the war came his professional services were invaluable on the Burma Road and later during Stilwell's campaign and famous retreat. This is the account of his adventures.

GOD IS MY CO-PILOT. By Colonel Robert L. Scott, Jr. New York: Scribner, 1943, 277 p. $2.50.

The adventures — some of them pretty close shaves! — of an American Army Air Force officer en route to, and in, the Asiatic theater of war.

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The United States

THE CENTURY OF THE COMMON MAN. By Henry A. Wallace. New York: Reynal, 1943, 96 p. $1.50.

Fifteen speeches illustrating the Vice-President's views on American foreign policy.

AN AMERICAN DIARY. By Samuel Grafton. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 246 p. $2.50.

The pungent columns of the author have been appearing in the *New York Post* and other American newspapers for several years. This volume consists of excerpts from those published since July 1939, selected and arranged to form a caustic commentary, particularly on American foreign policy. Mr. Grafton is a spirited crusader for the democratic way of life.

A PROFESSOR AT LARGE. By Stephen Duggan. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 468 p. $3.50.

Reminiscences, impressions and interpretations of events experienced by the Director of the Institute of International Education during an active and useful career.

THE THIRD TERM TRADITION. By Charles W. Stein. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, 382 p. $3.75.

A scholarly history of its rise and fall.

THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN THOUGHT. By Merle Curti. New York: Harper, 1943, 848 p. $5.00.

The history of the intellectual development of the American people.

THE STRUGGLE FOR A PROLETARIAN PARTY. By James P. Cannon. New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1943, 302 p. $1.50.

This volume completes the story begun in Trotsky's "In Defense of Marxism" concerning the recent split in the Socialist Workers Party in the United States.

'NEW WORLD A-COMING': INSIDE BLACK AMERICA. By Roi Ottley. Boston: Houghton, 1943, 364 p. $3.00.

A critical review of the present status of the American Negroes, by one of them.

OUR JEWISH FARMERS AND THE STORY OF THE JEWISH AGRICULTURAL SOCIETY. By Gabriel Davidson. New York: L. B. Fischer, 1943, 280 p. 50 cents.

An account of the growth of a Jewish farming class in the United States and of the organization largely responsible for it.

THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN ECONOMICS. By J. F. Normano. New York: Day, 1943, 252 p. $3.50.

This history of economic ideas in the United States before the Great Depression is the first volume in a series of "Studies in the History of Economic Thought." There is a supplement on Canada by Professor A. R. M. Lower.

THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICA AT WAR. By Seymour E. Harris. New York: Norton, 1943, 418 p. $3.75.

A revised and enlarged version of "The Economics of American Defense," by the same author. The doctrines of Keynes are accorded a prominent place.

FOOD ENOUGH. By John D. Black. Lancaster (Pa.): Cattell Press, 1943, 269 p. $2.50.

A sound, factual survey of the American food problem at the threshold of our third year at war, by a professor of economics at Harvard.

A GUIDE TO AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE. By John H. Wigmore. Albany: Bender, 1943, 493 p. $6.50.

An invaluable, up-to-date reference work, by a onetime Dean of the Northwestern University Law School.

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LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP: DENATURALIZATION: THE ALIEN IN WAR TIME. By John L. Cable. Washington: National Law Book Co., 1943, 149 p. $4.00.
A digest of American law and practice.

THE HOME FRONT. By David Hinshaw. New York: Putnam, 1943, 352 p. $3.00.
An anti-New Deal observer reports on the state of the nation in wartime.

AMATEURS AT WAR. Edited by Ben Ames Williams. Boston: Houghton, 1943, 498 p. $3.00.
An anthology illustrating American battle tactics since the Revolutionary War.

HOW THE ARMY FIGHTS. By Lowell M. Limpus. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 388 p. $3.00.
A journalist's wide-ranging survey of the tools, tactics and strategy of contemporary land and air warfare used by the United States Army.

THE UNITED STATES NAVY. By Carrol Storrs Alden and Allan Westcott. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1943, 452 p. $5.50.
The authors have sought to relate the development and exploits of our Navy to our political and diplomatic history.

SCHOOL OF THE CITIZEN SAILOR. By Louis H. Bolander and Others. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 615 p. $2.40.
Except for the chapters exclusively pertaining to Navy matters, most of this book appeared originally in "School of the Citizen Soldier."

WE FIGHT WITH MERCHANT SHIPS. By M. B. Palmer. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943, 307 p. $2.75.
Snapshots of America's merchant marine under construction and on the high seas.

Western Europe

THIS IS NOT THE END OF FRANCE. By Gustav Winter. New York: Norton (London: Allen and Unwin, 1942), 1943, 299 p. $4.00.
This interpretation of the fall of France is more convincing when the author leaves strategy and politics to discuss social and psychological factors.

UN PEUPLE RESSUSCITE. By Fernand-Laurent. New York: Brentano, 1943, 278 p. $1.75.
After two years in occupied France, the author, a former Deputy from Paris, escaped to America. In this book he describes how French people are gradually recovering from the numbing effects of defeat and renewing their sense of national solidarity.

PÉTAIN: VERDUN TO VICHY. By Francis Martel. New York: Dutton, 1943, 226 p. $2.50.
On the basis of the evidence presented here, Pétain is not only a Fascist-minded defeatist but an outright traitor.

LA VIE FRANÇAISE. By A. D. Sertillanges. Montreal: Variétés, 1943, 262 p. $1.25.
Homilies on the sins of the French people and the reforms they must effect to put their country back in good order. The author is a priest and Member of the *Institut.*

UN SEUL ENNEMI: L'ENVAHISSEUR. By Paul Simon. London: Hachette, 1942, 196 p. 5/.
The graphic story of how the author operated a clandestine newspaper in Nazi-occupied territory.

ÉCONOMIE ET FINANCES DE LA FRANCE: PASSÉ ET AVENIR. By Robert Wolff. New York: Brentano, 1943, 320 p. $2.25.
A comprehensive survey of such problems as population, production, social legislation, public finance, and the relations of government to business.

DUEL FOR THE NORTHLAND. By Kurt Singer. New York: McBride, 1943, 212 p. $2.75.

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This book purports to lift the veil of secrecy on the activities of secret agents in Scandinavia, the Baltic States, Iceland and Greenland.

STALWART SWEDEN. By Joachim Joesten. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 215 p. $2.50.

A description and a not always balanced interpretation of Sweden's policy of neutrality, by a journalist well acquainted with Scandinavian affairs.

MEIN KAMPF. By Adolf Hitler. Boston: Houghton, 1943, 694 p. $2.50.

The Führer's turgid rhetoric and bombastic verbosity defy translation, even into German. However, in this version of his *chef d'oeuvre* the translator, Ralph Manheim, has sought to preserve the sense (or otherwise) of the original. The United States Supreme Court has recognized Houghton Mifflin's sole right to the American copyright of "Mein Kampf."

THIS MAN RIBBENTROP: HIS LIFE AND TIMES. By Paul Schwarz. New York: Messner, 1943, 303 p. $3.00.

The amazing, and sometimes amusing, career of the ex-wine merchant, told by the last Consul General of the Weimar Republic in New York.

THE OTHER GERMANY. By Heinrich Fraenkel. London: Drummond, 1942, 144 p. 6/.

An attempt to demonstrate that among the German people there is a great anti-Nazi mass on whose support the democratic Powers can eventually count.

THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM AS AN IDEOLOGY: WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GERMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT. By John H. Hallowell. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943, 145 p. $1.50.

A scholarly monograph.

THE LUFTWAFFE: ITS RISE AND FALL. By Hauptmann Hermann. New York: Putnam, 1943, 300 p. $3.00.

Writing under a pseudonym, a former German flier and associate of Junkers traces the history of German aviation since the last war. He stresses the importance of the progress made by pre-Nazi Germany and explains the shortcomings of the Luftwaffe.

HITLER'S TEN-YEAR WAR ON THE JEWS. New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1943, 311 p. $1.50.

A balance sheet of the destruction wrought by the Nazis on the Jews of Europe and their property during the last ten years.

THE FRUITS OF FASCISM. By Herbert L. Matthews. New York: Harcourt, 1943, 341 p. $3.00.

The author served for a number of years as Rome correspondent of the *The New York Times*. His original admiration for Fascism disappeared during the period when he covered the Spanish Civil War from the Loyalist side. He nevertheless strives in this historical review of the Fascist régime to be utterly objective in his appraisals. Some readers may feel that he has carried impartiality beyond the point where it is a virtue.

WHAT TO DO WITH ITALY. By Gaetano Salvemini and George LaPiana. New York: Duell, 1943, 301 p. $2.75.

In this forthright volume, written before the fall of Mussolini, two Italian-born, anti-Fascist professors of history at Harvard mince no words in diagnosing the ills of Italy and prescribing remedies. They remind the Western Powers of their long record of appeasing Fascism, and they are very critical of Vatican policy, which they assert is not motivated by sympathy for democratic principles. The book would have profited by adopting a more judicial tone.

RICOSTRUZIONE DELL'ECONOMIA NEL DOPOGUERRA. By Gino Borgatta and Others. Padua: CEDAM, 1942, 258 p.

This volume by five outstanding Italian economists contains a series of strictures on the closed economy of the Fascist state and on the Nazi plan for a German-dominated

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economic system in Europe. They believe that Italy can begin her own recovery only by restoring her traditional ties with the West. It is interesting to note that this book appeared in Italy in February 1942, over a year before the fall of Mussolini.

THE SPANISH LABYRINTH. By Gerald Brenan. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 384 p. $3.50.

This is a highly informative book. The author, long a resident of Spain, gives a penetrating analysis of the conflicting loyalties at work among the Spanish people.

Eastern Europe

RUSSIA AND HER WESTERN NEIGHBOURS. By George W. Keeton and Rudolph Schlesinger. London: Cape, 1942, 160 p. 8/6.

The authors examine the question of the Soviet Union's relations — past, present and future — with Finland, the Baltic States and Poland. Their review of the issues involved is on the whole impartial and well-informed. They find that the Soviet's arguments in favor of extending its frontiers westward contain logic and justice.

MEMORIES OF LENIN (1893–1917). By Nadezhda K. Krupskaya. London: Lawrence, 1942, 304 p. 3/6.

This reprint of the biographical sketch of Lenin by his widow contains many valuable first-hand impressions.

U. S. S. R. ECONOMY AND THE WAR. Edited by Robert J. Kerner. New York: Russian Economic Institute, 1943, 110 p. $1.50.

Addresses delivered at the first public conference of the Institute in New York City on October 2, 1942.

ROUND TRIP TO RUSSIA. By Walter Graebner. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1943, 216 p. $3.00.

One of the better books on Russia at war, by a representative of the *Time-Life-Fortune* combination.

POLAND STILL UNKNOWN. By Vincent Swicz. Kilmarnock: Standard Printing Works, 1942, 148 p. 3/.

A popular survey of Polish history, economics and political problems.

POLAND'S FREEDOM OF THE SEA. By Henryk Bagiński. Kirkcaldy: Allen Lithographic Co., 1942, 166 p. 12/.

This revised version of a work first published in Polish in 1931 sets forth the political and military reasons why Poland must become a naval power.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN EUROPEAN HISTORY. By S. Harrison Thomson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943, 390 p. $3.75.

A survey of the political and cultural development of the Czechoslovak people in relation to general European history. The emphasis is on the period since the beginning of the First World War. The author, professor of history at the University of Colorado, is editor of the *Journal of Central European Affairs*.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE END OF THE BEGINNING. By Winston S. Churchill. Boston: Little, Brown, 1943, 322 p. $3.50.

The British Prime Minister's addresses for the crucial year 1942. They are part of the lasting printed monument to the man's remarkable historical insight and give fresh evidence of his supreme confidence in the face of adversity.

MORTAL STRIFE. By John Cowper Powys. London: Cape, 1942, 240 p. 10/6.

A well-known English novelist presents what he believes is a cross-section of the reactions to this war on the part of ordinary Britishers.

THE PILLARS OF SOCIETY. By Sir William H. Beveridge. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 248 p. $2.50.

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Essays in which the author of the Beveridge Report explains his objectives.

BRITISH LABOR AND THE BEVERIDGE PLAN. By Frederick Joseph Scheu. New York: Island Press, 1943, 128 p. $2.00.

The famous plan examined from the labor point of view.

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION. Volume I. By J. R. Bellerby. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 396 p. $5.00.

Theoretical considerations and practical suggestions concerning specific problems and areas in Britain.

STUDIES IN NATIONAL INCOME, 1924–1938. Edited by Arthur Lyon Bowley. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 255 p. $3.50.

This technical statistical treatise is the first volume in a new series of "Economic and Social Studies" prepared for the National Institute of Economic and Social Research of Great Britain.

EMPIRE IN THE CHANGING WORLD. By W. K. Hancock. New York: Penguin, 1943, 186 p. 25 cents.

A concise little survey of the recent history and current problems of the British Empire, by a leading authority.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE: ITS STRUCTURE AND SPIRIT. By Eric A. Walker. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 250 p. $3.50.

A closely knit, thoroughly reliable review and interpretation of the Empire's growth up to the end of 1941. The author is Harmsworth Professor of Imperial and Naval History at Cambridge University, and his book is published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

STUDIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF DOMINION STATUS. By Gwen Neuendorff. New York: Norton (London: Allen and Unwin), 1942, 379 p. $5.00.

This scholarly monograph is devoted to a study of the Governor-Generalship of Canada and the development of Canadian nationalism.

LE CANADA ET LES NATIONS UNIES. By Emile Vaillancourt. Montreal: Beauchemin, 1942, 143 p.

Articles and radio talks concerning Canada's place in the world today.

WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION: SOME CANADIAN ISSUES. By A. R. M. Lower and J. F. Parkinson. Toronto: Ryerson, 1942, 106 p. 25 cents.

Addresses by several Canadian and American experts made at the Canadian Institute of Public Affairs in August 1942.

SUBJECT INDIA. By Henry Noel Brailsford. New York: Day, 1943, 274 p. $2.50.

Mr. Brailsford enjoys a reputation as one of Britain's foremost liberal writers. In this uncompromising book he comes out for complete independence without any shilly-shally, and asserts that the attainment of this end is in part an American responsibility.

INDIA: THE ROAD TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 1908–1940. By John Coatman. New York: Norton (London: Allen and Unwin), 1943, 152 p. $1.75.

An excellent little book summarizing the steps toward self-government taken in India since the First World War. The author indicates that India will achieve independence whenever her people show themselves able to carry that responsibility.

INDIA'S PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED. By DeWitt Mackenzie. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 265 p. $3.00.

An Associated Press correspondent is — as his title indicates — hopeful of a compromise solution for the present impasse. In this book he outlines the complicated problems that bedevil Indian politics and suggests a way out.

REPORT ON INDIA. By T. A. Raman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 231 p. $2.50.

Mr. Raman is more objective about the problems of his country than most Indian publicists. His sections on the economics of India are especially useful.

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The Near East

THE MIDDLE EAST: CROSSROADS OF HISTORY. By Eliahu Ben-Horin. New York: Norton, 1943, 248 p. $3.00.

A none-too-careful review of the history of Egypt, the Arab countries, Iran and Afghanistan. The anti-Arab tone of the book detracts from its usefulness.

MEET THE ARAB. By John Van Ess. New York: Day, 1943, 229 p. $3.00.

The author has lived and taught among the Arabs for forty years. This distillation of his accumulated wisdom forms one of the most pleasantly informative books about that remarkable people.

THE JEWISH STATE. By Theodor Herzl. New York: Scopus, 1943, 111 p. $1.00.

A translation and revised version of the program laid down by the Zionist leader.

Africa

THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF AFRICA. By A. Williams Postel. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press and University Museum, 1943, 105 p. $1.50.

This valuable compendium of up-to-date information and statistical data is the second in the University's series of African Handbooks.

BENVENUTO CELLINI HAD NO PREJUDICE AGAINST BRONZE. Edited by Anna Melissa Graves. Westminster (Md.): Author, 1943, 176 p. $2.00.

Letters written by West Africans, illustrative of their problems and points of view. This is a companion piece to the author's similar collections of letters from the Near and Far East: "But the Twain Do Meet" and "The Far East is Not Very Far."

JAN SMUTS: A BIOGRAPHY. By F. S. Crafford. Garden City: Doubleday, 1943, 322 p. $3.50.

A popular biography of the South African statesman.

The Far East

AMERICAN EMPIRE IN ASIA? By Albert Viton. New York: Day, 1943, 308 p. $3.00.

Mr. Viton sounds the death-knell of imperialism in Asia and sets forth the basis for a new order in which Asiatic peoples may eventually determine their own future.

ASIA UNBOUND. By Sydney Greenbie. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 393 p. $3.00.

An American writer and lecturer, well acquainted with the Orient, discusses a variety of Far Eastern problems. His section exposing the subtlety of Japanese propaganda methods is particularly interesting.

FREE CHINA'S NEW DEAL. By Hubert Freyn. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 277 p. $2.50.

This is an important book by one who knows China well from long study and residence there. It is a fact-and-figure-laden survey of the economic and financial metamorphosis which the hitherto backward interior of the country has undergone since becoming the center of resistance to Japanese invasion.

MY LIFE IN CHINA 1926–1941. By Hallett Abend. New York: Harcourt, 1943, 396 p. $3.00.

The interesting reminiscences of a veteran *New York Times* correspondent.

BATTLE HYMN OF CHINA. By Agnes Smedley. New York: Knopf, 1943, 528 p. $3.50.

An American Leftist writer, well acquainted with the Communist forces in China, describes conditions in that country in the light of her own ideological predilections.

MY WAR WITH JAPAN. By Carroll Alcott. New York: Holt, 1943, 368 p. $3.00.

From 1938 to 1941 Mr. Alcott infuriated the Japanese with his biting radio broad-

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casts from the International Settlement in Shanghai. This rather uneven book tells of his experiences and gives some *obiter dicta* on Chinese affairs.

CHINA. By Kwok Ying Fung. New York: Holt, 1943, 192 p. $5.00.

Photographs illustrating the picturesque rather than the typical. There are short passages of textual description here and there.

BLOOD ON THE RISING SUN. By Douglas Gilbert Haring. Philadelphia: Macrae-Smith, 1943, 239 p. $2.50.

An attempt to explain how the guiding behavior patterns and national myths of the Japanese people have led them into the paths of militarism and imperialism.

IN PEACE JAPAN BREEDS WAR. By Gustav Eckstein. New York: Harper, 1943, 326 p. $2.50.

Glimpses into the life and mentality of the Japanese people.

EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By J. S. Furnivall. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943, 186 p. $2.00.

This socio-historical survey forms part of the Institute's valuable "Inquiry Series." As a supplement there is a chapter on "Training for Native Self-Rule," by Bruno Lasker of the Institute's research staff.

Latin America

THE WIND THAT SWEPT MEXICO. By Anita Brenner. New York: Harper, 1943, 302 p. $3.75.

An exciting review of Mexican history since the Revolution of 1910, illustrated by nearly two hundred photographs so captioned as to make a running commentary.

THE OTHER AMERICANS. By Edward Tomlinson. New York: Scribner, 1943, 456 p. $3.00.

A chatty, illustrated travelogue through each of our twenty sister republics. The author follows the precept to see no evil.

FALANGE: THE AXIS SECRET ARMY IN THE AMERICAS. By Allan Chase. New York: Putnam, 1943, 278 p. $3.00.

An American journalist presents the documentary fruits of several years of investigation into the pro-Axis activities of the Spanish Falange organization in Latin America and the Philippine Islands. Pro-Franco appeasers will have a hard time explaining away Mr. Chase's revelations.

OUR GOOD NEIGHBOR HURDLE. By John W. White. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1943, 209 p. $2.50.

Mr. White is an American journalist with many years of experience in Latin America. In this book he dwells on the politically undesirable effects of the activities of North American Protestant missionaries in Middle and South America.

HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES: 1941. Edited by Miron Burgin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942, 648 p. $4.00.

The seventh annual issue of an indispensable bibliographical series.

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS: 1942. Edited by Arthur P. Whitaker. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, 252 p. $3.00.

This second volume in an annual survey contains chapters on important political, economic and social developments by a number of authorities. In the appendix there are statistical tables and a chronology.

A SELECTIVE GUIDE TO THE ENGLISH LITERATURE ON THE NETHERLANDS WEST INDIES. By Philip Hanson Hiss. New York: Netherlands Information Bureau, 1943, 129 p. 75 cents.

A useful compilation with full bibliographical data but without critical commentary.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Coöperation:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 734 Jackson Pl., Washington 6, D.C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

Aeronautics

Civil aeronautics act of 1938. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 1012. March 11–19, 1943. Washington, 1943. 145 p. 20¢.

Agriculture

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Commercial policies and trade relations of European possessions in the Caribbean area. Washington, 1943. 324 p. (U. S. Tariff Commission. Report No. 151. Second Series.) 40¢.

Extension of reciprocal trade agreements act. Hearings before the Committee on Finance, Senate, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. J. Res. 111, revised, May 17, 18, 19 and 22, 1943. Washington, 1943. 148 p. 15¢.

Communications

The Communications act of 1934 with amendments and index thereto; published by the Federal Communications Commission, revised to March 6, 1943. Washington, 1943. 83 p. 15¢.

Extraterritoriality

Relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China and the regulation of related matters; treaty and an accompanying exchange of notes between the United States of America and China . . . proclaimed by the President of the United States May 24, 1943. Washington, 1943. 35 p. (Treaty Series 984) 5¢.

Treaty between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and India and His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China for the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights in China and the regulation of related matters (with exchange of notes and agreed minute), Chungking, January 11, 1943 (ratifications exchanged at Chungking, May 20, 1943). London, 1943. 32 p. (Treaty Series No. 2 (1943). Cmd. 6456.) 1s. 3d.

First World War

Europe's overseas needs, 1919–1920, and how they were met. Geneva, Economic, Financial and Transit Department, League of Nations, 1943. 52 p. (1943. II. A. 6.)

Immigration

Repeal of the Chinese exclusion acts. Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 1882 and H. R. 2309. May 19–June 3, 1943. Washington, 1943. 283 p.

Inter-American Highway

Alaska highway; agreement between the United States of America and Canada, effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington July 19, 1943. Washington, 1943. 2 p. (Executive Agreement Series 331.) 5¢.

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Memoria del Departamento de Hacienda, correspondiente al año 1942. Tomo 1. Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1943. 252 p.

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POSTWAR PLANNING

FOREIGN trade after the war, by August Maffry and H. B. Lary. Washington, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 1943. 22 p. (Economic Series, No. 28.)

PUERTO RICO

ECONOMIC and social conditions in Puerto Rico. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, Senate, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 309. December 7, 8, 9 and 17, 1942. Washington, 1943. 178 p. 20¢.

INVESTIGATION of political, economic, and social conditions in Puerto Rico. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Insular Affairs, House, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to H. Res. 159. April 23–June 10, 1943. Washington, 1943. 7 pts.

SECOND WORLD WAR

THE DISPLACEMENT of population in Europe, by E. M. Kulischer. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1943. 170 p. (Studies and Reports. Series O, No. 8.) $1.00.

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1. The Inter-Allied declaration signed at St. James's palace, London on 13th January, 1942, and relative documents. 5¢. 2. Collective notes presented to the governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the U. S. A., and relative correspondence. 10¢.

SECOND WORLD WAR — INTER-ALLIED COÖPERATION

PRINCIPLES applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression; preliminary agreement between the United States of America and Ethiopia, signed at Washington August 9, 1943, effective August 9, 1943, and exchange of notes. Washington, 1943. 6 p. (Executive Agreement Series 334.) 5¢.

———. Liberia, signed at New York, June 8, 1943, effective June 8, 1943, and exchange of notes. Washington, 1943. 5 p. (Executive Agreement Series 324.) 5¢.

DEFENSE aid (lend-lease) supplemental appropriation bill, 1943. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., (on H. R. 2753). May 4–6, 1943. Washington, 1943. 193 p. 25¢.

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REPORT to the 78th Congress on lend-lease operations. Letter from the lend-lease administrator transmitting a report on the operations under the lend-lease act, from the passage of the act, March 11, 1941, to December 31, 1942. Washington, 1943. 91 p. (House Doc. No. 57. 78th Cong. 1st Sess.) 15¢.

REPORT to Congress on lend-lease operations. Message from the President of the United States . . . for the period ended April 30, 1943. Washington, 1943. 43 p. 10¢.

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APPORTIONING of supplies of African asbestos; agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland approving memorandum of understanding signed January 6, 1943, effected by exchange of notes signed at London April 30, 1943. Washington, 1943. 7 p. (Executive Agreement Series 332.) 5¢.

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MILITARY laws of the United States, edition of 1939, containing legislation of the 76th and 77th Congresses. Supplement II. Washington, 1943. 766 p. $1.50.

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8. The future economic policy of the United States, by W. D. Brown, Jr. 101 p. 50¢.

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9. A selective guide to the English literature on the Netherlands West Indies, with a supplement on British Guiana, by P. H. Hiss. 129 p.

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GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS AND VALUES, by Beardsley Ruml. New York, Harper, 1943. 52 p. (The Baxter Memorial Lectures delivered at the University of Omaha, March 25–26, 1943.) $1.00.

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41. The changing Far East, by William C. Johnstone. 96 p.

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